FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND MIXED MIGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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WORLD BANK GROUP

UNHCR
Eastern Africa
HOA Displacement Study:
Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUBP</td>
<td>Africa Union Borders Program</td>
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<td>CIDP</td>
<td>County integrated development plan</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<td>GISR</td>
<td>Global Initiative for Somali Refugees</td>
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<td>GOE</td>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>GOK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>GOU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<td>GPFD</td>
<td>Global Program on Forced Displacement</td>
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<td>HOA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on Great Lakes Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDDRSI</td>
<td>IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority for Development</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRAPP</td>
<td>IGAD Regional HIV/AIDS Partnership Program</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IsDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDMDF</td>
<td>Multi Donor Displacement Migration Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Migrant Response Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>Regional consultative process</td>
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<td>ReHoPE</td>
<td>Refugee and Host Population Empowerment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPLRP</td>
<td>Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Solutions Alliance for Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPDP</td>
<td>Sudan Peacebuilding for Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>State and Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSI</td>
<td>Transitional Solutions Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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*Note: All dollars are U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated.*
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
i. **Background.** The Horn of Africa (HOA) covers Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. Despite its rich endowment in human, social, and natural capital, the region is plagued by a complex history of weak governance, insecurity, increasing environmental degradation, entrenched poverty, and a range of persistent development challenges. Conflict remains endemic in the region. The complex cultural, social, and political nature of these conflicts is compounded by demographic shifts due both to population growth and the movement of people, as well as imbalanced service provision, inaccessibility, the growing threat of pandemic diseases, increasing conflicts over scarce natural resources, and harsh climatic conditions including frequent droughts and floods.

ii. In a region with an estimated 242 million inhabitants, the HOA hosts over 8.7 million displaced persons, including over 6.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and about 2.2 million refugees. The majority of the displaced are children and women, with many female-headed households. Most of the displacement situations in the HOA have lasted for over 20 years. Refugee camps continue to see new arrivals in 2015. Displacement is a complex and pressing regional challenge and a significant obstacle to reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development with peace and security. It has been compounded by migration within and outside the region, which is driven by a number of natural and man-made reasons, as well as a young population that faces unemployment and alienation.

iii. There are four major protracted displacement situations in the HOA, each with its own characteristics but also with similarities: (1) Eritrea, with significant mixed migration; (2) Somalia, with conflict and violence in areas of origin and food insecurity and destruction of shelter due to floods and droughts; (3) South Sudan, as a result of conflict with Sudan, and internal conflict; and (4) Sudan, where displacement is driven by tensions between center and peripheral regions, and a highly inequitable division of power and wealth (see Annex 1).

iv. **Objectives.** The study was undertaken in the context of the World Bank’s regional approach to the Horn of Africa and to support UNHCR’s strategic shift in addressing needs of the displaced populations from “care and maintenance” to “social cohesion and self-reliance.” The study sought to analyze the forced displacement and development nexus, explore the mixed migration phenomenon, assess the impacts of refugees and migrants on hosting areas and communities, identify ongoing innovative interventions, and propose entry points and practical steps to address the development dimensions of forced displacement and mixed migration in the HOA, including regional operations, institutional reforms, and policy changes. In addition, the study process helped bring together a range of (a) humanitarian and development agencies; (b) local, regional, and national governments; (c) national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and (d) bilateral and multilateral organizations. Together, these groups identified a shared agenda to address the humanitarian and development needs of displaced and migrants, as well as for the hosting communities, whose service delivery and developmental deficits are further exacerbated as a result of these movements.

v. **Methodology.** The study draws from a rich body of literature (see select bibliography). During visits to the region, the study team obtained additional documentation and information from in-depth interviews and focal group meetings with displaced persons (refugees, returnees, IDPs), host communities, government agencies in the region, United Nations (UN) partners, bilateral donors, and NGOs. Field visits were undertaken to the Dollo Ado and Shire refugee camps in Ethiopia, the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, the Kiryandongo settlements in Northern Uganda,
the Kilo 26 refugee camp in Sudan, the Ali Addeh refugee camp in Djibouti, and urban centers in Kampala and Juba. The study also looked at the efficacy of programs currently being implemented by the public sector, NGOs, and international organizations to address protracted displacement, return, and reintegration in the region; key emergent lessons, and opportunities for policy, programming, partnerships, and risk sharing among key actors.

vi. **Limitations.** The analysis and findings in the report are at the individual country level for refugee and IDP policy and practice, displacement status, and impacts on the host communities. They are at the regional level for mixed migration. The solutions and recommendations also are at the regional level, with some country-specific references where appropriate. Deeper analysis is required before the development of country-specific solutions and recommendations.

vii. **Key findings.** Every country in the HOA has been affected by forced displacement and mixed migration. Ethiopia and Kenya are the first and second largest refugee hosting countries in Africa. There were 6.5 million internally displaced persons in the region at the end of 2014, with Sudan having the highest number. While endemic armed conflict remains a major cause of displacement, it is rarely an isolated cause of displacement. In reality, in most cases a complex set of circumstances drives displacement, including poor governance, environmental degradation and food insecurity, and lack of economic opportunities. The region stands out for the complexity and dynamism of its combination of mixed migration and asylum seekers, with countries simultaneously hosting and assisting internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, victims of trafficking, and labor migrants (EUI 2015).

viii. Most of the displacement situations in the HOA have lasted for over 20 years. The protracted nature of displacement has had both negative and positive effects on refugee and hosting communities alike. Major refugee camps are in relatively poor, underdeveloped, and economically marginalized borderlands and in relatively remote areas in host countries. Limitations—including competition for basic services, weak governance, the struggle over scarce natural resources, accelerated environmental degradation, and limited livelihood opportunities—have played a role in the region’s constrained human and social capital development, poor economic growth, and entrenched poverty. In Somalia, due to the protracted nature of refugee and internal displacement, refugee and IDP camps are morphing into urban areas. In South Sudan, the concentration of returnees in urban areas is resulting in overcrowding and greater pressure on already weak services and sanitation, thus increasing the health burden and risk of disease outbreak.

ix. The economic impact of the presence of the refugees has been both positive as well as negative. Overall, it is usually contended that the “costs” of refugees borne by their hosts—rising food and commodity prices, the depression of local wage rates, fiscal pressures, and increasing environmental degradation—outweigh other micro- and macroeconomic benefits. Positive impacts of refugee camps have been their contribution to an overall increase in wealth and living standards of host community households by serving as a market for animal products, home-produced agricultural products, increased availability of labor (especially for local agricultural production), and infrastructure investments. In addition, the associated influx of aid to scarcely populated border areas has had a positive impact on local economic development and the labor market, and helped strengthen civil society. A critical imperative in the development response is to build on the positive impacts of forced displacement while minimizing the negative impacts.
x. Displaced and migrant populations in general, but women in particular, confront a range of severe protection challenges emerging from a constellation of poverty, uncertainty, insecurity, conflict, and flight. Gender-based violence (GBV) is a pervasive challenge across the HOA, particularly in those countries affected by persistent conflict. The prevalence of GBV is often rooted in entrenched norms and practices that perpetuate uneven power dynamics between men and women. Conditions of conflict and insecurity—manifested in varying forms of physical, sexual, psychosocial, and economic abuse—often exacerbate the incidence of GBV.

xi. Forced displacement in the region is not only a humanitarian and security challenge, but also a development challenge. Emerging trends point toward transitional solutions aimed at: (a) enhancing social cohesion between displaced and host communities and increasing their self-reliance by building on their human, social, and financial skills and capital; (b) improving the quality of social and economic ties between displaced and host communities; (c) strengthening the resilience of host communities, while preparing the displaced for durable solutions; and (d) equipping refugees to secure livelihoods, resources, and assets so as to have a better chance of returning and also contributing to host economies.

xii. The response to displacement issues in the HOA is predicated on the range of international, regional, and domestic laws and regulations that govern the situation of refugees and IDPs. HOA countries also have displacement-specific laws and regulations governing the situation of refugees and IDPs. In addition to the displacement-specific international and domestic legal framework, several international human rights instruments are applicable to refugees and IDPs in the region. However, the laws and regulations of the Horn countries—which may or may not give refugees freedom of movement, the right to work, and the right to own property—define the options for durable solutions. The opportunity for refugees to return to their home country hinges on similar uncertainties; for example, in many cases restoration of housing, land, and property left behind by returning refugees—or compensation for lost property—is not guaranteed.

xiii. The emerging reality. The complex set of displacement drivers in the Horn—including violent conflict, climate change, and resource scarcity—and the pursuit of better economic or livelihood opportunities have to a significant extent triggered the mixed migration of people within countries and across borders. There is a continuum of displacement in the HOA that includes both involuntary refugees and voluntary economic migrants. There are growing instances of an intermingling of the two, with refugees and IDPs (especially young people) embarking on economic migration that further exacerbates their vulnerability. This reality has informed the broadening of the conceptual framework for this study from forced displacement to mixed migration. This interplay is best illustrated in the burgeoning “shantytowns” in Djiboutiville and Turkana, which are occupied by pastoralist communities that have suffered significant losses to their pastoral livelihoods due to climate change in Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya. As a consequence of the combined stress of displacement and mixed migration, accompanied by weak governance and entrenched corruption, the region is seeing an uptick in interconnected threats such as illegal trafficking in people and arms, terrorism, and related money flows.

xiv. Despite the threats and risks, the HOA is a region comprising some of the world’s more buoyant economies with a rich array of natural resources, including both renewable and nonrenewable sources of energy, pockets of groundwater reserves, an untapped agricultural capacity, and an emerging entrepreneurial and innovative business community. Alongside unclear demarcation and management of borders, limited sub regional transport connectivity, and nontariff barriers that
are significant structural impediments to formal cross-border trade, there exist cross-border social connections/ethnic networks that continue to facilitate the movement of people, goods, and money that could underpin regional economic growth and integration. Developing regional legal and regulatory frameworks that facilitate cross-border movements and intra-regional migration—plus a standardized skills training framework—could potentially benefit displaced populations and hosts as well as migrants. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Free Movement Protocols, which provide for the right of residence and employment, could be a useful model for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to consider as it develops a regional free movement legal framework for its member countries in the HOA.

xv. The regional nature of impacts and solutions for both displacement and mixed migration necessitates a strengthened framework for regional integration and cooperation. There are encouraging signs of political momentum for enhanced regional economic interdependence. HOA countries are increasingly becoming members of the East African Community (EAC), IGAD, and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). In addition, they are making greater efforts to solve both security and development issues through increased cooperation. Improved regional infrastructure connectivity can improve human development and business competitiveness, as well as strengthen trust and cross-border collaboration. The impending extraction of oil and gas in the region—with the addition of Kenya, Uganda, and possibly Somalia and Ethiopia to current producers Sudan and South Sudan—provide both an opportunity and a challenge. When used well, these resources can create greater prosperity for current and future generations; used poorly, or squandered, they can cause economic instability, social conflict, and lasting environmental damage (NRGI 2014).

xvi. A Holistic Approach. The large conflict and climate-induced displacement in the HOA is converging with mixed migrations of populations as a result of resource scarcity and the pursuit of better economic or livelihood opportunities. Therefore, the conceptual framework for the study has been broadened to develop a holistic approach to address forced displacement and mixed migration in the HOA. This approach builds on clearly identified challenges and the quest for solutions among key actors. There are encouraging trends and emerging examples of good practice in the HOA. For example, there is (a) a bubbling informal trade in goods and services by Somalis in Dadaab, Kenya; and (b) labor exchanges and market access between the refugee and host community for riverine irrigated agriculture in Dollo Ado, Southern Ethiopia. The "open camp" policy in Kakuma, Kenya builds on the growing extant trade links between the camp denizens and the surrounding communities. The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) Program is being designed by the UN country team and the Government of Uganda (GOU) as a self-reliance and resilience strategic framework for refugee and host communities in Uganda.

xvii. Even though the issues of displacement and mixed migration are treated separately at the policy and program level, the reality on the ground is that the causes, dynamics, and solutions to these regional problems are increasingly converging. Effectively addressing these issues requires a holistic approach designed to (a) support capacity enhancement of governance structures at national, subnational, and local levels for improved security and development; (b) mitigate economic, social, and environmental impacts to support social cohesion; (c) strengthen the resilience and economic capacities for self-reliance; and (d) address the conditions for return to communities of origin and urban areas, given the increasing urbanization of displacement and return.
Solutions. Both transitional and durable solutions need to address a similar set of key challenges related to environmental amelioration, strengthening governance, improving service delivery, enhancing economic and livelihood opportunities, and addressing GBV. Key instruments are (a) analytical studies to build the knowledge base and to inform policy dialogue and development interventions; (b) development projects aimed at addressing service and livelihood deficits, while also building the capacity of national and local governments; and (c) integrated international assistance aimed at development programming for both refugees and host countries. A summary of displacement challenges and solutions is presented in Table 1. The quest for these solutions will need to recognize and build on existing regional institutions and initiatives such as IGAD, EAC, and the African Union (AU). A concerted and coordinated effort by all developmental and humanitarian actors in the region—the World Bank Group (WBG), European Union (EU), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), UNHCR, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), and other UN and multilateral and bilateral agencies—is critical. With their respective mandates, skills, and experience, these agencies can support IGAD and the AU to coordinate and integrate implementation arrangements in partnership with local governments and other development partners, as well as the private sector. With regard to the transitional approach, a concerted effort by development partners in partnership with the private sector to build on and scale up existing good practice livelihood interventions of humanitarian actors (UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), IKEA Foundation, and other NGOs) in the region is critical to sustainable economic development and strengthening refugees and surrounding host communities’ self-reliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES</th>
<th>PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSE</th>
<th>Transitional Solutions—IDP/Refugee Camps and Host Communities</th>
<th>Durable Solutions—Return Sites</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Aspects</strong></td>
<td>Confirm displacement and different categories of migrant data disaggregated by sex and age groups and by origin.</td>
<td>• In potential areas of return, conduct an initial assessment of security, the rule of law, property rights, livelihoods availability, credit, basic services, skill acquisition, and credible governance structures to facilitate the provision of these services.</td>
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<td>Map the location and accessibility of basic services, including education, health, nutrition, and water supply and sanitation.</td>
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<td>Holistically address GBV by strengthening comprehensive community programs involving men and women and understanding incidents of GBV, gender inequality, and the psychological needs of women, children, and</td>
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<td>Support capacity enhancement of governance structures at national, subnational, and local levels in both host and return communities to ensure security and rule of law; and augment capacity to undertake planning and implementation of inclusive development activities.</td>
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<td>Mitigate economic, social, and environmental impacts on the host communities through improved basic services, livelihoods, and alternative energy sources, preventing violent conflict from erupting.</td>
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<td>Strengthen the resilience and economic capacities of both displaced populations (IDPs and refugees), host populations, migrants and returnees.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Address the conditions for return in communities of origin—including security, rule of law, property rights, and basic services—to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs. Augment services in urban areas, given the increasing urbanization of displacement and return.</td>
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Table 1. Holistic Approach to Displacement Challenges and Solutions
### Environmental Amelioration
- Develop integrated country-level plans and programs to address environmental degradation.
- Explore support to assist in reforestation, water management, and other ecosystem services and facilitate necessary investments.
- Explore and expand options for substitutes for fuel wood, to mitigate tree cutting.
- Appraise potential to reduce water runoff through check dams, water harvesting, etc.
- Support reforestation, water, and soil conservation interventions to sustain increased pressures on land, water resources, and forests.
- Strengthen capacity and technical training of relevant ministries (Agricultural and Resource Management, Environment, Energy, etc.) across the region.
- Map alternative sources of energy and develop plans for harnessing them.

### Livelihoods Enhancement
- Assess economic and fiscal impact of host and refugee community economies and opportunities for integration.
- Promote more open but regulated production (including issuing of work permits) and exchange or trade between refugee camps/settlements and hosting communities to benefit both parties, and integrate and enhance local revenue like a regional standardized skills training framework, which could facilitate both a higher level of standardized quality training across the region and greater acceptance rates of employment seekers.
- Wherever appropriate, livelihoods programs for refugees should be added to national development plans and funds.
- Scale up existing best practices of livelihoods interventions from development actors.
- Assess land availability for cultivation, pasture lands, water resources, and potential for irrigation.
- Assess land availability for cultivation, pasture lands, water resources, and potential for irrigation.
- Strengthen or build up appropriate livelihoods programs to enhance economic and regional stability.

### Natural Resources Extraction
- Support inclusive national approaches in the region for careful extraction of newly discovered natural resources such as oil, gas, and water under a clear governance framework. In addition, explore appropriate methods for equitable distribution of natural resources such as a redistributive tax to share across regions of a nation and ensure equitable profits nationally.

### COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIPS
- Establish a Horn of Africa Displacement Secretariat in an existing regional institution with strengthened forced displacement technical capacity to coordinate the regional response to displacement and mixed migration in the HOA.
- Support joint analytical and development work to link relief to development in order to build a shared knowledge base by undertaking joint assessments, commissioning research and technical assistance, and ascertaining through an inclusive process of consultation the priority needs and aspirations of displaced
persons with a goal of ensuring sustainable approaches to regional economic development.

- Create an HOA Regional Multi-Donor Displacement, Migration, and Development Fund (MDMDF), managed by the Secretariat, to serve as a flexible financing, preferably grant, to address emerging policy, analytical, and operational responses to protracted displacement and mixed migration in the region.
- Displacement secretariat to serve as an incubator for new ideas and innovations that could be quickly piloted though the MDMDF and then scaled up by government and donor interventions.
- HOA Implementation Partnership—recognizing and building on existing regional institutions and initiatives such as IGAD, EAC, and the AU—will require a concerted and coordinated effort by (a) local, regional, and national governments; (b) all developmental and humanitarian actors in the region—WBG, EU, IsDB, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO and other UN and multilaterals and bilaterals; (c) humanitarian NGOs, such as Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), DRC, and Lutheran World Federation (LWF); and (d) private sector associations.

xix. **Recommendations.** The study provides some specific recommendations for key actors (Table 2): (a) capitalize on the emerging positive trends to address forced displacement and mixed migration in the region, (b) take forward the holistic approach to displacement that includes transitional and durable solutions, and (c) harness the collaboration between a range of local, national, regional, and global partners. This should be guided by the social inclusion, political decentralization, and economic devolution efforts currently under way in the HOA countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Recommendations to Key Actors: Governments, the World Bank, and International Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNMENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Incorporate displacement populations and needs in national and local development planning processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Revisit national displacement (refugees and IDPs) policies and the legal framework in the context of mixed migration (recognizing economic as well as political and environmental drivers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Revise refugee and IDP laws and policies, focusing on freedom of movement, right to work status (e.g., work permits or guest worker arrangements).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enable the smooth transition for the displaced out of dependent, protected camps to places of economic opportunity and needs by establishing guest worker status; skills verification processes; centers for counseling, information, and referral; and safe movement practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Envisage refugees and IDPs as a common target group of vulnerable, underserved, and often poverty-stricken populations, thereby taking an area or geographic approach to host community and displaced alike to economic and social development that promotes opportunity and hope rather than despair and marginality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>REGIONAL PARTNERS, ESPECIALLY IGAD, AU, IDB, AND EU</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Establish a common policy and coordinated program approach by establishing a joint donor secretariat in the region for displacement, mixed migration, and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develop a comprehensive shared plan of action for the various crisis situations discussed in this report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthen local capacity for community consultation, planning, budgeting, and implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support the proposed flexible, quick disbursing partner Multi-Donor Displacement, Migration, and Development Fund (MDMDF) to support priority programs in real time as and when needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE UNHCR
- Advocate and provide assistance to harmonize refugee and IDP laws and policies, focusing on freedom of movement, right to work status (e.g., work permits or guest worker arrangements) among all HOA countries.
- Allocate resources to support joint technical missions with the WBG in preparation of the MDMDF.
- Assess best practice livelihoods programs in the region to put forward as possible scalable programs for the transitional approach.
- Where appropriate and in consultation with the government and WFP, shift to cash transfer instead of food aid so as to give beneficiaries choice and provide a demand stimulus to the local supply of goods and services in host areas.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP
- Establish a frame of reference—including an analysis of impacts, risks, and opportunities—for a consultation with affected governments and partners regarding challenges and measures to address these challenges in specific country contexts.
- In the short term, explore extension of existing projects targeting underserved, poor, and vulnerable groups typically found in refugee and IDP hosting areas.
- Continue with movement to “cash rather than food” for work, thus reducing the transaction costs, freeing up resources for direct use of beneficiaries, and providing a demand stimulus to the local supply of goods and services in host areas.
- Increase attention to GBV and human trafficking with expanded and dedicated programs for community education and justice.
- In the medium to long term, develop integrated area, multi-sector programs, creating the synergy of placing a critical mass of funding and technical assistance in shared cross-border areas to address both push and pull factors for the displaced.
- Focus priority development in strengthening pull factors in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan areas of return when and where security conditions allow.
- Develop cultural and conflict-sensitive programs by including conflict resolution training to local leaders and extending access to justice, mobile courts, and security presence to foreshadow and manage potential conflict between different refugee communities.
- Assist host and return governments to revisit the laws, policies, and practices governing mixed migration toward a rational, transparent, and accountable regime meeting the security as well as economic and social needs of all stakeholders.
- Continue to support knowledge-building activities such as social, economic, and environmental impact studies of displacement; displaced intentions studies; and the profiling of needs and aspirations of the displaced as key inputs into community stabilization and development programming and project design going forward. Strengthen partner relations with key regional bodies—including the AU, IGAD, and UNHCR (as well as other related UN agencies such as WFP and UNDP)—by establishing regular meetings, forums, and a regional donor working group of relief and development actors on displacement, mixed migration, and development. This working group would facilitate the operationalization of the construct of “bridging relief and development.”

THE HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENTAL DONORS
- Flexibility to create opportunities for joint funding and complementarity between humanitarian and developmental funds. Where appropriate, build on existing large investments from donors to link relief to development in a smooth and sustainable manner.
xx. **Next Steps.** An important first step would be to convene all relevant stakeholders for the dissemination and discussion of this report; a consultation process to build ownership; and determine the institutional location, structure, and functions of the Forced Displacement Secretariat. This would be crucial in forging and strengthening the framework for regional integration and cooperation across governments, regional agencies, and development partners. At the time of the finalization of this report, the World Bank has commenced the preparation of a regional operation on "Development Response to Displacement in the Horn of Africa" in partnership with governments of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda.

xxi. A second step would be developing a shared and detailed holistic strategy for durable solutions for the HOA. This will be informed by the current reality, which is characterized by (a) the protracted nature of forced displacement in the HOA, (b) the tenuous security situation in the refugee producing countries, and (c) shrinking asylum space globally. In the short to medium term, this will require the temporary local social and economic integration focused on building host community resilience and refugee community self-reliance, complemented by creating enabling conditions for return in the medium to long term. However, such a strategy would require a careful and considered process with stakeholders, building evidence and buy-in, particularly from regional institutions and national governments, which the Regional Forced Displacement Secretariat will need to spearhead. Based on this report, a policy note will be drafted to kick-start the process.
CHAPTER 1.

FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND MIXED MIGRATION
This chapter provides an overview of the political, social, economic, and security context prevailing in the Horn of Africa region and then attempts to capture a broad picture of forced displacement, including country-specific trends on refugee and IDP populations. It endeavors to highlight the complex set of drivers for forced displacement beyond armed conflict in the region that are inextricably linked. It also provides a brief overview of the legal and institutional framework governing forced displacement in the HOA.

The Political, Social, and Economic Context

2. The HOA—which covers Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda—is plagued by persistent governance, security, and development challenges, despite its rich endowment in human, social, and natural capital. The region is witness to inequalities within and between countries, high poverty levels, too many children dying of preventable or treatable causes, high and stagnant stunting rates, poor education outcomes, and frequent violence against women and children (UNICEF 2014). The main regional and international risks and threats emanate from a long, complex history of weak governance, further exacerbated by increasing environmental degradation and entrenched poverty. This is particularly acute along often marginalized, underserved, and impoverished peripheral border areas. The complex cultural, social, and political nature of these conflicts is compounded by the increasing contestation over scarce natural resources, especially in areas affected by climate change and ungoverned and ungovernable territories.

3. There are four major protracted displacement situations in the HOA, each with its own characteristic but also with similarities. These are: (1) Eritrea, with significant mixed migration; (2) Somalia, with conflict and violence in areas of origin and food insecurity and destruction of shelter due to floods and droughts; (3) South Sudan, as a result of conflict with Sudan, and internal conflict; and (4) Sudan, where displacement is driven by tensions between center and peripheral regions, and a highly inequitable division of power and wealth (see Annex 1).

4. The absolute number of poor people is increasing, while the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day is only marginally declining. The average population growth rate is about 3 percent, even though the countries of the region have adult and infant mortality rates that are among the highest in the African continent. At this rate, the region’s population is doubling every 23 years, compounding efforts to reduce absolute poverty. It is a region where the most basic necessities—security, rule of law, clean water, food, health care, and education—are not available for much of the population. The majority of countries are not on track for meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), such as reducing maternal and under-five mortality, and addressing food insecurity. Most countries will be able to halve the percentage of people without access to safe water by 2015, but in many countries the baseline is so low that achieving this goal will still leave millions without access to safe water. Disparities in education, health, and other requisites of human development are often manifested in particular social groups, especially the most marginalized and vulnerable parts of the population in urban and rural border areas.

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1 Forced displacement means loss of housing, land and property, jobs, physical assets, social networks and resources, and changes in family dynamics and traditional gender roles.

2 Mixed migration refers to a movement in which a number of persons are traveling together, generally in an irregular manner, using the same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons. Persons traveling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and profiles and may include asylum seekers, refugees, trafficked persons, unaccompanied/separated children, and migrants in an irregular situation. Source: UNHCR, accessible at: <http://www.unhcr.org/50a4c2789.html>.

3 Refugees have access to health, education, and food subsidies, and in many places are better served than host communities. Therefore this average income may not fully represent this nuanced economic welfare.
They suffer disproportionately from income inequality and weak consumptive power, inadequate access to quality basic services, and limited social and financial protection in case of catastrophic health expenses.

5. **In addition, some HOA countries are not well prepared to respond to regional and global public health threats.** They have made limited progress on the delivery of regional public goods (such as vaccinations and medicines) that are critical for preventing, controlling, or eliminating communicable diseases and promoting public health security. The HOA subregion faces multiple challenges with outbreak-prone diseases (cholera, measles, meningitis, Kala-azar, and hemorrhagic fevers), endemic diseases (multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis), and diseases with pandemic potential (influenza). Many of these diseases are exacerbated by poverty, displacement, malnutrition, illiteracy, and poor sanitation and housing. Increased movements of people for cross-border trade and economic activity in the HOA will necessitate simultaneous investments in strengthening basic service access (particularly health, clean water, and education), and disease monitoring, control, and preparedness.

6. **The arid lowland border zones of the HOA are home to predominantly pastoral societies whose lives and livelihoods are under severe stress.** The region has one of the largest global concentrations of pastoralist communities. Yet pastoralist systems and livelihoods have been neglected at the policy and program level due to perceptions that these systems are outdated and unsustainable. This has increased the vulnerability of the poorer pastoralist households, reduced their mobility, increased ethnic and resource-based conflicts, and consequent dispossession and forced migration. Droughts have also further exacerbated community clashes over scarce pasture and water. Climate change threatens to undermine development gains and future opportunities. Table 3 provides a disaggregation of natural hazards versus conflict-related displacement. As the HOA develops, it is facing growing challenges to sustainably manage its environmental and renewable natural resources—land, water, forests, livestock, fish, and the ecosystems on which they depend.

**Table 3. Conflict versus Natural-Hazard-Induced Displacement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Natural-hazard-related</th>
<th>Conflict/violence-related</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>149,200</td>
<td>178,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>180,300</td>
<td>55,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>63,100</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>115,800</td>
<td>383,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>319,700</td>
<td>470,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IDMC 2014a*

7. **Many of the HOA countries are among the countries impacted by droughts and floods and at the highest risk of climate-related impacts.** Climate-change-induced water scarcity and drought will continue to put pressure on a region whose resources are already stretched by population growth and environmental degradation. Efforts to manage water and make it available where it is most needed and in a balanced manner are hampered by underdeveloped water storage infrastructure, changing climates, and the weak capacity of regional water resource management institutions. Inclusive water management could significantly contribute to addressing food insecurity threats and preventing/managing conflict.
8. **Unclearly demarcated and managed borders and the resultant struggle for sustainable livelihoods have often triggered conflicts.** Resource scarcity—combined with rapid population growth, poverty, and underdevelopment in weakly governed border regions—exacerbates both communal conflict and civil wars. These often-neglected areas on the periphery of states are sparsely populated—often by groups who lack representation in central power structures—and offer limited economic potential. This is manifested in limited investment of public resources and weak local capacity to govern. These conditions have increased the pressures to cope by resorting to rent seeking at the barrel of a gun; that is, engaging in criminal or violent activity.

9. **The HOA countries now have some of the most youthful populations in the world.** In many countries, a majority of 15-to-24-year-olds are unemployed. Research has shown a positive association between the growth of youth unemployment and alienation on the one hand, and radicalization and recruitment into armed movements and criminal networks on the other. The resulting unemployment and alienation nurtures “irregular migration” in the search for alternative, often illicit, livelihoods—joining piracy, rebel groups, and organized criminality—and affirmed self-worth and identities. These conditions are exacerbated when young people are unable to find ways to legitimately voice their concerns in the political arena.

10. **Women are especially affected by social and economic discrimination.** Women continue to face such obstacles as limited land rights, lack of educational opportunity, and antiquated social customs that often thwart their ability to improve food security conditions and livelihood options for themselves, their families, and their communities. They are often perceived as objects or commodities to be exploited and trafficked rather than as independent agents of their own development and well-being. In addition, those with children, are unable to claim them because of the unclear legal rights of women toward their offspring, thus leaving many children stateless.

11. **Despite their economic promise and resilience, countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are becoming the unintended “shock absorbers” for the growing conflict, insecurity, and weak governance in the neighboring countries of South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia.** This is manifested in the increasing burden of hosting millions of refugees, and the additional threats posed by illegal trafficking (particularly in arms and child labor), environmental degradation resulting from floods and droughts, and the struggle over diminishing natural resources such as firewood and water. These interrelated threats and risks pose many challenges individually and collectively for the HOA region.

12. **The origins and consequences of the HOA challenges go far beyond the borders of any one country.** From this perspective, regional solutions may be required to address cross-border regional issues in order to transform the risks and threats facing individual countries into opportunities for regional stability, socioeconomic development, and shared prosperity. The strengthening of security, governance, economic development, and local capacity along contiguous borders is a real necessity.

### The Security Context

13. **The HOA region is one of the most unstable in the world, with repeated cycles of armed conflict, violence, crime, political instability, and extremism.** Located in a geo-strategic position with regard to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf, the HOA has a special regional and international significance, even in the post-Cold War world (Woodward 2002). The region’s mix of colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism has resulted in states that were created in significantly different ways, which shapes their governance systems, patterns of justice and exclusion (be they real or perceived), and how each state relates to the others.
14. **Governance systems in much of the Horn are primarily focused on security.** Political dispensations and governance systems that prioritize security are often less democratic, less inclusive, and less accountable. Those in power argue that this is necessary in order to avoid greater instability. As a result, the region is characterized by huge differences in social and political opportunity, with ongoing instability often encouraging less open and more directive governance. Economic interconnections—both dependencies and opportunities—are strengthened or weakened by the region’s security dynamics. Terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational organized crime—notably in the areas of drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and illicit trafficking in firearms—pose serious threats to peace, security, stability, and development in the Horn of Africa.

An Overview of Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration

15. **With an estimated 242 million inhabitants, the HOA hosts over 8.7 million forcibly displaced persons, including over 6.5 million IDPs and about 2.2 million refugees.** Table 4 provides displaced people by country. Due to the ongoing crisis in South Sudan, the number of refugees has been increasing throughout 2014 and 2015 especially in the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. By mid-March 2015, there were over 1.5 million IDPs and over 500,000 refugees displaced by the ongoing civil war in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>REFUGEES ORIGINATING FROM COUNTRYa</th>
<th>IDPsb</th>
<th>REFUGEES HOSTEDc</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE WOMEN**</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE CHILDREN UNDER 18**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,509</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>354,474</td>
<td>10,000 (2013)</td>
<td>3,178</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>124,952</td>
<td>397,200 (2014)</td>
<td>588,628d</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>10,822</td>
<td>412,000 (Jan 2013)</td>
<td>569,772d</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,119,527</td>
<td>1,107,000 (2014)</td>
<td>12,089</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>512,644a</td>
<td>1,474,500 (Mar 2015)</td>
<td>240,705d</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>703,567</td>
<td>3,100,000 (Jan 2015)</td>
<td>245,603d</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>29,800 (Jan 2012)</td>
<td>388,989d (Feb 2015)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>61 (Feb 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>2,838,177</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,530,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,073,473</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaboration based on UNHCR Population Statistics database.*

*Notes:*
*Cut-off date is mid-2014 (June), unless otherwise noted. Figures include asylum seekers.*

** Demographic percentages refer to the number of refugees at the end of 2013, and not to the figures in the present table. Percentage of women and children under 18 is based on the number of refugees, by country of asylum (excluding asylum seekers).***

*** Total numbers include different cut-off dates.
16. The majority of the displaced are children and women with many female-headed households. Map 1 provides the demographic distribution of displaced persons in the Horn. For instance, women and children constitute 82 percent of the refugee population in Uganda. Women and children constitute 90 percent of the newly arriving South Sudanese refugee population in Ethiopia.

Map 1. Demographics of the Displaced

17. War, conflict, and insecurity—compounded by political uncertainties, governance failures, drought, and poor economic conditions—have triggered major displacements of people in the HOA. Most of the displacement situations in the HOA have lasted for over 20 years. Refugee camps continue to see new arrivals in 2015, thus making displacement one of the most complex and pressing regional challenges to reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development with peace and security. Conflict has made the concentration of protracted refugees and IDPs one of the highest in the world. In addition to refugees and IDP displacement due to insecurity and violence, the HOA also faces the
challenge of mixed migration. The region stands out for the complexity and dynamics of mixed migration with those seeking asylum, with countries simultaneously hosting and assisting internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, victims of trafficking, as well as labor migrants (EUI 2015).

18. **There is a continuum of displacement in the HOA across involuntary refugees and voluntary economic migrants.** There are growing instances of an intermingling of the two, with refugees—especially youth—embarking on economic migration (Map 2). Every year some 100,000 migrants make the hazardous journey through Djibouti in transit to Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula in search of work and a better life in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Many Ethiopians undertake a harrowing eight-day journey on foot between Dewelle (Ethiopia/Djibouti border) and Tadjoura (Djibouti). Refugees and economic migrants are both increasingly facing forced returns and deportation orders from host countries, owing to the increasing threat of terrorism and insecurity. Countries of asylum fear that terror networks may infiltrate refugee flows and cause violence. Forced returns and deportations may therefore leave former refugees worse off in the countries of origin than in the countries of asylum.

Map 2. HOA Displacement Overview, end of 2013

![HaA Displacement Overview](image)

Source: Elaboration based on UNHCR Population Statistics database.
19. The HOA has a range of mixed migration movements. In the Horn, there are four primary mixed migration movements: (1) the western route (via Sudan, into Libya and across the Mediterranean); (2) the northern route (Egypt and into Israel—severely restricted as of mid-2012); (3) the southern route (down the Eastern Corridor toward South Africa); and (4) the eastern route (into Yemen to Saudi Arabia and beyond). There are different groups of migrants with various needs and vulnerabilities. The different types include: (a) irregular migrants, migrants dislodged by a real and/or perceived inability to thrive (economic migrants) or driven by aspirations, a desire to unite with other family members or some other factor; (b) victims of trafficking (involuntary migrants) who have been coerced or deceived into servitude, forced labor, or sexual exploitation; (c) stateless persons without recognized citizenship, placing them in a limbo between different national borders; (d) unaccompanied minors and separated children and other vulnerable persons on the move; (e) migrant children without protection or assistance, in a state of acute vulnerability; and (f) refugees and asylum seekers in search of asylum from conflict or persecution in their country of origin (RMMS 2013).

20. The causes of forced displacement in the Horn of Africa have regional dimensions. A major manifestation of this includes recurrent tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil and borders, tenuous relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the continued instability in Somalia. Tensions between countries in the region often influence the progression of internal conflicts and associated displacement. The consequences of such large-scale displacement are exacerbated due to internal conflicts frequently spilling over borders and fueling further tensions between refugees and host communities over land, natural resources, and livelihood opportunities. Finally, legal and political issues relating to the status and return of refugees continue to be a growing source of tension within the region.

21. Over 4 million refugees and IDPs have returned to their areas of origin between 2006 and 2013. As there is no equivalent legal definition of a returnee, this report uses the term to describe “former IDPs and refugees who return voluntarily to their homes of origin, whether spontaneously or in an organized manner.” For both IDPs and refugees, the return to their area or country of origin does not necessarily mean that they find durable solutions to the situation of displacement. From a development perspective, the question—“When does displacement end?”—therefore has to do with the barriers to and the conditions and processes that underpin durable solutions, and by implication, the development activities that are necessary to achieve such solutions (Christensen & Harild, 2009). The emerging experience of return to Somalia and South Sudan is discussed in Chapter 3.

Summary of Forced Displacement Situations in the HOA

22. Djibouti hosts about 20,000 Somali refugees, and is the main transit route for HOA migrants traveling to the Middle East and Europe seeking better economic opportunities. Mixed migration is a shared challenge across the HOA countries, as evidenced by the hazardous journey made by thousands of Somali migrants through Djibouti in transit to Yemen and the Arab

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5 Three durable solutions—voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of first asylum, or resettlement in a third country—are the options available for the permanent resolution of the “refugee cycle.” All three are regarded as durable because they promise an end to refugees’ suffering and their need for international protection and dependence on humanitarian assistance.
6 UNHCR has recently undertaken a revalidation exercise and the number of Somali refugees and asylum-seekers has declined to about 12,000.
Peninsula in search of a better life in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (see Table 5 for migrants by country of origin). Since 2009, the departure points around the Obock areas of Djibouti have become the locus for mixed migration flows of individuals attempting to reach Yemen. The number of people travelling through Djibouti en route to Yemen has risen rapidly, increasing 23 percent between 2011 and 2012. Through 2012, it is estimated that 84,000 migrants that departed from Obock and its environs arrived in Yemen. In 2014, an estimated 91,952 migrants/refugees arrived in Yemen between January and December (inclusive) via the Red Sea (Djibouti) and the Arabian Sea (Somaliland/Puntland) (RMMS 2014). The majority of the migrants have urgent humanitarian needs. Many Ethiopians journey on foot between Dewelle (Ethiopia-Djibouti border) and Tadjoura (Djibouti), an eight-day journey with few personal belongings and limited access to water and food.

### Table 5. Migrants Arriving in Yemen, by country of origin

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>75,651</td>
<td>84,376</td>
<td>54,213</td>
<td>71,907</td>
<td>7,507</td>
<td>293,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>14,151</td>
<td>17,785</td>
<td>33,019</td>
<td>32,988</td>
<td>18,855</td>
<td>27,350</td>
<td>23,086</td>
<td>11,045</td>
<td>19,640</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>199,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11,747</td>
<td>11,575</td>
<td>17,072</td>
<td>44,814</td>
<td>34,527</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>120,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25,898</td>
<td>29,360</td>
<td>50,091</td>
<td>77,802</td>
<td>53,382</td>
<td>103,154</td>
<td>107,532</td>
<td>65,319</td>
<td>91,592</td>
<td>8,755</td>
<td>612,885</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


23. **Obock, the closest Djiboutian town to Yemen, continues to experience the burden of the mixed migration flows.** In response, the International Organization on Migration (IOM) opened a Migrant Response Centre (MRC) in Obock in 2011, to assist the Government of Djibouti in managing mixed migration flows and to sensitize migrants on the risks of irregular migration. With the recent crisis in Yemen between Houthi’s and the Yemeni government, between 26th March and 3rd June 2015, IOM reported that an estimated 16,801 people had arrived in Djibouti by air and sea from Yemen. 40% of these arrivals were transiting Third Country Nationals, 50% were Yemenis and 10% Djiboutian (RMMS 2015).

24. **Significant number of Eritreans have sought asylum over the years.** As of June 2014, there were over 354,000 Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers, about 205,000 of whom are hosted by countries in the region, mainly Sudan and Ethiopia. The path taken by refugees may be fraught with obstacles and can be life threatening, as many have fallen into the hands of traffickers and smugglers who demand high ransoms for their victims’ freedom.

25. **Ethiopia is the largest refugee hosting country in Africa.** At the end of 2013 there were 433,936 refugees in Ethiopia displaced by droughts, conflicts, political events, and civil wars in neighboring countries including Somalia, Eritrea, South Sudan, and Sudan (UNHCR 2013c). By the end of March 2015, Ethiopia hosted over 682,000 refugees and asylum seekers, while an estimated 124,952 Ethiopians have sought asylum in other countries (UNHCR 2015). Most Eritrean and Somali refugees in Ethiopia are living in protracted displacement. The majority of refugees live in camps situated near the borders of their respective countries of origin. Somali
refugees, fleeing insecurity and famine, are the largest refugee group in Ethiopia. Most live in Dollo Ado and Jijiga camp complexes (eight camps in total), with a small number living in Addis Ababa. Eritrean refugees are mainly located in camps in Shire, Tigray region, and Afar region, with a number of urban refugees in Addis Ababa and Mekele. South Sudanese refugees are mainly living in Gambella and Sudanese refugees mainly fleeing the Blue Nile region in Sudan live in three camps in the Assosa area in Benishangul Gumuz region (UNHCR 2015a). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) estimates that, as of April 2015, there were over 396,100 internally displaced people in Ethiopia due to inter-communal and cross-border violence, most of them living in protracted displacement situations (IDMC, 2015).

26. **Kenya is the second largest receiving country of refugees in the Africa region.** Kenya was host to over 586,000 refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and other countries in the region by the end of March 2015. These figures include more than 424,000 Somali refugees in protracted displacement and about 90,000 South Sudanese refugees. Somali refugees are mainly located in Dadaab camp, which is the largest refugee settlement in the world with a population corresponding to Kenya’s fourth largest city. In December 2012, following a series of security incidents in Nairobi, the Government of Kenya issued a Directive outlining an encampment policy. In July 2013, the High Court ruled that the Directive was unconstitutional. Serious security incidents, including the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, increased the sense of insecurity in Kenya following which the government launched in April 2014 a security operation—called “Usalama Watch”7—targeting persons who may pose a security or terrorist threat (UNHCR, 2014 b). In December 2014, the Parliament passed the controversial Security Amendment Act, which limits the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya to 150,000. In January 2015, the High Court suspended parts of the Act, including the provision that limits the number of refugees. In April 2015, following the attack at Garissa University, the Deputy President of Kenya announced that the Dadaab refugee camps should be closed within three months and 350,000 Somali refugees returned to Somalia. 8 After a meeting between the President of Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on May 6, 2015, it was announced that the Dadaab Camp would not be closed in three months, although the repatriation program of the Somali refugees from Dadaab would be enhanced to include new areas that are considered safe9. These recent events underscore the complexity and tenuous position of pockets of refugees in the region.

27. **In addition to refugees, there are IDPs in Kenya.** In the absence of official, comprehensive, up-to-date national data on IDPs, the most recent estimates show that, at the end of 2013, there were about 412,000 IDPs displaced due to ethnic and political violence and land disputes since the 1990s. This figure also includes 55,000 new displacements in 2013 as a result of inter-communal clashes. These figures do not include those displaced by natural disasters, development projects, and pastoralist IDPs. Nor do they include any of the estimated 300,000 people who fled post-election violence in 2007–08 and who are usually described as “integrated” IDPs; that is, IDPs who found shelter with host communities or in rented accommodations in urban and peri-urban areas (IDMC 2015)

28. **Almost a fifth of Somalia’s population has been affected by forced displacement.** This is a major consequence of more than 20 years of internal conflict, insecurity, political uncertainty,

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7 Usalama Watch was a Government Directive and security operation on refugees and asylum seekers in urban areas of Kenya.
8 Accessible at: <http://www.unhcr.org/552d12c49.html>.
9 Accessible at: <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/UNHCR-boss-Uhuru-discuss-Dadaab/-/1056/2708212/-/y4hhfj/-/index.html>
human rights violations, and governance failures, compounded by periods of acute drought and famine. Many communities have further suffered multiple displacements from the forcible acquisition of their land by armed clans, resulting in a loss of assets and livelihoods (World Bank 2014a). By the end of 2013, about 2.3 million people were displaced, including over 1.1 million IDPs (10.8 percent of the country’s population and the seventh largest IDP population in the world) and over 1.1 million refugees (30 percent of the regional total and the third largest refugee population in the world after Afghanistan and Syria). The number of Somali refugees has dropped to about 970,000 due to spontaneous returns from Kenya. Figure 1 has more details on these and other country trends.

Figure 1. Trends in Refugees and Asylum Seekers, by country of asylum (2000–2013)

Source: Elaboration based on UNHCR Population Statistics database.
Note: Trends in refugees residing in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia are omitted from this graph as their magnitudes are substantially lower than the other countries. Djibouti never had more than 24,000 refugees in any given year, Eritrea’s record year is 2007 with 7,061 refugees, and Somalia recorded over 26,000 refugees in 2009–10, but never had more than 12,300 (2013) in any other year.

29. Forced displacement in South Sudan is a consequence of internal and external factors. Major factors include the conflict with Sudan; tribal conflicts fueled by competition over natural resources; attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); instability in neighboring countries; and, most recently, the ongoing South Sudan Civil War that erupted following the alleged coup attempt on December 15, 2013 (ICG 2015). By the end of 2013, there were 145,000 South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers outside the country and 383,000 IDPs in South Sudan, including 50,000 previously displaced by LRA attacks who have not found durable solutions, 193,000 displaced in 2012, and 189,000 displaced in 2013 (IDMC 2014b). Since October 2010, 366,000 South Sudanese have returned from Sudan but there have been no documented returns, local integrations, or resettlement of IDPs since 2012. Large numbers of refugees and returnees are living in vulnerable urban settings, and insecurity and lack of access to land, services, or livelihood opportunities have complicated the pursuit of durable solutions. Since the eruption of the South Sudan Civil War in December 2013, more than 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes (one in seven people), including 1.5 million IDPs (see Figure 2 for IDP trends) and over 500,000 refugees who have sought refuge in neighboring countries. South Sudan is also host to almost 259,232 refugees and asylum seekers (as of the end of March 2015) from neighboring countries, including Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic.
30. **Conflict in Sudan generated more than 3.7 million displaced people.** The conflicts in Darfur, Eastern Sudan, and the Three Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains) have led to 3.1 million IDPs (as of January 2015) and over 703,000 refugees and asylum seekers (as of June 2014). The majority are in a state of protracted displacement in urban and peri-urban areas. The numbers continue to grow due to the ongoing conflict. Sudan is also host to an estimated 304,879 refugees and asylum seekers (as of end of March 2015) from neighboring countries, including South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Chad. Approximately 107,000 refugees from Eritrea are living in situations of protracted displacement (more than five consecutive years) in Sudan.

Figure 2. Trends in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2005–2014

![Graph showing trends in IDPs from 2005 to 2014](source: Elaboration based on IDMC statistics. Note: Cutoff date for Sudan is June 2014.

31. **Uganda hosts over 433,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including more than 166,000 fleeing conflict in South Sudan and 28,000 from Somalia.** According to UNHCR, over 146,000 refugees from South Sudan arrived in Uganda from December 2013 to the beginning of April 2015. Most of them have settled in Adjumani, Kiryandongo, and Arua, and some in Kampala. The majority of refugees in Uganda are based in fourteen large refugee settlements and eight refugee villages in the northern and western parts of the country, where they receive government and international support. However, the number of refugees residing in the urban area is increasing, with Kampala hosting 17 percent of the officially registered population. The civil war between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda led to the displacement of over 1.8 million people, the majority of whom have now returned to their areas of origin. About 30,000 IDPs are thought to remain in camps—most of which have been officially closed—and are unable to return to their areas of origin due to age, illness or disability, or lack of land. Recovery and development efforts in areas of return have not been sufficient, with inadequate basic services and limited support to rebuild livelihoods.

**Causes and Drivers of Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration**

32. **A complex set of circumstances underpin the displacement and mixed migration in the HOA.** The original focus of this study was forced displacement due to armed conflict. However, in a region where pastoralism is the traditional lifestyle for a large part of the population and where natural and manmade disasters have with regular intervals affected populations and caused displacement and mixed migration, armed conflict is rarely an isolated cause of displacement. In reality, causes of displacement include armed conflict, poor governance, environmental...
degradation and food insecurity, climatic disasters including droughts and floods, and lack of economic opportunities. This has led to a shift in study focus to also cover “mixed migration.”

- **Armed conflict** in the region is closely related to poor governance, but also to the other drivers identified below. It is possible to distinguish between the following types of armed conflict, but it should also be noted that there are overlaps between them: (a) war between states (either directly or through proxies, such as allegedly in the “Three Areas” between South Sudan and Sudan); (b) civil war (for example, presently in South Sudan and at a lower scale in Sudan and Somalia); (c) ethnicity-based armed conflict (such as the conflict in South Central Somalia involving different clans and war-lords, and the violent internal political crisis in South Sudan, which has taken on ethnic dimensions); (d) socio-ethnic conflict (such as cattle rustling in South Sudan and Northern Kenya, “war-lords” due to clan differences in Somalia); and (e) international terrorism (such as Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya). The socio-ethnic conflict in several HOA countries is associated with the reshaping of (a) local social structures in the region with respect to hereditary structures (clans, lineages, and families), territorial entities, age systems, and the role and powers of traditional authorities; and (b) of economic organizations, especially due to war, trauma, and displacement. For example, conflicts over dry-season pastures have been contributing to land-related disputes among livestock tending populations and between villages, sub-locations, tribes, and countries.

- **Poor governance, weak institutions, and low capacity** limit the ability of states to provide security, law and order, property rights, and basic services such as primary education and basic health. Lack of these services is a “push factor” for displacement, not only in Somalia but also in countries such as Sudan and South Sudan. Lack of protection of basic human rights is a characteristic of many of the states in question. A specific feature in several countries in the region is tension between the center and peripheral regions, with an inequitable division of power and wealth and with some governments not willing to respect sociocultural differences such as ethnicity, religion, and language.

- **Environmental degradation and food insecurity** are a result of drought, floods, and other factors such as diminishing pasture for cattle, as well as water, firewood, and other resource scarcities. Such factors contribute to displacement. The result is increased competition for scarce resources, which also contributes to armed conflict, particularly between pastoralists and sedentary communities. This is especially pronounced in Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, all of which have large pastoralist populations who migrate according to seasonal patterns and climatic variations.

- **Youth bulge** in the HOA presents opportunities for demographic dividends. It also presents a risk, since the high numbers of unemployed and unskilled young people in many countries could lead to frustration and violence. In Kenya, over 60 percent of the population is under 25 years of age, while in South Sudan and Somalia, 70 percent of the population is under 30 years of age. The lack of economic opportunities in a region with a pronounced youth bulge occurs in many settings and is a major driver of displacement, leading to migration of young people (a majority being male) to more economically prosperous regions of Europe, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, as well as South Africa.

33. In addition to the above-mentioned causes, the decision of migrants to leave countries of origin is partly attributable to unrealistic notions of the costs and benefits of movement, generated in part by unscrupulous smugglers (RMMS 2013).
Legal and Institutional Frameworks Governing Forced Displacement

34. **A range of international, regional, and domestic laws, policies, and institutions govern the situation of refugees and IDPs in the Horn of Africa.** This section provides a brief overview of the key displacement-related laws and institutions. Annex 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the international, regional, and domestic laws and institutions addressing the situation of refugees and IDPs in the region.

35. **There are three major international and regional legal instruments governing the situation of refugees in the HOA.** These include: (1) the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention); (2) the 1969 OAU (Organization of African Unity) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Convention); and (3) the ICGLR Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons (the ICGLR Property Protocol, 2006). In addition to adapting international legal instruments (Table 6), domestic refugee laws govern the situation of refugees in the region. All HOA countries, except Eritrea, have refugee-specific domestic laws. While the main focus of almost all refugee laws is regulating the asylum and refugee status determination process and setting up national refugee agencies, few of the domestic refugee laws have provisions relevant to development issues. Although the non-refugee-specific international and domestic laws have provisions that affect development outcomes, the focus here is on refugee-specific national and international legal frameworks.

### Table 6. International and Regional Legal and Institutional Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>1951 CONVENTION</th>
<th>1967 PROTOCOL</th>
<th>1969 OAU CONVENTION</th>
<th>RESERVATIONS TO THE 1951 CONVENTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>09/08 1977</td>
<td>09/08/1977</td>
<td>15/11/2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25/04/2012</td>
<td>Article 17(2) dealing with wage earning employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>10/11/1969</td>
<td>10/11/1969</td>
<td>15/10/1973</td>
<td>Article 22(1) dealing with the provision of public education to refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>16/05/1966</td>
<td>13/11/1981</td>
<td>23/06/1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>22/02/1974</td>
<td>23/05/1974</td>
<td>24/12/1972</td>
<td>Article 26 dealing with freedom of movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Elaboration by Authors*

36. **The development-related provisions of the international and domestic refugee laws deal with property rights, freedom of movement, right to work, and access to services.** The 1951 Convention has provisions dealing with these issues. In addition, the ICGLR Property Protocol deals with the recovery of refugees’ property and possessions left behind or dispossessed during displacement. Domestic laws have taken different approaches in addressing development-related issues. For instance, the domestic refugee laws of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan make no mention of the property rights of refugees. Even those countries that have provisions dealing with property rights in their refugee laws have taken
different approaches. With regard to freedom of movement, the only domestic refugee law that explicitly provides for the freedom of movement for refugees is the 2006 Uganda Refugee Act. Domestic refugee laws of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya effectively limit the refugees’ right to work by imposing the same restrictions and conditions applicable to aliens. The 2006 Ugandan Refugee Act provides that refugees shall receive at least the same treatment accorded to aliens generally in similar circumstances relating to employment and income-generating activities. None of the domestic refugee laws in the Horn of Africa—except Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda—have provisions dealing with the extending services to refugees. Table 7 provides an overview of development-related provisions in national and international legal instruments.

Table 7. Relevant Development-related Provisions for Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>PROPERTY RIGHTS</th>
<th>FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT</th>
<th>RIGHT TO WORK</th>
<th>PROVISION OF SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951 Convention</td>
<td>Articles 13 &amp; 14</td>
<td>Article 26</td>
<td>Articles 17 &amp; 18</td>
<td>Article 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti: Ordinance No. 77053/P.R./A.E. du 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia: 2004 Refugee Proclamation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 21</td>
<td>Article 21</td>
<td>Article 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya: Refugee Act 2006</td>
<td>Article 16 (1)</td>
<td>Article 16 (2)</td>
<td>Article 16 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia: Presidential Decree No. 25 of 1984 on Determination of Refugee Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: Refugee Act 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan: Regulation of Asylum Act of 1974</td>
<td>Articles 8 &amp; 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda: Refugee Act 2006</td>
<td>Article 29 (1) &amp; (2)</td>
<td>Article 30</td>
<td>Article 29 (1)</td>
<td>Article 29 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaboration by Authors

37. **At the international and regional level, four legal instruments deal with IDPs in the Horn of Africa.** These include: (1) UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (the Guiding Principles); (2) the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (ICGLR IDP Protocol, 2006); (3) the ICGLR Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons (the ICGLR Property Protocol, 2006); and (4) the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009). Only three HOA countries have a comprehensive legal and policy framework dealing with internal displacement (see Table 8 for country-specific membership).

Table 8. Membership in the Various IDP Treaties and Protocols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ICGLR IDP PROTOCOL</th>
<th>ICGLR PROPERTY PROTOCOL</th>
<th>AU KAMPALA CONVENTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed and Ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
38. **Uganda is one of the first countries in the world to develop a national policy for IDPs.** Kenya’s IDP legislation—the Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act 2012—confirms the application of the Great Lakes Protocol and UN Guiding Principles to IDPs in the country. In Sudan, the National Policy on Internal Displacement 2009 covers all phases of the displacement cycle and establishes the right to freedom of movement, but favors return over and above other settlement options.

39. **The international, regional, and domestic IDP laws also have relevant provisions dealing with development issues, including property rights, freedom of movement, access to livelihoods, and provision of services.** The Guiding Principles, the ICGLR IDP and Property Protocols, and the Kampala Convention have relevant provisions dealing with these issues. At the national level, domestic laws and policies of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have provisions dealing with property rights, freedom of movement, access to livelihoods, and provision of services. Table 9 provides the key provisions.

### Table 9. Relevant Development-related Provisions for IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>PROPERTY RIGHTS</th>
<th>FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT</th>
<th>ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS</th>
<th>PROVISION OF SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guiding Principles</td>
<td>Principle 21</td>
<td>Principle 14</td>
<td>Principle 22 (b)</td>
<td>Principle 18(2)(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR IDP Protocol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICGLR Property Protocol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampala Convention</td>
<td>Articles 9 &amp; 11</td>
<td>Article 9(f)</td>
<td>Articles 3 &amp; 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya: Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act 2012</td>
<td>Article 9</td>
<td>Article 9</td>
<td>Article 9</td>
<td>Article 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan: National Policy on Internal Displacement 2009</td>
<td>Article 6</td>
<td>Articles 5 &amp; 6</td>
<td>Articles 5 &amp; 6</td>
<td>Article 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan: IDP Policy 2004</td>
<td>Article 3.6</td>
<td>Article 3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Articles 3.9, 3.11 &amp; 3.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaboration by Authors

40. **At the regional level, a range of institutions deal with the situation of refugees and IDPs in the HOA.** The African Union (AU) Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees, and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa is a decision-making body and supports the work of the AU Commission in matters of forced displacement. In particular, it provides political leadership in formulating responses to humanitarian emergencies; conducts field missions and in-country needs assessments; where possible, provides refugee hosting states with financial assistance; and works to sensitize member states and the international community to the plight of displaced persons in Africa. The Department of Political Affairs’ Division of Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees, and Displaced Persons (HARDP) functions as a secretariat to all AU bodies dealing with refugees, facilitating their activities, decision making, and
policy development. The EAC currently does not have active institutional involvement in refugee management. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has a unit responsible for humanitarian and social issues, which coordinates a cluster of activities, including aspects relating to the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. IGAD has established a Regional Consultative Process (IGAD-RCP) on migration, in accordance with relevant AU decisions, with a core function of promoting the common position of the IGAD member states and the African Union as provided in the Migration Policy Framework and to facilitate regional dialogue and cooperation on migration policy issues among the IGAD member states.

41. At the national level, most of the institutions dealing with refugee issues are housed in ministries dealing with security issues. In Djibouti, the Ministry of the Interior is the main government institution in charge of refugee protection. The national refugee agency is the Office National d’Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (ONARS). However, the presidency, which is mandated to deal with issues of national security in asylum cases, also has a role to play. In Ethiopia, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is part of the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority (SIRA). In Kenya, the Department of Refugee Affairs is part of the Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government, which is responsible for internal security. An exception to this trend is Uganda, whose Refugee Department is part of the Office of the Prime Minister, which also has the mandate for the socioeconomic development of conflict- and disaster-affected parts of the country.
CHAPTER 2.

THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES OF PROTRACTED FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND MIXED MIGRATION
42. This chapter discusses the development challenges of protracted forced displacement and mixed migration in the Horn of Africa. It attempts to highlight both positive and negative implications, as well as the development challenges of forced displacement and mixed migration in the region. The chapter includes an overview of emerging trends and the salient features and characteristics of the refugee/IDP hosting areas. It then discusses the key development issues of environmental, economic, and social, in refugee/IDP hosting areas.

Emerging trends

43. Forced displacement in the HOA is not only a humanitarian and security challenge, but also a development challenge. Most of the displacement situations in the Horn of Africa are protracted. Protracted displacement situations are those that have moved beyond the initial emergency phase, but are without solutions in the foreseeable future. Too often, international attention begins to fade after the initial emergency phase, and long-term support becomes less predictable as displacement situations become entrenched. Humanitarian assistance and the generosity of host communities are overstretched, especially when policy frameworks and institutional arrangements are developed primarily for short-term humanitarian interventions. In these situations, the challenge is often developmental—rather than humanitarian—in nature (Box 1).

Box 1. Forced Displacement: Revisiting the Humanitarian-Development Nexus

Key considerations in addressing the humanitarian-development nexus include:

- The complex nature of conflict-related displacement in the HOA requires attention to a range of challenges like human rights, humanitarian, development, reconstruction, and peace-building in the quest for durable solutions.
- A differentiated approach is required to address the humanitarian and developmental needs of the displaced, based on the years of displacement and relative vulnerability of individual households/families.
- Addressing displacement challenges through humanitarian means has limited capacity to deliver sustainable self-reliance of populations and in some cases has resulted in a cycle of dependence on humanitarian assistance.
- Durable solutions will require situation-specific comprehensive approaches and partnerships among government, humanitarian, and development actors with bilateral and multilateral assistance.
- Despite their best efforts, humanitarian actors are limited by annual budget cycles, which do not provide the right incentives for sustainable multiyear planning necessary in a development program. There is a mismatch between demand for humanitarian emergencies and resources, making it difficult to sustain investments in livelihood activities.

44. The development implications of forced displacement are both positive and negative. The presence of displaced persons can add a serious strain on weak national and local institutions, as well as potentially causing or exacerbating strained relations between the displaced and the host community. Displacement may also have long-term negative developmental impacts affecting human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction efforts, and environmental sustainability. At the same time, displacement may have some positive impacts. Where those displaced are able to further develop and make use of their skills and coping mechanisms, displacement may contribute to economic growth benefiting both the displaced and the host
region. In the event of return, successful local integration, or resettlement in third countries, displaced persons can bring valuable human and economic capital to the recovery process. Therefore, building on the positive impacts of forced displacement—and minimizing the negative impacts—constitutes a significant development imperative.

45. **Migrants have varied needs and vulnerabilities.** The vast majority of migrants do not fit any particular label or established (legal) category, such as a refugee or trafficked person. However, the migrants and communities affected by mixed migration have various humanitarian and development needs. In particular, migrants with distinct vulnerabilities merit special attention, notably to the needs and vulnerabilities of refugee migrants (IOM, 2008). Displaced refugees lose housing, land and property, jobs, physical assets, social networks, and resources. Displacement often also results in food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, and social marginalization. In many cases, access to services such as education and health is exceedingly difficult because the displaced may have left behind the necessary personal documentation, may not be recognized as having any entitlements under the local government authority where they now reside, or because they can no longer pay for school fees and health services (Christensen & Harild, 2009).

**Characteristics of refugee and IDP hosting areas**

46. **All the refugee camps are situated close to the border of the refugee producing country.** The host communities are often of the same ethnic background as the refugees, with whom they share language, culture, and religion. Refugees are generally placed in camps and provided with humanitarian assistance, including food aid, housing material, education, and health. A positive variation of this is Uganda, which does not have camps but settlements where refugees have the right to the use of land for cultivation, giving them a chance at becoming self-reliant. In Djibouti, refugee camps are more akin to transit points. While the camps themselves remain somewhat permanent structures, the populations in them are continually moving. A few examples of this dynamic include (a) Dollo Ado in Ethiopia, which is more like a collaborative host and camp community tied by dynamic trade in goods, services, and labor exchange; (b) Dadaab in Kenya, which is tantamount to a free trade zone connecting tax-free contraband from Dubai through Kismayo to Dadaab and surrounding points; and (c) Ali Addeh in Djibouti, which is a kind of rest home for the aged and young, with youth and able-bodied residents migrating out for work to the urban centers and to the Gulf and sending remittances back to the socially protected extended families. In northern Uganda, the planning of humanitarian assistance is increasingly taking the “protracted” refugee situations into consideration though short-term emergency humanitarian assistance, which is still provided in Kiryandango (northwest Uganda) where the South Sudanese have occupied settlements for the last 20 years.

47. **Humanitarian actors are undertaking developmental interventions in many of the refugee and IDP hosting areas.** Since refugee and IDP issues are often not part of host country local and national development plans, UNHCR and its implementing partners (IPs) and other humanitarian actors often construct intra/inter camp roads, and build schools and health facilities that are not included in local planning. In many places, host communities have therefore benefited from social services, such as better-quality health and education provided to refugees in the camps. A critical challenge is to both increase and better target social services in a more balanced manner benefiting hosts and refugees in these traditionally underserved areas. Sudan
offers a good example of integrated planning (Box 2). In addition, both UNHCR in Uganda and Ethiopia have made significant efforts to add refugee programs to their respective national development plans; both hope to realize this goal shortly.

Box 2. Integrated Planning in Eastern Sudan

The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) and the program “Sustainable Options for Livelihood Security in Eastern Sudan (SOLSES)” provide the overall policy framework for the promotion of recovery and development in East Sudan and embed the scope for addressing the needs of IDPs as part of the local recovery and development planning. The Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF) is the main institution responsible for the planning and allocation of development resources to the region and is providing operational capacity to ESPA. At the programmatic level, a Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) has been implemented during 2012–14 by development and humanitarian agencies to introduce an area-based approach, which attempted to integrate refugees, IDPs, and host communities into common program planning platforms. In addition, the Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) notes that integrating the displaced into communities and providing them with sustainable livelihood options will be essential for peace, security, and shared economic growth. The Interim-PRSP also identified the reintegration of IDPs and refugees as one of its pillars. In 2015, the poverty assessment is being conducted in Sudan as a preparatory step for the elaboration of the full-PRSP. A similar assessment is being planned for all the refugee camps in Eastern Sudan to establish a comparable baseline in terms of poverty reduction based on national standards (World Bank).

48. **Refugee hosting areas are often neglected and viewed as neither economically nor politically important.** Generally perceived to be areas of limited economic potential, border areas are populated by low numbers of minority groups who lack representation in central power structures. They are often underdeveloped and unstable, with low education and health outcomes and entrenched poverty. The state often has limited reach, making it even more difficult for border communities to cope with either the pressures associated with increasing resource scarcity and perceived or real social and economic exclusion. Where governments have ignored demands for basic services, closed avenues for political participation, or failed to address grievances, marginalized groups may become radicalized and resort to violence. Some governments in the region agree that development of these marginalized areas has huge potential to reduce ethnic conflict, increase resilience, create jobs, and improve the lives of border communities, which include, among others, displaced people.

49. **In most of the HOA countries, refugee issues are looked at through a security lens.** An exception is Uganda, where the Refugees Department is under the Office of Prime Minister and led by the Minister of Relief, Disaster Preparedness, and Refugees. In other HOA countries, refugee issues are managed by ministries dealing with internal security, a reflection of the predominant view in the region that associates refugees with security issues. A typical example of this is the Kenyan government’s reaction to a range of security incidents. Since December 2012, security incidents in Nairobi and other parts of the country have been followed by government actions that have directly or indirectly affected refugees.
Environmental degradation

50. **The presence of refugees can have a negative environmental impact in the hosting communities and areas.** The setting up of camps or settlements in many instances requires the clearing of vegetation leading to some level of deforestation. The materials used to construct the shelters for refugee families are often taken from the areas around the camps, contributing to more deforestation. In Shire and Kakuma, the practice of constructing refugee shelters using mud bricks has contributed to increased soil erosion. The main impact on the environment, however, is associated with the massive energy needs of the refugees. In all refugee camps visited, both refugees and host communities complained about the shortage of fire wood/energy supply. As a result, refugees go out to fetch firewood and host communities sell charcoal to refugees. The sale of firewood, sticks for shelter construction, and charcoal are a major livelihood activity for the host community.

51. **Environmental impacts—particularly the cutting of trees for firewood—have caused tensions between refugees and host communities.** Since the locals themselves depend on wood-based fuels for cooking, and since the refugee hosting areas often are rain-deficient and have historically faced environmental degradation, the presence of a large number of refugees has tremendously exacerbated the environmental problem. In addition, in camps like Dadaab and Dollo Ado, the significant influx of host community migrants to these areas—in addition to refugees—has further increased competition for scarce environmental resources like cooking fuel. The stakeholders in various refugee hosting areas—including the government, refugees, host communities, and humanitarian agencies—have pointed out the need for solutions to the refugees’ energy problem, not only to improve their quality of life but to also address tensions with the host communities.

Economic dynamics

52. **The economic impact of the presence of the refugees has been both positive as well as negative.** Overall, it is usually contended that the indirect costs of refugees on their hosts outweigh other long-term economic benefits. The introduction of refugees to an economy, particularly large refugee movements, can lead to rising prices for essential goods and services, depress local wage rates, and increase environmental degradation, though these tend to change in protracted displacement scenarios. They can also mean increased fiscal costs to governments, as refugees are users of public services and goods. For instance, in Dollo Ado, the host communities complained that the price of charcoal and sugar had quadrupled after the arrival of Somali refugees. The most vulnerable persons in the host communities are often severely affected by this inflation in basic goods and services prices.

53. **A positive economic impact has been the stimulation of the host economy by the refugee demand for consumption and luxury goods.** Remittances coming into the refugee camps—often from the expansive Somali diaspora networks—have increased refugee purchasing power, stimulating the host economy and providing working capital for refugees to engage in small business activities. The refugee hosting areas have seen increased economic activity, partly due to the presence of refugees, their demand for goods and services, as well as the refugees’ desire

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10 For example, in Uganda the use of solid fuels is almost universal: 96 percent of households use solid fuels for cooking. Wood is the normal fuel in 85 percent of rural households, while 68 percent of urban households use charcoal (Uganda Bureau of Statistics and ICF International Inc. 2012).
to feel "normal" and to gain dignity by maintaining hope and trying to escape the realities of their status. The increased access to goods imported through trading routes in the refugee producing country—for example, electronic goods in Dollo Ado originated from the Middle East through Mogadishu—is another important factor. Refugee camps—such as Dadaab, with a population of some 475,000, and Dollo Ado, with over 205,000 refugees receiving remittances and wanting to supplement income and diet—represent market opportunities for host communities and beyond. In particular, local contractors in the Dollo Ado and Kakuma areas were contracted by humanitarian agencies to construct schools and health facilities in the camps. In Shire, the small businesses owned by the refugees and local host communities have made the local economy even more vibrant. In several refugee-hosting locations, including Dadaab and Dollo Ado, the influx of refugees has been followed by the influx of nationals, moving to refugee-hosting areas in search of better livelihoods and economic opportunities.

54. Refuges—and the humanitarian agencies that assist them—provide additional unexploited economic opportunities at the local and regional levels. With the right support and guidance, local businesses could provide even more products and services to the aid agencies. The introduction of a cash component in lieu of a portion of the food aid, which is soon to be introduced in Kakuma, has the potential to provide a positive boost to the local economy. The opportunities to use the millions of dollars of humanitarian assistance in refugee hosting areas could possibly be better used to stimulate the local economy and to build a strong private sector in the refugee hosting areas. However, in order to explore these opportunities, the legal and policy framework in most of the refugee hosting countries needs to be revised to give refugees the right to own property, the right to work, and the freedom to move out of camps.

55. Both the displaced and host communities are economically active. The most common misperceptions of refugees in protracted displacement is that they are (a) economically homogenous, (b) technologically illiterate, (c) economically isolated, (d) a burden or dependent, (e) inherently dangerous and/or exploitative, and (f) competitors for jobs and opportunities (Betts, Bloom, Kaplan, & Omata, 2014). This is not the case in various displacement situations in the Horn of Africa. For example, in Kakuma, Kenya, there is a relatively vibrant economy with trade in a wide range of items—including livestock, construction materials, and charcoal—between the refugee and host communities. The refugee camps represent opportune markets for host community businesses, where refugees spend a large proportion of their disposable incomes on food and non-food items provided by refugee and host community businesses. Small traders and wholesale outlets run by both refugee and host communities are engaged in selling food and non-food items, reflecting a fair level of integration between the economies of the two communities. Businesses in camps pay trade licenses, but the realization of their full tax potential is limited by the enforcement capacity of local government and also the ease of doing business.

56. It is inaccurate to portray refugees as poor people who represent an economic burden to the host community. Refugees have some access to capital, thanks to remittances and relief assistance, and bring with them useful skills that could contribute to the economy of the host community. In Kakuma, the superior purchasing power of the refugees has been driving economic activities in the camp and its surroundings. Communities in Turkana have developed pastoralist skill sets that are adapted to the region’s particular landscape and harsh climatic conditions and are renowned for their production of significant amounts of high quality goat and camel meat. Together, economic transactions between these two groups are likely to be mutually beneficial. In camp areas like Dollo Ado (southern Ethiopia), refugees from farming communities
have much-needed agricultural skills that could interact with the host community to optimize irrigation-fed agriculture in camp and hosting areas.

57. A study of refugee economies in Uganda refuted a number of myths on refugees and their economic inactivity and isolation. The study revealed that (a) refugees are networked within settlements, nationally, and transnationally, and both refugee and Ugandan traders connect refugee settlements to wider economic systems; (b) refugees often make a positive contribution to the host state economy, exemplified by the significant volume of exchange between refugees and Ugandan nationals, as well as by refugees’ creation of employment opportunities for Ugandan nationals; (c) refugees are economically diverse and have significant levels of internal inequality, as well as a range of different livelihood activities; (d) some refugees are successful entrepreneurs; and (e) refugees are users and, in some cases, creators of technology. They have higher levels of internet use than the general population, use mobile phones extensively, and frequently adapt their own appropriate technologies (Betts, Bloom, Kaplan, & Omata, 2014).

Social effects

58. Interactions between refugees and host communities occur against a complex backdrop. The host community is shaped by its cultural history and the condition of poverty. Meanwhile, the refugee community is shaped by the drastic change in their situation, but this is tempered by their continued access to global networks, capital consumption, and relief. The result is that in many instances, the situation of the refugees is better off than the host communities. For example, members of the host community may seek employment in the camps, and host-community children may seek educational opportunities in camps. There are also examples of trade, whereby members of the host community sell meat, firewood, charcoal, and timber to the refugees. These interactions are uneven, since a larger percentage of the refugees have better purchasing power than the host community, as well as improved access to basic services. In this imbalance, there is potential for anger, and misunderstanding. The net result of this unequal relationship is that it succeeds in increasing or maintaining social distance between the host community and refugees.

59. Among the positive social impacts of the presence of refugees are the increased ties between the refugees and host communities. This is because in most areas there is a strong ethnic and cultural affinity between the two that has contributed to a positive experience for the refugees and strengthened ties with host communities including incidents of intermarriage between members of the host and refugee communities, despite the negative environmental impact that is often associated with the presence of massive refugee numbers. The generosity of the host communities in the Shire area, is improving the tenuous relationship between Ethiopian and Eritrean communities, at the local level, created by the 1998–2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean War (and before). The increased trading ties and marriage between the host and refugee communities in other refugee camps like Turkana is strengthening social bonds between the governments and among the people of the region.

60. There have also been negative effects, including blaming refugees for criminal activities and terrorists attacks in host countries. For example, the attacks by Al Shabaab in Kenya led to increased security concerns for Kenyans and was blamed on the presence of the Somali refugees.
Increased urbanization

61. **Displacement and return are increasingly becoming urbanized.** According to recent estimates of UNHCR, some five million refugees—almost one-half of the world’s total—and approximately 13 million IDPs now live in urban areas (Head et al. 2012). In recent decades, many cities and towns around the world have seen dramatic population growth, and a prominent feature of this global trend of urbanization is forced displacement (Metcalfe et al. 2011). In the HOA, Juba (South Sudan), Khartoum (Sudan), and Nairobi (Kenya) are examples of cities that have seen an urban population explosion with the displaced. Many of those refugees and IDPs have moved to urban areas (Table 10) in search of greater security, including a degree of anonymity, better access to basic services, and greater economic opportunities.

Table 10. Urbanization of Forced Displacement in HOA Countries (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>RURAL</th>
<th>URBAN</th>
<th>UNKNOWN</th>
<th>TOT. POPULATION OF CONCERN TO UNHCR³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>19,442</td>
<td>4,368</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>430,904</td>
<td>4,813</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>435,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>536,823</td>
<td>50,400</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>607,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,842</td>
<td>1,274,334</td>
<td>1,286,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>546,186</td>
<td>12,927</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>561,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,032,078</td>
<td>48,065</td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>2,083,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>251,394</td>
<td>43,379</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>294,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,819,887</strong></td>
<td><strong>175,794</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,300,210</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,295,891</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: ³ Including refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs protected by UNHCR, returned refugees, returned IDPs, stateless persons, and others. UNHCR’s urban vs. rural data is not differentiated by categories (i.e. refugees, IDPs etc.); instead, they are all grouped together under the label “Total Population of Concern to UNHCR.”

62. There is a severe underestimation of the number of refugee returnees who stay in urban areas. This is partly due to the widespread assumption that returnees would return to their rural place of origin. Returnees staying in urban areas are often reluctant to identify themselves, as they are afraid of being forced back to rural areas. While they often face challenges familiar to all urban poor and migrants, urban displaced people can be further disadvantaged by virtue of the trauma of displacement, loss of social capital, non-possession of sufficient documentation, limited support networks, restrictions on rights to work and enter markets, and, in many contexts, antagonism by settled residents (Head et al. 2012). This in turn makes displaced people vulnerable to further destitution, exploitation, and abuse.

63. **Limited or nonexistent basic social services in areas of origin has resulted in urban expansion in South Sudan.** With limited or nonexistent social services available to returnees in
South Sudan, especially in their areas of origin, many have moved into urban centers, with less than optimal results. Refugees that returned to South Sudan after the CPA were unable to integrate into urban areas in the absence of a clear policy on land allocation for returnees, who are consequently forced to try to keep their options open (Martin and Sluga 2011). It was also common to see a lot of returnees from Sudan staying in transit camps for longer periods, mainly due to their inability to return to their areas of origin.

64. **Due to the protracted nature of refugee and IDP displacement, refugee and IDP camps are morphing into urban areas.** In areas of displacement, the presence of IDPs in urban areas or previously settled areas increases the risk that conflict will erupt between them and the local population. IDP camps are often located in inhospitable areas, worsening competition over resources. The environment outside the camps is often unsafe, which further restricts population mobility and access to livelihoods. In Darfur, the urban and demographic landscape has significantly changed since the rebellion began. IDP hosting areas have now morphed into towns. The urbanization of IDPs is becoming a factor that contributes to conflict. The prolonged displacement and its associated urban lifestyle may affect the institutions that traditionally mitigate conflict. Protracted displacement has also changed the indigenous social structures that once governed the community. The clash between the new social structures and the traditional mechanisms could make conflict resolution and building social cohesion more difficult.

65. The growth of urban displacement is being addressed through a range of measures. The policy dynamic is largely informed by a recognition of several interrelated factors: the global, regional, and local impacts of climate change; heightened drivers of migration and increasingly restrictive national asylum and migration policies; chronic underdevelopment and the continuing proliferation of urban slums; and the increased local, national, and even international security threats originating in many slum areas (Pantuliano et al. 2012). After extensive consultation, UNHCR issued new operational guidance in September 2009—"UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas." It recognizes that the organization will need to revisit a number of assumptions that underpin current approaches to the issue of IDPs and refugees. The policy emphasizes that UNHCR’s mandated responsibilities to refugees are not affected by their location: cities are legitimate places for refugees to reside. UNHCR is committed to advocating for the expansion of protection space for urban refugees, so that their internationally recognized rights may be respected and their needs met. Outside UNHCR, there is an increased consensus that urban planning, poverty reduction strategies, slum upgrading, and other community development interventions must take full account of new demographic realities. Urban development policies—such as planning infrastructure or devising livelihood support interventions—need to acknowledge the existence, needs, and abilities of communities of displaced people (Head et al. 2012).

**Increased need for social infrastructure and livelihoods opportunities**

66. **Basic service provision in most return sites is inadequate.** Assistance by the international community is normally provided only at a final destination in order to avoid clustering of people in transitional sites, protracted displacement situations, and aid dependency. This leaves those who cannot return to their home village without any assistance (IDMC 2010 a). In some cases, returnee families to southern Kordofan—sensitive to the lack of educational opportunities in areas of return—chose to leave their children behind in the place of displacement. In east, west, and
north Aweli, the presence of a large number of returnees is placing further pressure on already overstretched education services. Many of the displaced in Jonglei State had little access to clean water, and as a result there was an outbreak of cholera in 2009. In addition to the risk of cholera and other communicable diseases, there is an underlying nutritional problem in many states of South Sudan (IDMC 2010 b), highlighting the urgent need to strengthen institutions that deliver basic services. In eastern Sudan, refugees and IDPs have been affected by acute poverty and underdevelopment. Given their difficulties in accessing food, drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities, their health conditions are generally dire (IDMC 2013 a). In southern Kordofan, some villages have more than doubled in size since the arrival of the returnees, putting tremendous pressure on resources, food, and particularly shelter (Pantuliano et al. 2007). Overall access to basic education has remained extremely low for a number of years. According to a primary education survey conducted by UNICEF in 2006 and 2007, IDPs living in the Afgoye corridor and in settlements in Galgadud, Mudug, and other areas in Somalia had among the lowest enrollment rates.

67. **Livelihood opportunities for returnees and receiving communities remain limited to subsistence agriculture and small commerce that fail to guarantee adequate food security.** According to a livelihoods assessment conducted by WFP, IDPs and returnees in South Sudan face greater food insecurity than non-displaced residents (WFP 2013). Additional constraints to the reintegration of the returnees include poor cultivation (caused by a lack of seeds and tools), lack of cultivation knowledge, lack of oxen and ploughs, poor harvests, and reliance on subsistence farming (IDMC 2013 c). The limited ability to meet income needs means that they also rely on local charity, scarce international food aid (which is generally not dependable or close to meeting their needs), or begging (Lindley and Haslie) 2011. The lack of livelihood opportunities exacerbate other problems for IDPs—such as exploitation by landlords or the lack of access to existing basic services—and lowers their coping capacities. Empowering IDPs by creating livelihoods, in particular agricultural or business opportunities, will enable them to cope better and will therefore lessen the burden on local communities. A “holistic reintegration strategy” and accompanying resources are urgently needed to help the millions of people who have returned to rebuild their lives and obtain access to livelihoods (Refugees International 2009).

68. **IDPs have significant malnutrition rates.** Kassala and the Red Sea states have the highest malnutrition rates in Sudan, with acute malnutrition rates above the 15 percent emergency threshold in some areas. Just over 50 percent of camp-based IDPs were reported to be receiving food rations in September 2010 (IDMC 2010 c). In the ‘Three Areas region,’ consisting of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, there are high rates of malnutrition. A 2009 UN food security assessment revealed that 30 percent of the Dinka Ngok population and 23 percent of the Misseriya population were severely food insecure. In the greater Abyei area, 52,000 people receive food assistance (IDMC 2010 b). In Darfur, the 2010 UN and Partners Work Plan for Sudan noted that conditions in Darfur remained critical, with some areas in acute nutritional crisis (IDMC 2010a) The expulsion of NGOs has impacted the delivery of services, with a particularly serious gap in sanitation services in some areas (IDMC 2010a).
Protection Challenges and Gender-based violence (GBV)

69. **Displaced populations in general, but women in particular, confront a range of severe protection challenges.** As indicated, constrained or lack of access to basic services, resources, and livelihoods constitute a considerable challenge to the socioeconomic resilience of displaced populations. Refugees and IDPs also confront threats to their physical and psychosocial well-being, both external to and within protection sites, including risk of and exposure to gender-based violence. Displaced women and children, who are a majority in many areas, are among the most vulnerable (Map 2). LGBTI members of the population, while a minority, are also targets for discrimination and violence.\(^\text{11}\)

70. **GBV is a pervasive challenge across the Horn of Africa, particularly in those countries affected by persistent conflict.** While prevalence is often rooted in entrenched norms and practices that perpetuate uneven power dynamics between men and women, conditions of conflict and insecurity often exacerbate the incidence of GBV, as manifested in varying forms of physical, sexual, psychosocial, and economic abuse. Persistent violations include rape, physical assault, intimate partner violence, abduction, forced prostitution, exploitation, and human trafficking.

71. **GBV, and particularly sexual violence, may occur as a crime of opportunity.** Perpetrators capitalize on the climate of impunity resulting from the breakdown in social and moral order, as well as from the breakdown in security and rule of law, including of justice institutions that would normally mitigate such acts. In many circumstances, however, threat or use of sexual or physical violence has also been used as a systematic tool of war, intended to humiliate communities and to disempower civilians, particularly men, in opposing groups. In Sudan, for example, sexual and physical assault of women and girls throughout the crisis in Darfur and elsewhere has constituted a systematic pattern of attack perpetrated by state and non-state actors, including members of the government’s armed forces, as well as by armed militia and opposition groups (UNSC 2014a). Although GBV was a persistent challenge in South Sudan prior to the political crisis, the onset of conflict in December 2013 precipitated increased violence against women and girls, including reports of targeted rapes against opposing ethnic groups as a distressing feature of the ongoing violence (UNFPA 2014).

72. **Other forms of GBV prevail as well.** Human trafficking and torture, of refugees and other asylum seekers, has been highlighted as a particularly devastating practice. Intimate partner violence is also a persistent challenge, particularly in IDP camps, likely extending from conditions of extreme psychosocial trauma as well as from the dislocation of male identities as a result of displacement. Male IDPs and refugees, often unable to fulfill their traditional roles as providers and protectors, suffer from frustration, stress, and inadequacy, which can manifest in negative coping behaviors, including substance abuse and violence in the home.

73. **IDPs and refugees are particularly vulnerable, as conditions of conflict and flight increase exposure to the varying forms of violence.** Women and children often account for a disproportionate share of the displaced as pervasive insecurity and conflict contribute to shifts in social structures and household demographics and traditional socialization patterns. This is exacerbated when men leave families to join armed groups, seek out economic resources or are subject to violence, insecurity, and/or death. Family splitting, as occurs in Somalia, constitutes an

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important survival mechanism as families break up to spread economic risks and increase access to livelihood opportunities and other basic services. As such, families undergo prolonged or indefinite phases of separation, often contributing to high numbers of female-headed households and unaccompanied children among the displaced. In Somalia, for example, some reports have described that 50–60 percent of IDP households are female-headed (UNICEF 2011), while others have suggested that 70–80 percent of IDPs and refugees are women and children (UNDP 2012a). Similarly, a striking feature of the current crisis in South Sudan is the significant number of women and children among refugee populations in neighboring countries. According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), there are reported cases of men being turned away at borders by parties to the conflict, leaving women and children to cross into the refugee context on their own. Women and children account for over 90 percent of South Sudanese refugees in Gambella, Ethiopia, and over 85 percent of new arrivals in Kiryandongo, Uganda (IRC 2014).

74. **The absence of families or community structures exposes displaced women and children to severe protection challenges, both outside of and within protection sites.** Migration to camps often exposes displaced populations to varying security threats. An IRC assessment (IRC 2011) reported that Somali women and girls in transit to Dadaab were often victims of sexual and physical violence, frequently targeted by bandits and armed groups along the way. Within IDP and refugee settlements, however, women and girls are further exposed to various forms of violence. Camps are often insecure, unplanned, and transient spaces, with informal housing structures with no locks on doors or latrine facilities, increasing opportunities for violence. In South Sudan, civilian sites are overcrowded, with little security, oversight, or privacy, further increasing the risk of assault (IDMC 2014b; FAO/FSNAU 2012).

75. **Displaced women and children often employ high-risk coping strategies to access basic resources for themselves and their families.** As men face greater risks of death if they leave protection sites, women and girls travel long distances outside camps to collect firewood or to distribution points for water, food, or other materials, further exposing them to the potential for sexual and physical assault. In an effort to improve security of populations inside camps and to minimize migration outside, organizations have subsequently adopted a number of basic protection measures such as increasing street lighting—particularly of public spaces in camps—and distributing fuel efficient stoves to minimize the need for firewood (IRC 2014).

76. **There are a number of common challenges impeding prevention and response to GBV.** The evidence base measuring prevalence and extent remains poor, blocking efforts for targeted programming and effective response. Barriers to proper collection of data include insecurity, restricted access, and inadequate capacity for data collection. Additionally, in the context of Darfur and Somalia, local actors have been discouraged and threatened against reporting specific dimensions of GBV data, resulting in a dearth of usable information (UN OCHA 2011).

77. **Rape carries extreme social stigma, and a culture of silence and shame persists.** Women and girls are often reluctant to report cases of rape or to seek medical attention or psychosocial support. In Darfur in particular, distrust of government institutions or resources is pervasive among IDPs. Survivors of violence are therefore less likely to seek emergency medical services or to report cases of violence or abuse out of fear or mistrust toward government bodies, including health centers, police, or other security forces.

78. **When the rule of law has broken down, a culture of impunity persists as there is little legal recourse for survivors of violence.** In situations such as that in Sudan, there is little political will
to investigate or prosecute allegations of rape, particularly those levied against government forces. Other barriers include limited availability of qualified medical and psychosocial care, lack of proper case management support, limited access to confidential reporting mechanisms, and often a breakdown or absence of traditional or statutory structures within communities to seek redress. Support programming offered from UN and humanitarian organizations, while critically important, is often fragmented, underfunded, and insufficient to meet the needs of survivors. Major protection constraints affecting organizations like humanitarian institutions include volatile security conditions, lack of access to affected populations, and insufficient resources to meet the full extent of needs.

79. **The developmental impacts of GBV are severe.** Beyond the physical and psychological damage for the individuals involved, GBV also carries important social and economic costs. An atmosphere of fear impedes participation in economic, social, and political life; survivors often face societal stigma and rejection by their spouses, families, and communities, and are therefore often unlikely to report cases of rape or seek support services. This has a significant impact on communal security, social cohesion, and efforts toward more sustainable recovery. Proposed programming to address facets of forced displacement presents an important opportunity to include or improve understanding of the extent and incidence of gender-based violence and to strengthen integrated service provision for survivors, as well as programming for other critical protection concerns such as human trafficking. Transforming social values and norms that perpetuate forms of violence against women and children (and sometimes men), is critical and requires sensitization and engagement with communities as a whole, including with religious and communities leaders.
CHAPTER 3.

REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INITIATIVES ADDRESSING FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND MIXED MIGRATION
80. This chapter provides an overview of some of the ongoing regional and national efforts that are aimed at addressing forced displacement and mixed migration. It also highlights the experiences of returnees to South Sudan and Somalia and key emerging lessons.

Regional Initiatives

81. There have been a number of national and regional initiatives that are designed to address the issue of mixed migration and displacement.

82. **EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative.** In November 2014, the European Union and the African Union launched a regional initiative to deal with migration and asylum challenges, which is known as the Khartoum Process or EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative. The initiative includes the European Union and Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt, and Tunisia. It is focused on trafficking and smuggling of human beings from the region, and commits the signing states to establish and manage reception centers, cooperate in the identification and prosecution of criminal networks, support victims of trafficking, and protect the human rights of smuggled migrants.

83. **Global Initiative on Somali Refugees (GISR).** GISR is a strategic initiative launched in 2013 and managed from UNHCR in close partnership with representatives in the six affected states—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, and Yemen. It seeks ways to create dialogue and generate ideas for sustainable solutions for Somali refugees. A high-level panel on Somali refugees was convened in November 2013 in Geneva to identify priority areas to be addressed in the search for solutions, and generated a set of guiding principles to shape action going forward. In August 2014, the Global Initiative on Somali Refugees convened a meeting in Addis Ababa between UNHCR and ministers from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, and Yemen, as well as representatives of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, the African Union, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The meeting agreed to consider a move from the traditional care and maintenance approach to one that emphasized refugee self-reliance, and to preserve asylum space as long as conditions in Somalia were not conducive to large-scale return. The meeting also called on the international community to play their part in sharing the responsibility by supporting host nations and Somalia and providing expanded resettlement opportunities for Somali refugees.

84. **Solutions Alliance Somalia (SAS).** Launched in April 2014, the Solution Alliance is a coalition of humanitarian actors, development organizations, affected states, donor nations, academics, the private sector, civil society and other actors working together to promote and enable the transition for displaced persons away from dependency toward increased resilience, self-reliance, and development. In particular, the Solutions Alliance aims to (a) support innovative solutions and concrete operations in selected displacement situations; (b) help shape the global policy agenda, including the post-2015 development agenda and the New Deal process, to recognize displacement as a development challenge as well as a humanitarian and protection issue; and (c) ensure that a diverse and growing group of partners form a vibrant network and maximize the impact of their individual efforts. The Solutions Alliance Somalia (SAS) is a Kenya-based forum/coalition for providing common ground and a platform for data analysis and exchange of information, as well as creating a joint vision to address Somali displacement within the region. The members of the SAS include the World Bank, UNHCR, and the Danish Embassy (Danida),
National Initiatives

85. **There are emerging examples of national development plans and compacts incorporating the needs of refugees and IDPs.** The Sudan peace building project, the devolution process in Kenya after the 2010 constitution, and the “emerging regions” policy in Ethiopia provide possibilities for regional development plans to integrate displacement issues into development planning. In Uganda, the hosting areas for refugees from South Sudan are mainly in the northern part of the country. While the present formulation of a new national development plan does not incorporate displacement issues, the planning of a new phase of the Peace, Recovery and Development Program—targeting development support for northern Uganda, together with the WB-supported Northern Uganda Social Action Fund—provides an opportunity to include refugee issues in development planning and strengthen local governance structures to help implement such development programs. Several development interventions support the displaced and host communities. Some of the more prominent initiatives are described below.

86. **The Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI).** TSI provides a framework for transitioning from displacement situations to durable solutions. As a partnership between humanitarian and development actors, TSI prioritizes effective inter-agency partnerships, with specially tailored area-specific interventions to increase self-reliance. Projects are designed to benefit the host populations as well as the displaced, and have a strong component of national ownership and building the capacity of local government, without which sustainable solutions would be impossible. Through comprehensive interventions—in the areas of vocational training and business skills, basic services, protection, rural livelihoods, microfinance, environment, gender, and social cohesion—the program aims to enhance self-reliance, reduce aid dependency, and assist the socioeconomic integration of both refugees and host communities by restoring and expanding sustainable livelihood opportunities. Some 30,000 refugees of working age are opting to work within Kassala State. The provision of work permits to the refugees is an important milestone, helping them achieve self-reliance and alleviating dependence on external humanitarian aid.

87. As part of TSI, two ongoing pilot projects—the UNDP-UNHCR Transitional Solutions Initiative for Refugees and their Host Communities, Eastern Sudan-Phase 1, and the World Bank-UNHCR Sustainable Livelihoods for Displaced and Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Sudan (for refugees, IDPs, and host communities)—are trying to address the needs of the displaced and host communities in eastern Sudan. The two pilot projects, implemented in two areas and contexts, are designed to be fully complementary in terms of the expected implementation lessons they would generate. Different approaches are applied by the projects in areas such as micro-credit, capacity building and gender to assess their relative effectiveness for future application. A key difference between the two pilots is the World Bank’s emphasis on using local government agencies for project implementation. The World Bank-supported project emphasizes enhancing the capacity of state and local authorities, the private sector, and civil society for participatory development management.

88. **The Sudan Peacebuilding for Development Project Phase 2 (SPDP2).** This project is
attempting to address the needs of IDPs, host communities, and other conflict-affected people in Darfur and the Three Areas of Sudan. This project, which is building on SPDP Phase 1 (pilot project), attempts to reduce resource-related conflict along target livestock migration routes by improving livelihood opportunities and access to related infrastructures. Component three of the project (Livelihoods and Economic Development) targets women, who suffer the most due to conflicts, and unemployed youth, who are vulnerable to involvement in conflict movements in the absence of employment opportunities. Among women and youth along livestock migration routes, the project has a special focus on those from IDP and returnee communities.

89. **UNHCR/IKEA livelihoods program in Ethiopia.** In Ethiopia’s Dollo Ado, UNHCR, in partnership with the IKEA Foundation, has been engaged in a livelihoods program. The program aims to cultivate 5,000 hectares through 2017 in order to produce sufficient food locally and to raise the economic levels of households among the host and refugee communities, through market development, export of produce, and skills and business enhancement. UNHCR will work with the relevant local administration and communities to form a cooperative or farmer’s union to gradually take over the management of this large program. The cooperative/farmer’s union will take responsibility for locating markets, collecting and transporting produce, ensuring that producers are making a fair profit from their labors, and for eventual overall management of the program. An initial allocation of 125 hectares was made by the local administration in each location in 2013, but work only started in January 2014. Although the refugees will not own the land, they will have the opportunity to work on the farms, providing them with livelihood opportunities. Although the project is not designed to provide durable solutions for the refugees, it can be seen as a transitional safety net for the refugees and local communities.

90. **Cash vouchers instead of food rations.** The World Food Program (WFP) is currently considering the feasibility of cash vouchers, instead of food rations, for the refugees in the Dollo Ado area. If implemented, cash vouchers will have tremendous positive impacts by empowering the refugees and creating more market opportunities for local business people. Inflation, which will be created by the increased demand for local goods, and its subsequent impact on the most vulnerable in the communities needs to be carefully addressed.

91. **The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) program.** This is a UN Country Team commitment linked to the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2016–2020. It is directly complementary to the Government of Uganda’s Settlement Transformative Agenda, which is supported in part as a special project within the NDP II. REHoPE aims to enhance self-reliance and resilience through two main pillars: (1) sustainable livelihoods for refugees and host communities, and (2) enhancing local government capacity for social service delivery. REHoPE links relief and development by rallying development actors—such as other UN agencies and development partner—around refugee-impacted districts. Currently, the strategy is in the final approval stages; in 2015, it will be established as one of the main joint programs of the UN Country Team within the UNDAF. The total program is expected to be around $170 million over the course of 5 years (see Box 3).

92. **UNHCR gardening program in Kenya.** In Turkana, Kenya, UNHCR has been supporting refugees to establish multi-story gardening and backyard gardening activities, which
contributed greatly to dietary diversification and dignity. In partnership with Don Bosco, UNHCR has been building refugees’ technical skills. In order to explore opportunities to better integrate refugee and host community economies and to enhance peaceful coexistence between refugee and host communities in the Turkana area, UNHCR has launched the Turkana Initiative aimed at integrating the refugee and host community economies. The initiative attempts to reorient the refugee assistance program to contribute to (a) improving the socioeconomic conditions of the refugee and host communities; (b) better prepare the host community to take advantage of emerging economic opportunities in upcoming extraction and potential irrigation-fed agriculture; and (c) reduce overdependence on humanitarian aid and prepare refugees for durable solutions.

93. **Exploring potential for integration of host-refugee economies in Turkana, Kenya.** In November 2014, UNHCR and the World Bank organized the Turkana Roundtable on the Integration of Refugees and Host Community Economies. The event, opened by the Governor of Turkana County, brought together UN agencies, development organizations, government agencies, CSOs, and local and refugee community representatives. Participants discussed socioeconomic interactions and opportunities to formalize and better integrate the two economies for the mutual benefit of both refugees and the host communities. The roundtable highlighted the need for the new approach to be informed by a better understanding of the economic and social impact of refugee displacement on the county and the socioeconomic dimensions of the pastoral economy. As a follow-up to the roundtable, UNHCR and the World Bank are jointly undertaking an economic social impact analysis. The main objective is to assess the economic and social impact of the presence of refugees on the host communities in Turkana County in Kenya to inform (a) policy discussions on integrating the refugee and host community economies; and (b) the World Bank Group’s development response to displacement-induced macro-fiscal, environmental, and social impacts through existing or stand-alone operations.

94. **The Koboko Initiative.** This is a public-private-UN-NGO sector partnership in Uganda between the Refugee Department in the Office of the Prime Minster, the UNHCR, the Koboko District local government, Associazione Centro Aiuti Volontari, and Kato Eco Farming Limited to deliver commercial-scale agriculture and broader local economic development support to refugee hosting areas. The initiative seeks to develop refugees’ and host communities’ economic capacities as a means to (a) strengthen the communities’ socioeconomic resilience, (b) sustainably increase household income, and (c) utilize refugee and host community economic cooperation to foster a peaceful coexistence.

95. The memorandum of understanding signed between the participants clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each party in relation to phase two and phase three of the Koboko model. These phases are a follow-on to phase one, which focused on humanitarian aid, lifesaving, life sustaining, and basic infrastructure. Phases two and three are focused on building socioeconomic resilience among the Congolese refugees and host communities settled in Koboko District and establishing an institutional cooperation framework. The initiative envisages the participation of refugees and local leaders in jointly planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the program activities.
Box 3. ReHoPE in Uganda

The Adjumani, Arua, and Kiryandongo districts in northern Uganda are currently hosting 157,000 South Sudanese among the nine refugee hosting districts. These refugee-impacted areas are more vulnerable to social and economic shocks than the non-impacted areas due to the underlying poverty of refugees in relation to nationals, and their limited resilience owing to minimum livelihoods diversity and their limited assets or capital to fall back on. Given the poor socioeconomic status of the host communities as well, an area-based approach to addressing critical development needs will need to focus on both refugees and host communities related to (a) community resilience, in particular economic self-reliance and food security, to better weather the impact of conflict (e.g. new influx, community tensions); (b) economic shocks such as market price volatility or food ration reductions; and (c) environmental stress such as drought, climate change, and natural resource degradation. The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) program therefore focuses on the self-reliance and resilience strategic framework for refugee and host communities in Uganda. It is aligned with the National Development Plan II (NDP), as it derives from the government’s refugee strategy within the NDP, known as the Settlement Transformative Agenda, and from the UNDAF 2016–2020. Through a multiyear and multisectoral partnership, the GOU and UN agencies, supported by their development partners, aim to enhance coordination of the gradual transition of programming for refugee-impacted districts from humanitarian toward development approaches. This goal will be achieved through joint analysis, collective advocacy, integrated service delivery, and joint resource mobilization. ReHoPE emphasizes close working relationships between government partners and the UN Country Team in planning and implementation. The Office of the Prime Minister Department of Refugees and nine refugee hosting district local governments are central partners in the planning and coordination of development-oriented interventions and in basic service provision. Government leadership ensures that UN Country Team support will promote resilience and self-reliance in line with local development priorities.

Source: UNHCR
Return lessons

96. The return experience for refugees is informed by the social, economic, and political environment of the countries providing asylum. Access to healthcare, education, clean water, sanitation, and electricity, as well as opportunities for economic activities and jobs, all define the expectations of returnees. To be an attractive option for refugees, return needs to be informed by the voluntary choice of refugees to return in safety and dignity. This requires that circumstances in the country/area of return are conducive to sustainable reintegration, including the progressive establishment of conditions in which people can exercise their full rights and enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives (UNHCR 2014b). Key considerations guiding return as a durable solution are:

i. Long-term safety, security and freedom of movement
ii. An adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care, and basic education
iii. Access to employment and livelihoods
iv. Access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land, and property or provide them with compensation.

97. Past experiences with return to South Sudan and Somalia are illustrative of the challenges that returnees—both refugees and IDPs—face, and provide critical lessons for designing and implementing return as a durable solution.

South Sudan

98. A study done by Pantuliano and colleagues (Pantuliano et al. 2012) claims that “[i]n Southern Sudan there is a strong sense of people ‘returning home,’ often driven by a desire not only to rebuild their own livelihoods and futures, but also to contribute to the building of a viable and peaceful Southern Sudan.” While returnees are rarely able to bring back material capital—which is typically lost, stolen, destroyed, or used along the way—many are able to bring with them either academic or work experience. Nurses, doctors, pharmacists, administrators, carpenters, builders, plumbers, electricians, teachers, police, and business entrepreneurs have been among the returnees to South Sudan following the CPA and then the referendum.

99. Among the major constraints faced by returnees has been their inability to adjust to conditions in places of return with limited or nonexistent basic infrastructure and services, especially when they were introduced to the urban environment—a life with higher standards of living, different economic opportunities, and new social networks. There were also positive aspects to this exposure: returnees came back with both different mentalities, attitudes, and opinions, and an observed peacefulness of the returnees reflected in greater awareness and increasing acceptance of other people (Ersland 2014).

100. Especially in South Sudan, given the myriad range of developmental challenges and urgent needs facing the country—including security, access to clean water, food security, and health concerns for the population as a whole—the needs of returnees and their (re)integration were less urgent.

101. Returnees to South Sudan face harsh socioeconomic conditions, including limited employment opportunities, a limited formal economy, and harsh competition for livelihoods. These conditions generally hinder people's livelihood revival and their use of returnee capital—skills, education, experience, and expertise. Access to finance is a major issue; lending criteria, especially of
micro-finance institutions, often restrict returnees’ access (for example, requirements to have a business active for three months before the application, to own land, or to have been settled for 12–18 months before accessing the loan). Lack of social networks, language barriers, and lack of farming skills in a largely agricultural country are other barriers.

102. Access to land is another crucial barrier for the process of (re)settling and (re)integrating into society. The lack of land and housing—especially in urban areas of South Sudan, which have been the destination for the bulk of returnees—has limited people’s opportunities to restore their livelihoods and more generally reestablish their lives, and thus halts the (re)integration process and the utilization of returnee capital. This is a particular constraint when returnees have no farming skills and are not keen to return to places of origin in rural areas. Accessing land in urban areas requires correct formal documentation, money, and in some instances approval by the local chiefs. Those who previously owned land are unable to regain ownership, especially in urban areas, due to land-grabbing and an increasing demand for land. Those who wish to buy land in Juba also face several challenges, including high prices, ethnic discrimination, and bureaucracy.

103. Adding to the limited access to land and economic opportunities, South Sudan offers its population an extremely low level of social services. The weak state apparatus and lack of financial and human resources have limited the development of both infrastructure and social services. The government’s capacity is usually very low, due to lack of resources, corruption, and limited infrastructure, which results in extremely poor service delivery. The quality of the service delivery is further complicated by the lack of qualified personnel—including teachers, paramedics, doctors, and nurses. The state’s inability to provide adequate social services prevents the returnees from exercising their social and economic rights, to live stable and productive lives, and to make use of their returnee capital.

Somalia

104. The challenges for returnees to Somalia, especially IDPs, include access to shelter, livelihoods, services, and security. One impact study (Samuel Hall Consulting 2014) found that three-quarters of returnees were living in a temporary shelter. Nearly half perceived insecurity and violence as the main threat to their returnee livelihood. Nearly all perceived violence as a threat, including incidents of physical assault. Many did not have enough to eat and had difficulty accessing health facilities. More than half reported their main source of sustenance to be either the reception of food aid or the sale thereof, and not agriculture, pastoral, or trading activities. Among the key coping mechanisms deployed by returnees were renewed displacement back to site of displacement owing to insecurity, inability to afford sufficient food, worsening housing and tenure, and reductions in remittances and other sources of income except casual labor.

105. These basic needs are also reflected in intent surveys, as reflected in the Dadaab return intent survey (RIS) on the intention of Somali refugees in Dadaab to return to Somalia. While only 2.6 percent of the refugees living in Dadaab intended to return to Somalia within the 24 months following the RIS, the main decision to return is based on perceived opportunities to earn a living and restart a life in Somalia, and to others a decision of the clan (UNHCR & IOM 2014). In regard to conditions in Somalia, most families indicated a need for more information on the security situation and availability of basic services, including food, water, shelter, education, and health in the preferred areas of return. Those with a livelihood opportunity available on their own or family-
owned land in the return areas would require food security support in the short term, and the provision of agricultural tools, seed, and livestock to build livelihoods in the medium to long term.

106. The Dadaab RIS found that there are myriad different circumstances, expectations, and needs across the broad spectrum of individuals in Dadaab. It is a microcosm of the immense heterogeneity of the Somali people in asylum countries, across clan affiliations, duration of exile, skills, education, and levels of urbanization impacting on durable solutions and return possibilities. Likewise, there are fundamental differences between the experiences and expectations of Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kakuma, and refugees in urban centers. It is critical that solutions or strategies take these differences into account and are based on a comprehensive understanding of the unique sets of experiences. Protection solutions for each different group need to be flexible enough to incorporate what is truly meant by a “durable solution” for all (UNHCR & IOM 2014).
CHAPTER 4.

A HOLISTIC APPROACH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES OF PROTRACTED FORCED DISPLACEMENT
This chapter proposes a holistic approach inclusive of ‘push and pull factors’ to address the development challenges of finding solutions to the protracted displacement and mixed migration situation in the HOA. The Chapter describes the overview of the key principles and considerations that have informed the holistic approach to solutions - local integration, return and/or resettlement -and attempts to frame the proposed strategies and their components, and key recommendations for operationalizing.

The need for a holistic approach

The HOA region needs a holistic approach that builds on the frameworks and mechanisms in place to address forced displacement and mixed migration. There is an emerging, but growing consensus that issues of forced displacement and mixed migration should be addressed in a comprehensive manner. There is no denying that the forcibly displaced have specific protection needs not shared by migrants, but the particular vulnerability and tenuous situation of both these groups cannot be denied.

Protracted humanitarian assistance has inadequately addressed the negative developmental impacts of refugees on host communities. While it has been extremely useful in saving lives, humanitarian assistance has been unable to link to relevant government line ministries. Poor coordination among humanitarian, development, government, and private sector groups has failed to further social and economic development. However, there is a dearth of detailed assessments on the negative and positive impacts and costs of refugees on host economies. For the HOA region, one such study—for the Kakuma camp in Turkana County, Kenya—has just been initiated (Annex 3).

Many HOA countries recognize the need to enhance investments in social and economic infrastructure and services. This augurs well for refugee hosting areas, which are traditionally in marginalized and poor areas. Throughout the region, there is an effort to bring border areas into the mainstream of development and economic prosperity. The “Emerging Regions” agenda in Ethiopia, devolution in Kenya, and the increased focus on reconstructing conflict-affected refugee hosting areas provides an opportunity to address protracted displacement and mixed migration as part of the broader effort to develop these regions. Recent large natural resource discoveries, including oil in parts of Uganda and Kenya and a large reserve of underground water in Turkana, has increased the economic potential of these regions. These potentially new financial resources—if targeted and governed in an inclusive manner—could provide the impetus for addressing and preventing the negative impacts of mixed migration, thus converting host countries and communities from “shock absorbers” to “engines of growth and transformation” for the entire region.

Exploiting the agricultural potential of the HOA countries is a real opportunity. This could strongly influence economic growth, employment, demand for other goods, food security, and overall poverty reduction. The region has large amounts of arable land that are not yet under cultivation. Pastoralist communities and the livestock on which they rely—despite their significant contributions to national economies and to the maintenance of ecosystems—remain socially and economically marginalized. There is clearly a need for modernization, as the old pastoral life style is fading in the face of climate change and the government pursuit of more secure borders. The increase in occupationally broken pastoralists as urban slum dwellers is an alarming trend. The growing urban “shantytowns” in Djiboutiville, Kakuma, and elsewhere in the HOA attest to this trend, though it could be mitigated with
greater investment in better regulating and facilitating cross-border trade.

112. **Facilitating the extensive informal trade networks and the socioeconomic migration dynamics could directly impact incomes and employment in the region.** Most governments of the region do not rank highly on trading across borders in the “Doing Business Report” (World Bank 2014b). At the formal level, poor trade facilitation and weaknesses in institutions, regulations, and currencies of some countries exact a major cost on intraregional trade. Although some regional trade is taking place, the IGAD has lagged behind other regional economic communities in negotiating and interpreting trade agreements, and the institutional framework to resolve associated disputes is weak. There are encouraging signs of political momentum for enhanced regional economic interdependence, as is evident in the HOA country membership in the East African Community, IGAD, and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa. There is growing recognition that donor approaches should promote self-reliance of displaced populations by improving their skill set and reinforcing the legal framework to promote labor mobility—thus empowering them with voice and choice in a range of contexts.

113. **Improving regional infrastructure connectivity can help to improve human development and business competitiveness.** It can also help to strengthen trust and cross-border collaboration. Recognizing that cross-border cooperation is critical to more connected and competitive markets to spur faster economic growth, several HOA countries are working to strengthen their economic ties to their neighbors, particularly through support to cross-border infrastructure. For example, Ethiopia is exporting its abundant hydroelectric power, Kenya is experiencing the transformational effect of improved communications infrastructure, and Djibouti is upgrading its ports and electricity grid. The development of transport corridors to seaports (such as Ethiopia’s development of the Berbera Corridor), the management of shared water resources, improved ICT connectivity, and enhanced energy security are all potential drivers of economic integration.

**Principles of a holistic approach**

114. **Development interventions need to take into account the fact that there is strong interaction between the displaced and host communities.** In addition to resilient, informal economic activities, host communities have been benefiting from education and health services provided to refugees. Due to ethnic ties between the displaced and host communities, there are often strong social interactions. Development interventions should aim to strengthen the quality of the displaced-host community interactions and build on existing social capital for the benefit of both communities. Host communities have also borne the heavy burden of hosting refugees and IDPs. Living in some of the most marginalized and underdeveloped areas in the HOA, refugee and IDP host communities have unmet development needs. The presence of refugees and IDPs has led to environmental destruction and has burdened the weak service delivery capacity in refugee/IDP hosting areas. It is important to strengthen the quality of refugee/IDP/host community interactions. Further, development interventions need to build the resilience and absorptive capacities of host communities, while addressing the negative as well as emergent development impacts of displacement. Addressing the needs of the host communities and refugees—going beyond the ministry responsible for refugee affairs to planning, education, health, environment, agriculture, and livestock—would create better linkages between relevant line ministries to facilitate more expert and efficient delivery of services.
115. **Given the protracted nature of most displacement situations in the HOA, a strategic two-pronged approach to solutions is essential.** Transitional solutions focusing on areas of displacement will attempt to strengthen the resilience of the host communities, while preparing the refugees and IDPs for durable solutions. On the other hand, durable solutions are intended to mainly benefit the refugee/IDP returnees and return communities. In situations of local integration, durable solutions will build on transitional solutions. Both transitional and durable interventions will address similar challenges identified in the analysis thus far: (a) addressing environmental degradation, (b) improving social and economic infrastructure and service delivery, (c) enhancing economic and livelihood opportunities, and (d) addressing different forms of gender-based violence. Depending on the context, these four areas of intervention could be separately addressed or be part of a broader area development program.

116. **Transitional solutions to displacement need to be integrated into the broader development initiatives benefiting refugee/IDP hosting areas.** Refugees and IDPs have been hosted in poor and historically marginalized areas. Several countries in the region are paying increasing attention to the severe development needs of these areas. In Ethiopia, the Emerging Regions development agenda is focusing on four of the five regions (Afar, Beneshangul, Gambella, and Somali) hosting refugees. Due to devolution in 2010, refugee-hosting counties of Kenya (Turkana and Garissa) have local governments with increased resources and stronger commitment to address the severe development needs and service delivery deficits of their population. In Uganda, the government has been implementing a number of initiatives to build conflict-affected areas in northern Uganda that are currently hosting refugees from South Sudan.

117. **A holistic approach needs to comprehensively address the issues of displacement and mixed migration.** The reality on the ground is that the causes, dynamics, and solutions to these regional problems are increasingly converging; addressing these issues requires a holistic strategy. The objectives of the holistic approach proposed by this report are thus (a) supporting capacity enhancement of governance structures at national, subnational, and local levels for improved security and development; (b) mitigating economic, social, and environmental impacts to support social cohesion; (c) strengthening the resilience and economic capacities for self-reliance; and (d) addressing the conditions for return in communities of origin and urban areas given the increasing urbanization of displacement and return. Box 4 provides key principles and laws underpinning the UN engagement throughout the durable solutions process.

118. **Potential development interventions in the above-mentioned areas are along the three areas of analytics, operations, and international aid cooperation.** Key instruments are (a) analytical studies to build the knowledge base and to inform policy dialogue and development interventions; (b) development projects aimed at addressing service and livelihood deficits, but also building the capacity of national and local governments; and (c) integrated international assistance aimed at development programming for both refugees and host countries. Table 1 provides a summary of displacement challenges and proposed solutions.

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### Box 4. Principles and laws underpinning the UN engagement in the durable solutions process

- **State Responsibility.** Working in support of the national and local authorities, and national civil society to ensure they lead and own the process.
- **Rights-based approach.** The rights, needs, and interests of refugee returnees and IDPs should be the primary consideration guiding all policies, decisions, and programs on durable solutions.
- **Community-based, participatory approach.** The response should address the rights, needs, and interests of
refugee returnees, IDPs, and other affected populations and allow them to participate in the planning and management of durable solutions.

- **Address the needs of specific groups, including LGBTI populations.** Particular attention should be paid to address the specific needs of different population groups according to age, gender, and diversity, taking into account groups who are potentially marginalized such as women, children, older persons, people living with HIV/AIDS, LGBTI populations, and the disabled and ethnic or religious minorities.

- **Do no harm.** The assessment to seek durable solutions shall ensure that risk of conflicts is minimized with regard to ensuring nondiscriminatory access to assistance (e.g. IDPs only), property rights, and obligations in relation to access and use of natural resources (forests, fishery grounds, land, rivers, water, pastures and other). In addition, efforts should be made to minimize risks associated with the locations where IDP and returning refugees choose to live as they may relate to the previous conflict.

- **Evidence-based programming.** Assessments will be conducted to ensure that durable solutions are based on thorough assessments and analyses of capacities, resources, service delivery, productive activities, stresses on the natural resource base, social and economic integration, social capital, and rights and obligations, among others (UN 2011).

### Transitional and durable solutions: recommended analytical and operational activities

**119. In the Horn of Africa, the most desirable durable solution to displacement is return.** However, the ability and willingness of the displaced to return to their areas of origin has been hampered by the poor prospects for security, law and order, access to livelihoods, land, employment, education, and other public services. In addition to provision of such services and support, development actors also need to create conducive conditions for return by addressing governance issues, environmental degradation, and GBV in areas of return, benefiting both the returnees and return communities. It is interesting to note that the actual development challenges affecting hosting areas of displacement and return are similar. Therefore, both transitional and durable interventions involve similar sets of activities, which need to be designed and implemented as part of the broader development plans of the respective governments and in a manner that is tailored to the specific context. Proposals for possible analytical and operational activities are discussed hereafter.

**Addressing environmental degradation**

**120. Addressing environmental degradation is a critical component of transitional or durable interventions.** In almost all of the hosting areas, the large number of refugees and IDPs has resulted in environmental degradation and loss of vegetation cover. The unmet energy needs of the displaced are forcing them to cut trees, which is the main cause of tension between the displaced and host communities. In areas of return, rehabilitating the environment contributes to creating conducive conditions for return. Proposed interventions are:

- **Analytical activities.** Build on existing knowledge and where necessary launch new or limited efforts to fill gaps by (a) conducting environmental impact assessments in areas of displacement and return; (b) mapping alternative sources of energy (wind power, solar) in both the Turkana area of Kenya, the Leben Zone (in the Somali Region of Ethiopia), and other areas of displacement/return; and (c) formulating a transparent governance structure for managing the newly found extractive oil and gas resources (e.g. Turkana).
• **Operational activities.** In the short term, (a) explore the development of an integrated regional plan for environmental protection and sustainable energy (possibly with the African Development Bank already involved in the private-public partnership) for wind and other alternative energy sources in northern Kenya; and (b) explore the possibility of scaling up innovative UNHCR pilot projects. In the medium to long term, (c) design programs to address the environmental degradation under way in most areas where displaced now reside in camps and settlements. In addition, programs for the careful extraction of newly discovered natural resources—such as oil, gas, and water—under a clear governance framework is critical to mitigate potential conflict, but also to benefit marginalized host communities.

**Enhancing service delivery**

121. Host communities suffer from underinvestment and/or poor delivery of essential basic services. Even though they benefit from health and education facilities provided to the displaced, the lack of integration—or better coordination between service delivery to the displaced and host communities—means that the existing resources are not utilized in an optimal and sustainable manner. For many refugees and IDPs, the key constraint of return is the absence of services in areas of return. Providing services is one of the most critical activities to facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs. Proposed interventions are:

• **Analytical activities.** Undertake a study examining the possibility of better integrating basic service delivery benefiting the displaced and host communities for optimal and sustainable results.

• **Operational activities.** (a) In the short term, the WBG should conduct a portfolio review and expand projects where feasible, giving first priority to issues affecting the displaced. This could be a ready vehicle for addressing the inequities and underserved nature of basic services in these hosting areas. (b) In the medium to longer term, build decentralized local capacity by assisting national and regional governments in strengthening development plans toward a more holistic and integrated area approach (Box 4 provides an example). Such an approach also implies partnering (burden and risk sharing) with other donors and NGOs who have extensive experience on the ground. This would require both technical assistance and funding.

**Improving economic opportunities for the displaced and host communities**

122. As discussed, there are strong economic interactions between the displaced and host communities. The social, financial, and human capital possessed by refugees/IDP and host communities has not been factored into the design and implementation of humanitarian assistance, resulting in limited income-generating opportunities. Strengthening the livelihood capacities of displaced persons to strengthen their self-reliance and resilience would enable them to take up opportunities for durable solutions. This also improves their capacity to rebuild their lives upon return. This will also build resilience among the host communities by mitigating any negative economic impacts and harnessing the positive economic impacts of refugees/IDPs. Similarly, in areas of return, it is critical to provide the returnees and the return communities with meaningful economic and livelihood opportunities. Proposed interventions are:
• **Analytical activities.** (a) Complete the recently initiated study on the social and economic impact of the presence of refugees and host communities in Turkana; and (b) undertake a comprehensive study of the characteristics, assets (especially financial flows), and perceived needs of the displaced in various situations, including Somali refugees in Dollo Ado and the Leben in Ethiopia and in Dadaab in Kenya; Sudanese refugees in Kakuma camp, Turkana, and other Kenyan cities; and a mixture of Sudanese, Eritrean, and Somali refugees in Kampala and South Sudanese in the Kiryandongo refugee settlement in Uganda.

• **Operational activities.** (a) Begin by assessing best practice of humanitarian efforts in livelihoods; (b) based on a review of existing work identify income generation and self-employment activities in areas of displacement; and (c) improve investment incentives for job creation like building infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, and power supply).

**Addressing gender-based violence**

123. Forced displacement in the HOA exacerbates an already-existing challenge with regard to GBV, with a significant proportion of women and children in many displacement settings confronting a range of severe protection challenges. As indicated, programming to address facets of forced displacement presents an important opportunity to include or improve understanding of the type, incidence, and extent of gender-based violence and to strengthen integrated service provision for survivors, as well as programming for other critical forms of gender-based violence such as intimate partner violence and human trafficking. Importantly, as physical and sexual violence is usually accompanied by psychological trauma and other violations, GBV survivors are normally in need of concurrent, multifaceted assistance, including medical treatment, mental health counseling, case management support and, where relevant and accessible, legal support. Best practice interventions therefore emphasize the need for holistic, multi-sectoral initiatives that address the range of needs to enable both prevention of GBV and also provision of differentiated care to survivors. Proposed interventions are:

• **Analytical activities.** Conduct or confirm mapping of current GBV protection and response services in areas of displacement, engaging with the UN Protection Cluster and other relevant partner organizations and stakeholders. The review should include assessment of any existing information management systems (e.g. GBV IMS) or data collection and reporting mechanisms, as well as existing programming responding to the needs of survivors. The purpose of the mapping is to identify the scale and scope of current resources and services, persistent challenges, and key gaps in provision of care.

• **Operational activities.** (a) Develop integrated programming to improve service provision for survivors of gender-based violence, with particular emphasis on (but not limited to) sexual violence. Interventions should build on best practice models emphasizing holistic multi-sectoral support, including medical, psychosocial, and case management services, as well as linkages with livelihood and economic empowerment initiatives and other longer-term recovery options. Operational activities should identify opportunities for alignment and complementarity with ongoing initiatives and partner organizations to enhance effective approaches and minimize overlap. (b) Ensure linkages with and integration of GBV prevention or response provisions with other operational activities under the HOA initiative, particularly as related to enhanced basic service delivery and activities to improve
economic opportunities. (c) Improve regional knowledge sharing, research, and capacity building. Operational activities should leverage best practices and learning from relevant regional and national actors and communities of practice. Linkages with capacity building and knowledge sharing activities under way as part of the Great Lakes Emergency SGBV and Women’s Health Project, for example, should be pursued, particularly with the International Conference for the Great Lakes (which includes Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda).

Strengthening partnership, financing, and implementation arrangements

124. Various organizations and government entities are playing an important role in addressing the development challenges of protracted displacement and mixed migration in the Horn of Africa (Table 2). The plethora of national and regional initiatives of various entities needs to be better coordinated. There is a need for greater collaboration and strong partnerships to effectively address these challenges and strengthen the holistic approach. Proposals for coordinated regional arrangements are:

- **A Horn of Africa Displacement Secretariat** could be established to coordinate the regional response to displacement and mixed migration in the HOA. The Secretariat could support joint analytical and development work to bridge relief to development in order to build a shared knowledge base by undertaking joint assessments, commissioning research and technical assistance, and ascertaining through an inclusive process of consultation the priority needs and aspirations of displaced persons. The Secretariat could also facilitate policy dialogue with the highest level of governments responsible for security and development, and coordination between different initiatives to achieve a critical mass and synergies for support to comprehensive regional approaches, including returnee programs.

- **An HOA Regional Multi-Donor Displacement, Migration, and Development Fund (MDMDF)** could be established and managed by the above HOA Displacement Secretariat. The fund could serve as a quick disbursement and flexible financing to address emergent policy, analytical, and operational responses to protracted displacement and mixed migration in the region. It could serve as an incubator for new ideas and innovations that could be quickly piloted though the MDMDF and then scaled up by government and donor interventions. The details of the MDMDF could be designed initially drawing on a startup from the WBG-administered State and Peacebuilding Fund Grant and contributions from bilaterals such as (a) Norway, which is heavily involved in NGO-supported rehabilitation and development in south-central Somalia, a location of possible return for Somali refugees in the triangle, including the three districts for the UNHCR Pilot Return Project, Baidoa, Kismayo, and Luuq; and (b) Denmark, which leads the solutions alliance initiative for the Somali situation. The private sector and/or foundations may also be brought into the equation; for example, the IKEA Foundation is already financing assistance to the displaced in the Dollo Ado area.

- **HOA implementation partnerships** should be established, recognizing and building on existing regional institutions and initiatives such as IGAD, EAC, and the AU. This will require a concerted and coordinated effort by (a) local, regional, and national
governments; (b) all developmental and humanitarian actors in the region, including WBG, EU, IsDB, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and other UN actors; (c) development-oriented NGOs such as NRC and DRC; and (d) private sector associations. With their respective mandates, skills, and experience, these agencies can support IGAD and the AU to coordinate and integrate implementation arrangements in partnership with local governments, and other development partners as well as the private sector. IGAD could provide a governance facilitation structure for the partnership, convening relevant political actors across borders as a regional body for the promotion of joint regional planning and development, in line with their current collaboration with the African Development Bank.
ANNEX 1.

THE FOUR MAJOR PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT SITUATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
1. **Every HOA country has been affected by forced displacement.** However, the following four displacement situations have wider regional implications: (1) Eritrean refugee crisis; (2) Somali IDP and refugee displacement situation; (3) South Sudanese protracted and emergency IDP and refugee situation; and (4) Sudanese protracted and emergency IDP and refugee situations. Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the displacement situation in HOA, followed by a detailed discussion on the country-specific displacement crisis.

**Figure 3. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Horn of Africa (June 2014)**

![Graph showing refugee and asylum seeker numbers by country]


*Note:* Since the start of the crisis in South Sudan in December 2013, the number of refugees from South Sudan exponentially increased in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. However, for purpose of consistency, the mid-2014 (June) figures are provided here. An unknown number of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan may be included under Sudan (in absence of separate statistics for both countries).

**Eritrean Displacement**

2. **Brief history.** A former Italian colony, Eritrea joined the Ethiopian Federation as an autonomous region in 1952. The dissolution of the federation 10 years later sparked a violent 30-year struggle for independence that ended in 1991 with Eritrean rebels defeating government forces. Eritreans overwhelmingly voted for independence in a 1993 referendum. Isaias Afwerki has been Eritrea's only president since independence. Program of mandatory conscription into national service, originally of 18 months, has reportedly been extended in the recent years. A two-and-a-half-year border war with Ethiopia that erupted in 1998 ended under UN auspices in 2000. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission delivered its decision to the two governments on April 13, 2002, “to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.” Eritrea for several years hosted a UN peacekeeping operation that monitored a 25 km-wide temporary security zone. The Boundary Commission in November 2003 remotely demarcated the border, assigning the disputed town of Badme to Eritrea, from the time of the 1998–2000 war. Eritrea insisted that the UN terminate its peacekeeping mission on July 31, 2008. Eritrea has accepted the Boundary Commission’s “virtual demarcation” decision and
repeatedly called on Ethiopia to remove its troops. Ethiopia has not accepted the demarcation decision, and neither party has entered into meaningful dialogue to resolve the impasse. Eritrea is subject to several UN Security Council Resolutions (from 2009, 2011, and 2012) imposing various military and economic sanctions.

3. **Displaced population profile.** Currently, there are over 388,000 Eritrean refugees, mainly hosted in Sudan and Ethiopia (Figure 4). Sudan is hosting over 112,000 Eritrean refugees, while the number of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia is about 126,000. Refugees from Eritrea include a higher percentage of young boys and men, many of who claim to have left the country to avoid military conscription. The largest number of Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers are hosted by Sudan (n=107,639), followed by Ethiopia (n=96,660) (Fig.4).

![Figure 4. Eritrean Refugees and Asylum Seekers, by country of asylum by mid-2014](image_url)

**Source:** UNHCR. Mid-year Trends 2014. Statistical Annexes. June 2014

4. **Protection Challenges.** Eritrean refugees and migrants continue to confront violence and a range of protection risks emerging from the context of displacement and flight. As in the other displacement situations, Eritrean refugees are subject to sexual and physical assault, torture, domestic violence, and varying forms of exploitation. Unlike other countries, a significant number of refugees are young men. Additionally, a significant number of unaccompanied minors are a particular challenge. In response, UNHCR is developing a comprehensive regional program to address the special protection and reunification needs of these children.

**Somali Displacement**

5. **Brief history.** Like many other borders of African countries, Somalia’s borders are mainly determined by previous colonial powers. Ethnic Somalis who share a common language, culture, and religion are distributed across Somalia, the Somali region of Ethiopia, southern Djibouti and Wajir, and the Garissa and Mandera governorates (formerly the North Eastern Province) in

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Kenya. The idea of Somalia was to create a homeland for all Somalis, which met with resistance from neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia. Somalia has been termed a failed or collapsed state for decades, which can be attributed to the interplay among historical, socioeconomic, and political factors. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, southern Somalia has experienced cycles of conflict that fragmented the country, destroyed infrastructure and institutions, and created widespread displacement. Peace conferences finally led to the formation in 2000 of the transitional national government, and then the transitional federal government in 2004, but both were undermined by warlordism, mismanagement, and international interference, giving rise to militia-based opposition and today's al Shabab movement (World Bank 2013c).

6. **Causes of Somali Displacement.** For decades, widespread conflict, violence, human rights abuses, and natural disasters have sparked repeated waves of large- and small-scale internal displacement. A multitude of actors, including clan-based and political militias and external military forces, have used forced displacement as a method of warfare in order to obtain and exert control. There have been recurrent seizures of land, particularly as armed members of dominant clans have unlawfully and violently appropriated land owned or leased by members of rival clans in violation of any previous lease agreements (IDMC 2013b).

7. **Coping strategies.** Somalis have employed a number of coping strategies to manage and minimize disruptions in their lives, including displacement within or between urban centers, moving between town outskirts and rural areas, the separation of family members to maximize the benefits available at different locations, and by more significant movement to distant locations, including to neighboring countries and further abroad. These complex social networks and decision-making structures extend to the dynamics of return, with males opting to return to their areas of origin, sending remittances, leaving women and children behind within the protection of the camps with the intention to move back if and when the situation improves.

8. **Factors shaping return.** The following factors can be singled out as being especially influential in the decision to return: (a) conflict and violence in areas of origin (or new areas of settlement); (b) food insecurity as a result of general insecurity (meaning that people are either unable to fully work their land due to conflict, or that people have lost their farms to militias or stronger clans); (c) destruction of shelter due to flooding; (d) loss of livelihood opportunities as a result of environmental factors and natural disasters (such as the 2011 drought); and (e) growing urbanization due to the search for better livelihood opportunities in relatively more populated and safer urban areas.

9. **Displaced population profile (refugees).** At the end of 2013, Djibouti hosted over 19,000 refugees from Somalia, mainly displaced due to armed conflict, insecurity, and violence, which has been compounded by drought and poor economic conditions. Movements in and out of the country by Somali refugees are hard to confirm, as UNHCR has limited access within Eritrea and border monitoring is restricted. Eritrea recognizes Somali refugees on a *prima facie* basis. Somali refugees are camp-based and reside in Umkulu Camp; as of April 2015, there were 2,792 refugees hosted in this camp. The operation is solutions driven, with some 1,500 refugees in the resettlement pipeline, 203 expressions of interest to return to Somalia, and a potential 1,000 residual population, for whom no definite durable solution has been identified. Assistance is provided both in cash and in kind. Ethiopia hosted over 245,000 Somali refugees in January 2015. Most of the Somali refugees are in eastern and southeastern Ethiopia. In 2011, three new camps were opened in the Dollo Ado area. Currently, there are over five camps. During 2010–11,
more than 100,000 Somalis sought asylum in Ethiopia. The majority of the refugees are women and children (UNHCR 2013 a). Kenya hosts the largest Somali refugee population, over 424,000 in January 2015 (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Somali Refugees and Asylum Seekers, by country of asylum as of mid-2014

During 2011 and 2012, a large number of Somali refugees sought asylum in Kenya, mainly due to the drought, famine, and insecurity in Somalia (UNHCR 2013 a). Current hopes for stability to take root in Somalia have led to certain expectations of voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees. In November 2013, a Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR, the Government of Kenya, and the Somali government was signed to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya. The Tripartite Agreement sets out the legal framework for returns to Somalia. It specifies that all returns should be voluntary and take place in safety and dignity. There is no deadline in the agreement for the returns. Implementation of voluntary repatriation will initially concentrate on a pilot project to support refugees who are spontaneously returning to Somalia. Three areas in Somalia will be targeted for this purpose—Luq, Baidoa, and Kismayo. Preparations are under way in both Kenya and Somalia to implement the pilot project. In Dadaab, return help-desks have been established to provide refugees with information and assistance on repatriation to Somalia. Uganda is currently hosting over 18,000 Somali refugees. There is limited information specific to the situation of Somali refugees in Uganda.

Displaced population profile (IDPs). In south-central Somalia, the post-Cold War collapse of the state into factional violence (Lindley and Haslie 2011) and land grabbing by powerful armed clans led to massive displacement (World Bank 2014a). Militarily strong clans invaded new areas to plunder assets and appropriate land, evicting weaker groups, in particular minority farming communities. For example, the Bantu people of the Lower and Middle Juba riverine areas had many of their lands forcibly confiscated by mainly Hawiye armed groups. While some remained on the land as sharecroppers or forced laborers, many were displaced elsewhere (Lindley and Haslie 2011). Since 2006, the transformation of the Somali civil war in the context of the global
war on terror, combined with the problems of drought, has prompted large-scale and ongoing displacement (Lindley and Haslie 2011). In 2011 and 2012, conflict combined with the most severe drought in years to trigger a famine, which led to the deaths of an estimated 260,000 Somalis and caused further displacement. IDPs were particularly affected. Two of the areas in which famine was declared, Afgooye and Mogadishu, already had Somalia’s largest IDP populations. Most IDPs continue to be extremely vulnerable to any shocks or stresses and have low levels of resilience (IDMC 2013b). Recent seasons of average to above average rainfall, combined with low food prices and sustained levels of assistance, have reduced the number of people in crisis to the lowest levels since famine was declared in 2011. However, in 2013, around 50,000 people were internally displaced due to floods linked to intense rains, particularly in Middle and Lower Shabelle (IDMC 2013b).

12. **Durable solutions prospects.** In south-central Somalia, improvements in the security situation of certain areas since early 2012 have led to increased interest in return. In 2013, an estimated 16,000 IDPs had reportedly returned by the end of August. Of these, about 5,500 IDPs returned spontaneously to their habitual place of residence, while humanitarian actors assisted over 10,000 to return to villages of origin, mainly in the Bay and Shabelle regions, or within Mogadishu. Questions remain about the sustainability of returns. In many areas, security is still a challenge, and limited services and disrupted livelihoods are major obstacles to the sustainability of returns. The recovery of land, livestock, and other property for returning IDPs is problematic and can trigger further clan conflict. Competition over scarce resources and limited access to services and employment opportunities may lead to new tensions, especially if returns were to occur on a large scale (IDMC 2013b).

13. **Protection challenges.** Despite challenges in measuring prevalence and extent, incidents of sexual and physical violence against Somali women and children are widespread and perceived to be rising. Since 2011, humanitarian agencies have addressed over 10,000 cases of various forms of gender-based violence. Between January and July 2014, over 2,700 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were addressed by service providers, including 529 cases of rape, 226 cases of sexual assault, and 1,518 cases of physical assault. A report released by UNOCHA indicates that at least 800 cases of SGBV were reported in Mogadishu during the first six months of 2013, while in 2012 there were at least 1,700 cases in Somalia overall. These figures, however, likely belie the extent of the challenge, as most survivors are unlikely to seek formal support or care. Displaced women and girls are among the most vulnerable populations, with female IDPs accounting for nearly 80 percent of sexual violence survivors (Somalia GBV Integrated Management System 2014). A significant share of these cases has been further perpetrated against children under the age of 12. Outside of conflict-related sexual violence, women and girls are vulnerable to other forms of gender-based violence as well. Social and customary norms circumscribe women’s role in Somali society and ascribe them secondary status. Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) is estimated to be 98 percent, with most cases involving Type III infibulation with excision.13 The resulting health consequences are severe.14 Additional challenges include early and forced marriage, intimate partner violence, and other

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13 According to WHO, Type III FGM/C entails “Excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening (infibulation).” (UNFPA: [http://www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm](http://www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm))

14 In 2005 the World Bank, in conjunction with UNFPA, conducted an assessment of FGM/C eradication programs in Somalia in order to guide future programming. Among other recommendations, the report advocated for the integration of FGM/C eradication initiatives into reproductive health, education, social protection and rural development strategies.
forms of physical assault. Sexual and physical violence extends both as a consequence of conflict as well as from inter-clan violence.

South Sudanese Displacement

14. **Brief history.** Sudan was ruled by Britain and Egypt from the late 1800s. In the early 20th century, Christian missionaries converted a large segment of the population, especially in the south, and introduced English to the region. The result was a relatively clear line between the Arab north and the black African animists and Christians in the south. After Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was granted self-rule, army officers in the south mutinied in 1955, sparking a civil war between the north and south. Southerners accused the government, based in the north, of trying to force Islamic and Arab culture on the south. Independence was proclaimed in January 1956, and the civil war dragged on until 1972. The civil war led to large-scale displacement of populations affected by the fighting. War broke out again in 1983 when the Sudanese President declared all of Sudan a Muslim state, ruled by Islamic law. In response, southern rebels formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), consisting of ethnic-based militias and fought the government for more than two decades with the troops on both sides of the conflict inflicting massacres and violence against civilians. The war led to massive displacement, both internally and externally. A cease-fire was declared between the Sudanese government and the SPLA in July 2002. During peace talks, the government agreed to a power-sharing government for six years, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination for the south. Fighting on both sides continued, as did the displacements as an effect of the fighting throughout the peace negotiations. On January 9, 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. Under the agreement and its associated protocols, roughly half of Sudan’s oil wealth was given to the south, as well as nearly complete autonomy and the right to secede after six years. In April 2010, Salva Kiir, who succeeded the deceased John Garang as head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), was re-elected as president of the semi-autonomous South. In the referendum held in 2011, the southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for independence. South Sudan declared independence on July 9, 2011, and became the 54th independent African country.

15. **Causes of South Sudanese displacement.** Forced displacement in South Sudan is the result of the north-south conflict, inter-tribal violence, attacks by the rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and instability in neighboring countries. The latest north-south civil war that began in 1983—following the breakdown of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement—lasted for more than two decades and claimed the lives of 2 million people, while 4 to 4.5 million were internally displaced, and another 500,000 sought refuge outside the country. Initially, displacement was a secondary consequence of hostilities. From the late 1980s, however, the deliberate uprooting of local populations, often by local militias armed by the government, became a strategy for the conduct of war, and a military and economic objective in its own right. After independence, internal conflict (especially in Jonglei State) (IDMC 2013 d) and the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Sudan's South Kordofan and Blue Nile states have been contributing to further displacement (UNHCR 2013 d).

16. Over the brief period of South Sudanese independence, unresolved relations with Sudan have been at the center of violence and displacement. The CPA, which created the foundation for independence, did not define proper mechanisms for agreeing on key relations between the Sudan and South Sudan.
on oil sharing, trade relations, citizenship, and border demarcation. This has meant a continuously
difficult relationship between the two ranging from border incursions leading to increased tensions;
unresolved citizenship rights, creating uncertainty over residence and property ownership on both
sides of the border; and Sudan’s closing of the border to official trade between the two countries,
which resulted in higher prices and shortages of essential commodities. Finally, the failure to reach
agreement on oil transit fees from South Sudan’s oil fields through the pipelines in Sudan’s territory led
to the confiscation of oil by Sudan. In response, on January 20, 2012, South Sudan announced it
would close down oil production until a fair deal on transit fees could be reached or an alternative
pipeline built. After a new agreement was reached, oil production resumed in March 2013, but due to
the conflict in South Sudan production is presently sharply reduced.

17. Another major driver has been poor governance, exacerbated by the competition for power and ethnic
politics. South Sudan officially recognizes 65 ethnic groups. The major ethnic groups are the Dinkas
(about a third of the population), the Nuers (approximately 15 percent), Bari, Azandes and
Shiluks/Luos/Anwaks (each with almost 10 percent), and a large number of smaller ethnic groups.
Although the long struggle by the SPLA against the Northern Sudan oppression provided some
content for a common history for the South Sudanese, the SPLA was—and to some extent still is—
composed of a number of ethnic-based militias, which occasionally fought each other. Most South
Sudanese continue first and foremost to identify themselves by ethnic group. This means much more
to them in their daily life than the state, despite the euphoria of South Sudan becoming a new
independent state.

18. As ethnicity is still a defining factor for most South Sudanese, ethnic balancing has heavily influenced
the allocation of jobs and contracts in South Sudan. While acknowledging that this balancing may
have been necessary for the initial political settlement, the WB Interim Strategy Note (FY 13-14)
describes this as follows: “… public sector employment is a key part of the social compact struck
between the government and ethnic elites.” It continues: “the dynamic this has created carries several
potential dangers: the sharpening of old grievances and a neglect of merit and efficiency standards in
public service.”

19. An important step in ensuring a stable elected government in the near future, when the term of the
current government expires, will require the addressing of three interconnected issues before the
elections: (1) a review of the Transitional Constitution; (2) a census in order to establish the basis for a
fair election, e.g. a reliable voter roll; and (c) an SPLM party conference to transform SPLM from a
freedom movement to a political party, including agreeing on the “Rules of Procedure” for choosing
party officials and candidates for elections (including for president).

20. Violent uprisings have long been a feature in South Sudan. Even before the present crisis, in many
parts of South Sudan there was increasing violence and displacement caused by inter-communal
conflicts and cattle rustling, due especially to scarcity of grazing areas and a rise in bride price, often
increasing the ethnic divide. Over the last few years, there has been an increasing intensity and scope
of violence that moves beyond the traditional practice. Raids are now increasingly targeting civilians,
particularly women and the elderly. The increased militarization of civilian populations and proliferation
of small arms and light weapons have contributed to higher levels of death and violence. For instance,
feuds involving cattle-raiding between rival ethnic groups in Jonglei state in 2012–13 left hundreds of
people dead and some 100,000 displaced.

21. Displaced population profile (South Sudanese refugees and IDPs). South Sudan has a long
history of conflict-induced internal displacement. Before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
was signed in 2005, the conflict between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and Sudanese government forces had claimed the lives of over two million people and led to the displacement of over four million IDPs. Even after South Sudan’s independence, tribal and ethnic clashes, driven by competition over access to natural resources, have continued to displace people (IDMC 2013 d). During 2010, over 220,000 IDPs were newly displaced, and an unknown number of IDPs are still displaced from previous years, or have not managed to settle in their areas of origin and have moved to other locations, including urban areas. The number of newly displaced IDPs in 2010 has shown a considerable decrease from the 390,000 reported in 2009, mainly because good rains have led to a reduction in cattle raiding and disputes over access to water and grazing (IDMC 2010 d). At the end of 2012, there were over 243,000 IDPs, including 193,000 IDPs displaced in 2012 and about 50,000 previously displaced by LRA. The ongoing civil war has displaced 2 million people, or around one-tenth of South Sudan’s population. Of these, 1.5 million have been internally displaced and around 500,000 people have fled to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda (Figure 6). Almost twice as many people have fled their homes in the past eight months than in the previous three years combined, constituting the country’s most serious displacement crisis since the 1983–2005 civil war. All ten states in South Sudan have been affected directly or indirectly by displacement, and IDPs are scattered across more than 160 locations. The violent conflict of December 5, 2013, led to a further displacement of 512,812 externally, and some 1.53 million internally. South Sudan also hosts some 243,000 Sudanese, with limited access by the international community to provide essential services.

Figure 6. South Sudanese Refugees, by country of asylum (March 2015)

![Pie chart showing South Sudanese refugees by country of asylum:](image)

**Source:** Elaboration based on UNHCR. South Sudan Situation. Information Sharing Portal [accessed on March 19, 2015].

**Note:** Figures include asylum seekers.

22. Living conditions for the IDPs remain dire and tensions exist with hosting communities. Out of the 1.3 million IDPs displaced by the violence, attention and assistance has focused on the 26,000 IDPs sheltering in UNMISS bases. However, approximately 90 percent of those fleeing their homes have taken refuge elsewhere, and have therefore little access to protection, services, or humanitarian aid (IDMC 2014b). Displacement is becoming protracted, given that conditions for safe return are still not in place in many areas, causing tension with host communities,
particularly regarding access to and use of natural resources. This is often compounded by cultural differences between IDPs and host communities (IDMC 2014 b).

23. **Profile of returning refugees.** Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, over 2 million South Sudanese have returned to South Sudan; the majority settled in a small number of key areas across the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, as well as the country’s main urban centers (IOM South Sudan 2013). Of these, more than 334,000 are South Sudanese refugees that returned from exile in the CAR, the DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (UNHCR 2013c). The single largest return movement is the return of people of South Sudanese origin from Sudan. This has taken place primarily through voluntary returns, particularly in the years preceding independence, but the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also led a considerable logistical operation of facilitated returns.

24. **Challenges and prospects for durable solutions.** The major challenge is associated with the durability of return. The majority of the returnees have settled across a small number of key areas across the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, as well as the country’s main urban centers. The recent economic crisis, ongoing inter-communal tensions, tremendous difficulties in accessing land, and the scarcity of basic service infrastructure have had an overwhelmingly negative effect on returnees’ (re)integration prospects(IOM 2013a). The cost of urban land prevents many who might wish to settle in urban areas from doing so. As such, returnees’ choice of final destination is restricted. Large numbers of people have been returned to places they may be unfamiliar with after lengthy displacement, where they have no social networks and that often lack any real service provision, transport, or communications infrastructure. This has proved particularly problematic for families in which people from different areas of origin married during their displacement. Many returnees also lack the skills needed to establish rural livelihoods and are uncertain of the exact locations of land they may be able to reclaim. The attempt of many returnees to relocate to urban centers in search of better livelihoods and services has added to existing pressure on burgeoning towns and cities with limited urban planning (IDMC 2013b). The ongoing civil war has led to the displacement of the returning refugees. Land and property problems pose a serious obstacle to the successful return and reintegration of large numbers of IDPs and returnees (IDMC 2010c). The mounting land disputes among returning IDPs, refugees, and residents is leading to further displacement. SPLA soldiers who occupied urban plots in towns such as Juba and Yei during the war have refused to vacate the plots when the owners return (IDMC 2010b). In Nimule, Eastern Equatoria, refugee returnees have found their land occupied by IDPs, earlier returnees, or members of the host community who have taken over the land. In these situations, the land issues have prevented the refugees from returning (IDMC 2010c).

25. **Protection challenges.** Gender-based violence has been a prevalent feature of South Sudan even before the onset of the current crisis (Care International 2014). Patriarchal cultural practices persist, including polygamy, wife inheritance, early and forced marriages, abduction, high bride wealth, and ghost marriages. Domestic violence is widespread and generally treated as an accepted practice for disciplining one’s wife. Rape has been used as a mechanism to initiate marriage while circumventing high bride prices: survivors of rape were frequently regarded as less eligible for marriage, and are therefore often forced to marry their perpetrators in order to avoid social stigma and to secure some form of bride wealth (as compensation) for the family (Care International 2014). The onset of violence in December 2013, however, has exacerbated incidence of a range of critical protection issues with pronounced gender dimensions. Targeted killing of civilians, as well as looting and destruction of civilian property, have been common features of the violence since the onset of the conflict, including violence targeting women and
children. Male youth are also vulnerable both to violence from opposing groups, as well as to recruitment into militias. There are also a number of reports of child recruitment into armed groups. Additionally, several organizations report that the current crisis has aggravated incidence of violence against women and girls, including reports of targeted mass rapes as a prevalent feature of the ongoing violence (Care International 2014). Numerous field assessments by humanitarian organizations catalogue a range of violations against displaced populations, including accounts of rape, abduction, mutilation of sexual organs, forced marriage, sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual harassment, and sexual slavery (International Rescue Committee 2014). Violations have been committed by all parties to the conflict against IDPs and have been leveraged as a devastating practice against opposing political and ethnic groups. As elsewhere, IDPs are vulnerable both en route to and inside protection sites, while even higher levels of violence are presumed to be experienced by those living in more remote areas away from more formal protection or support networks.

Sudanese Displacement

26. Brief history. Since independence from the British in 1956, military regimes favoring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated national politics in Sudan. However, Sudan was embroiled in civil wars during most of the period from independence until 2005, mainly between northern and southern Sudanese forces and militias. This paused with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. South Sudan became independent on July 9, 2011. Since southern independence, Sudan has been combating rebels from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The Abyei is also a contested region between Sudan and South Sudan. The agreement is that a plebiscite should determine its future, but disagreement on eligibility of the voters has postponed this plebiscite. Therefore, there are three major displacement situations in Sudan—the Three Areas, Darfur, and East Sudan—and there are an estimated 670,332 refugees originating from Sudan (Figure 7) and over 2 million IDPs.

Figure 7. Sudanese Refugees, by country of asylum (2013)

Source: Based on UNHCR Populations Statistics database and Statistical Annex.
27. **Causes of Sudanese displacement.** The multiple situations of displacement in many areas of Sudan are essentially due to the same causes: deep-rooted tensions between the center and peripheral regions, a highly inequitable division of power and wealth, and a government unwilling to acknowledge Sudan’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity (Table 11).

Table 11. Internal Displacement Crises in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>CAUSES</th>
<th>ESTIMATE OF DISPLACED POPULATION DECEMBER 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>Conflict began in 2003 when two loosely allied rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), took up arms against the government in Khartoum. Since then the government’s use of Arab proxy militias, primarily Abbala from North Darfur (also known as Janjaweed), that practiced scorched earth, massacre, rape, and starvation as tools of war, has led to massive displacement. Although a number of peace agreements have been signed between the government and the different armed groups, violence still continues.</td>
<td>1,982,488 IDPs (mostly living in camps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains</td>
<td>Intra-tribal conflict in combination with armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance of armed opposition movements consisting of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), JEM and Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), continues to affect civilians in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Fighting in South Kordofan resulted in some 90,000 newly displaced people during the first six months of 2013 (UNOCHA 2013).</td>
<td>222,200 in South Kordofan, 176,566 in Blue Nile, and 45,475 in other states, excluding Abyei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Since the signing of the CPA, as many as 2 million South Sudanese displaced to the north, primarily to Khartoum, are believed to have returned. Former IDPs of South Sudanese origin who remain in Khartoum face possible statelessness as a result of their country’s independence (IDMC 2014).</td>
<td>There is no overall figure for the number of IDPs in Khartoum. It is estimated that as many as 350,000 former IDPs from South Sudan are still living there (IDMC 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sudan (Red Sea, Kassala, and Gedaref states)</td>
<td>Long-running grievances over economic and political marginalization in eastern Sudan led to an armed struggle by the Beja Congress (BC) beginning in 1995 and the emergence of the Eastern Front, an insurgent coalition of the BC and Rashaida Free Lions (RFL), in 2005. In October 2006, the Eastern Front and the Khartoum government signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), but grievances over the perceived failure to implement a 2006 peace agreement and address root causes of the conflict remain widespread.15</td>
<td>It is estimated that there are 150,000 IDPs in the eastern states of Red Sea, Kassala, and Gedaref (HRC 2012). Eastern Sudan is also host to long-standing Ethiopian and Eritrean refugee populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyei (contested area)</td>
<td>More than 100,000 people were displaced following an incursion by the Sudanese armed forces in May 2011. No new displacements were registered in 2013, but 45,000 Ngok Dinka remain displaced, of whom 20,000 are in Abyei itself (IDMC 2014).</td>
<td>At least 20,000 IDPs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Various eastern factions now call for toppling the regime and joining the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance of essentially southern and Darfur-based rebel groups.
28. **Conflicts in Darfur, eastern Sudan, and the Three Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains)** have led to the displacement of millions of people (IDMC 2010). In addition, Sudan is host to refugees from neighboring countries, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Chad (UNHCR 2010). The South Sudan crisis, which started in December 2013, has also caused refugee influx into Sudan (UNOCHA 2014).

29. **East Sudan displacement.** Eastern Sudan has experienced an insurgency. In 1995, long-running grievances over perceived exclusion and marginalization turned to violent conflict between the army and an insurgent coalition known as the Eastern Front. In October 2006, the two parties signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, but its implementation has been extremely slow and the east remains profoundly underdeveloped. While there been, until recently, a tendency to look at the three conflicts as separate, the situation has changed as the main Darfur opposition groups have created an alliance with the SPLM-N fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile under the umbrella Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). It is increasingly likely that instead of piecemeal solutions to each of the three conflicts, there is a need for a more comprehensive national approach.

30. **Darfur displacement.** In Darfur, a conflict broke out in 2003 caused by deep-rooted tensions between the center and periphery, a highly inequitable division of power and wealth, and a government unwilling to acknowledge Sudan’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity (IDMC 201a). Following deployment of a peacekeeping mission by the African Union in 2006, UN Security Council resolution 1769 established a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) in 2007. Peacekeeping troops have struggled to stabilize the situation, which has become increasingly regional in scope and has brought instability to eastern Chad. Armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and lack of government support have chronically obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. The Sudanese government and the insurgents organized into the Justice and Equality Movement signed a ceasefire agreement to end the Darfur conflict in February 2010, but fighting continues to this day. The violence spiked in 2013 as the mostly Arab militias initially armed by the government to contain the rebellion escaped Khartoum’s control and fought each other. In the Darfur region, government restrictions on humanitarian access, combined with continued insecurity, hamper activities by the UN and INGOs. Delays in the issuance of travel permits for staff negatively affect the implementation of programs. The security situation in Darfur has also further deteriorated with ongoing and renewed inter-tribal hostilities.

31. **Displacement in the Three Areas.** The Three Areas region,—consisting of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile—is important for oil production and for the transport of oil to and through Sudan. In this region, the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan is played out as a conflict between different groups, basically between agriculturalists and Arab nomads, with the two governments allegedly supporting each of their proponents. The Three Areas bore the brunt of decades of armed conflict that abated with the signing of the CPA. Given their strategic location and resource wealth—mainly oil, agricultural land, and water—these front-line areas were deemed critical to achieving long-term stability in Sudan and were awarded a special status in the CPA. But with attention subsequently focused on Darfur, and then on South Sudan, the international community neglected the Three Areas once the CPA was concluded. Fears that the still-unresolved status of Abyei—controlled by South Sudan’s SPLM but within the political boundaries of North Sudan—could derail the peace process rose steeply in early 2011, as the region saw five major clashes in the wake of the vote for independence by South Sudan.
32. **Displacement in Khartoum.** In 2010, there were between 1.3 and 1.7 million IDPs in the greater Khartoum area. The IDPs were displaced from various parts of southern Sudan, Darfur, and eastern Sudan. Most IDPs in Khartoum lived outside officially designated camps and resettlement areas, with some 300,000 to 400,000 living in camps where they had been allocated plots, and some squatting on private land (World Bank 2014a).

33. **Durable solutions prospects.** Sudan’s 2009 National Policy on IDPs mentions return, local integration, and resettlement, but it favors return to the potential detriment of the other options. The danger of seeing return as a de facto solution is illustrated in Darfur, where IDPs who go back to their areas of origin face a number of significant challenges. The insecurity and conflict that they originally fled is in some cases still ongoing or has resumed, and this has led to returnees being displaced again. Despite the government’s focus on return, it is thought that many IDPs in Darfur would prefer to integrate locally in urban or semi-urban areas (IDMC 2013a).

34. **Protection challenges.** Sexual violence and other incidents of gender-based violence have been a dominant characteristic of ongoing insecurity in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions in Sudan. While prevalence data is lacking, a number of humanitarian organizations—such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Médecins Sans Frontières, and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)—have reported extensively on widespread sexual violence in Darfur. In 2005, for example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported treating almost 50,000 women and girls for symptoms related to sexual violence during a five-month period in October 2004 (Nobel Women’s Initiative 2014).

35. More recently, UNAMID, the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur, reported 35 cases of sexual and gender-based violence involving 53 victims (and 19 minors) between February and April of 2014 (UNSC S/2014/279 2014). Beyond Darfur, sexual violence and other forms of GBV are also persistent challenges among displaced and conflict-affected populations in eastern Sudan, south Kordofan, and Blue Nile, and even within urban IDP communities in Khartoum, where displaced women are among the most vulnerable to sexual exploitation, prostitution, and assault (Nobel Women’s Initiative 2014). While the government has undertaken a number of steps seemingly to address violence against women in Sudan,\(^{16}\) conditions for delivery of SGBV programming in Sudan are extremely challenging, characterized by a political environment disinclined to recognize or respond to the incidence of sexual violence. Several organizations report interference on the part of the government toward efforts to document the scope and magnitude of sexual violence, including intimidation and threats of jail. Several organizations perceived as instrumental to the provision of prevention and response services for survivors were among those expelled from Darfur by the government in 2009 (UNSC S/2014/279 2014). As a result, available services for survivors are severely limited. As elsewhere, rape in Sudan carries extreme social stigma, as well as potential legal implications. Sudanese law conflates rape and adultery, forcing survivors of sexual violence to carry the burden first of acknowledging publicly to the assault and then carrying the evidentiary burden of proving they did not consent to intercourse (which often requires finding male witnesses to attest to the rape). If they are unable

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\(^{16}\) In 2005, a state plan was introduced to combat violence against women, resulting in the creation of a new implementation unit within the Ministry of Justice. A no-tolerance policy for sexual violence was further announced in 2007, as well as a commitment to the provision of medical care for survivors and punishment for perpetrators. The government also established Family and Child Protection Units. Furthermore, within the Darfur Development Strategy, the government and state committees in Darfur reconfirmed their commitment to increased security for women and girls, prosecution of perpetrators, improved access to judicial mechanisms for recourse, and the provision of medical and psychosocial care (GoS 2013). Little has been done to date, however, to realize these commitments.
to do so, women risk being held liable for committing a sexual act outside of marriage (zina), or potentially for raising a false accusation (quadfi) (Redress 2008). Legal recourse for cases of rape therefore present the possibility for punishment of the survivor and provides a strong disincentive for reporting, particularly for displaced populations whose access to legal aid or judicial structures is already severely constrained. Additionally, misconceptions regarding police procedures and legal requirements often present an additional barrier and disincentive for women seeking redress for violence perpetrated against them.
ANNEX 2.

LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND IDPS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
1. **A range of international, regional, and domestic laws and regulations govern the situation of refugees and IDPs.** The international legal frameworks governing the situation of refugees and IDPs include (a) the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention); (b) the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol); (c) the 1969 OAU (Organization of African Unity) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Convention); (d) the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (2006); (e) the ICGLR Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons (the ICGLR Property Protocol, 2006); and (f) the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention 2012). HOA countries also have displacement-specific laws and regulations governing the situation of refugees and IDPs in their countries. In addition to displacement-specific international and domestic legal frameworks, several international human rights instruments are applicable to refugees and IDPs in the region. The scope of this chapter is limited to the displacement-specific international and domestic legal and policy documents that deal with refugees and IDPs.

**International and domestic refugee laws**

2. The 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) is a key international legal document that defines who is a refugee, refugee rights, and the legal obligations of states. It has several provisions relevant to development, including those dealing with property ownership, employment, housing, education, and social protection. The 1967 UN Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol) removed geographical and temporal restrictions from the convention. All countries in the region, except Eritrea and South Sudan, are parties to the 1951 UN Convention. At the time of signature, ratification, or accession, countries can make reservations to some of the articles dealing with development. Ethiopia made reservations to the following development-related articles by recognizing them only as recommendations and not as legally binding obligations: (a) article 17(2), which deals with wage earning employment; and (b) article 22(1) dealing with the provision of public education to refugees. Sudan’s accession to the 1951 convention is subject to a reservation to article 26, which deals with freedom of movement. Uganda also made reservations to several articles, including: (a) article 13, which deals with movable and immovable property; and (b) article 17 dealing with wage-earning employment.

3. The 1969 OAU (Organization of African Unity) Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Convention), which was adopted in 1969 and entered into force on June 20, 1974, was prepared, in part, to take into account the unique aspects of the refugee situation on the African Continent. The 1951 UN Convention definition of refugees as “persons fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution” had not considered several problems encountered by African refugees and was too narrow within the African context. As a result, the 1969 OAU Convention expanded the refugee definition to apply to every person who—owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality—is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
4. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons (the ICGLR Property Protocol) addresses one of the most pressing obstacles to successful return and reintegration of refugees—access to land and property lost, confiscated, or expropriated through the process of displacement and exile. Neither the UN nor the African Union’s refugee conventions deal with the issue of property restoration, making the protocol a first multilateral instrument creating a unique regional framework for addressing conflicts over property and land in situations where the original owner or community has been long absent (IDMC; IRRI 2008). Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda are members of the ICGLR Property Protocol.

5. In addition to international legal instruments, domestic refugee laws govern the situation of refugees in the region. All HOA countries, except Eritrea, have refugee-specific domestic laws (Table 5). While the main focus of almost all refugee laws is regulating the asylum and refugee status determination process and setting up national refugee agencies, few of the domestic refugee laws have provisions relevant to development issues. Although the non-refugee-specific international and domestic laws have provisions that affect development outcomes, the focus here is on refugee-specific national and international legal frameworks.

**Property Rights**

6. All persons have the right to ownership and peaceful enjoyment of property and possessions and any deprivation of property and possessions and rights by the state or authorized by it must be in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law, including the payment of just compensation (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2008). Forced displacement situations are often accompanied by violations and abuses of rights in housing, property, and land. Violations to property rights take different forms. In some conflict situations, violations are part of planned and manifestly illegal acts. In other cases, states are not directly responsible for events that have taken place on their territory, but fail to fulfill their primary responsibility for resolving any resulting displacement in a manner consistent with the victims’ human rights (Williams 2010).

7. The 1951 UN Convention has provisions protecting the property rights of refugees. Article 13 of the 1951 Convention provides that parties shall accord refugees treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with regard to movable and immovable property. While the minimum standards of treatment of aliens under international law apply to refugees, countries are advised to treat refugees as favorably as possible with regard to movable and immovable property. With regard to intellectual property, Article 14 provides that refugees be provided with the same protection accorded to nationals of that country. Uganda made reservations to article 14.

8. In situations of refugee return, the restoration of housing, land, and property left behind by returning refugees is one of the key challenges. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons (the ICGLR Property Protocol) provides for the recovery and restoration of the property of refugees. State parties of the protocol are required to assist refugees to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions, which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. When
The restitution or recovery of such property and possessions is not possible, the returning refugees are entitled to appropriate compensation.\textsuperscript{17}

9. The domestic refugee laws of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan make no mention of the property rights of refugees. Even those countries that have provisions dealing with property rights in their refugee laws have taken different approaches. Kenya has explicitly adopted the standard set by the 1951 Convention. Article 16 (1) of the Refugee Act 2006 of Kenya provides that refugees are entitled to the rights and be subject to the obligations contained in the international conventions to which Kenya is party. Sudan’s Regulation of Asylum Act of 1974 provides for registration of movable property owned by refugees at the time of entry into Sudan. Article 8 stipulates that at the time of registration of the particulars of a refugee, the particulars of all movable properties brought by the refugee into Sudan will be registered so that they will be permitted to take them upon return to his/her country of origin. Article 9 prohibits the ownership of land and immovable property. The act does not explicitly deal with the right of the refugees to own movable property while they are in displacement in Sudan, although it could be implied from articles 8 and 9 that refugees can own moveable property provided they do not take it with them when leaving Sudan to return to their own or another asylum country. The Ugandan Refugee Act 2006 adopts the 1951 UN Convention standard by clearly stipulating that refugees will receive at least the same treatment accorded to aliens generally in similar circumstances relating to movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining to property and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property. The act also provides for the right to transfer assets held and declared by a refugee at the time of entry into Uganda, including those lawfully acquired in Uganda.

\textit{Freedom of Movement}

10. A fundamental human right, freedom of movement is an indispensable condition for the development of a person. It is also an essential element in finding durable solutions to displacement. Freedom of movement is often a precondition for other development-related rights, including rights to health, shelter, food, water, education, employment, and property restoration (Oloka-Onyango 2010). Article 26 of the 1951 convention deals with the freedom of movement of refugees. It requires member states to provide refugees with the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances. When acceding to the 1951 convention, Sudan made a reservation to this article.

11. The only domestic refugee law that explicitly provides for the freedom of movement for refugees is the 2006 Uganda Refugee Act. Article 30 of the refugee act provides that refugees are entitled to free movement in Uganda, subject to reasonable restrictions applicable to aliens in the same circumstances, especially on grounds of national security, public order, public health, public morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Nearly 50,000 urban refugees are currently hosted in Kampala. The administrative decree in Djibouti does not deal with freedom of movement, and refugees are often arrested in police roundups and detained for one or two days before they are released and ordered to return to the refugee camp (UNHCR 2012). Sudan’s Regulation of Asylum Act of 1974 does not provide for freedom of movement. Furthermore,

\textsuperscript{17} The Colombian “Victims Law” (2008) provides an excellent example of adjudicating restitution with compensation for forced displaced persons.
Sudan’s reservation to Article 26 of the 1951 Convention, which deals with the freedom of movement of refugees, has led to encampment policies and penalization of refugees who attempt to leave the camps (UNHCR 2010).

12. Ethiopia’s domestic refugee legislation, the 2004 Refugee Proclamation, does not provide for freedom of movement in a manner provided by the 2006 Uganda Refugee Act. However, Article 21 gives the head of the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority the power to designate places and areas within which refugees and asylum seekers live. Until 2009, Ethiopia enforced a strict policy of encampment for all refugees with the exceptions of those who demonstrated reasons for staying out of camps, such as on medical, protection, and humanitarian grounds. Freedom of movement from the camps is subject to the grant of exit permits, issued by government officials in the camp. Since 2009, Ethiopia introduced a new policy known as the “Out of Camp Policy,” which currently mainly benefits Eritrean refugees and refugee university students. Ethiopia has also adopted an urban policy for vulnerable refugees in order to respond to their specific protection and/or medical needs that cannot be properly addressed in a camp setting. Under the Out of Camp program, refugees who have stayed for six months in a camp, can demonstrate that they can live without assistance from the Government of Ethiopia and UNHCR, and have no criminal record are allowed to leave the camps and reside elsewhere in the country (UNHCR 2013c).

13. Kenya’s Refugee Act 2006 does not explicitly deal with freedom of movement. Article 16 of the act takes the approach followed by the Ethiopian Refugee Proclamation (2004) and gives the minister responsible for refugee affairs the authority to designate areas in Kenya to be refugee camps. However, the 2010 Constitution provides for the right to free movement and guarantees freedom to all to enter, remain, and reside anywhere in the country. Until 2012, urban refugees enjoyed freedom of movement. Their freedom of movement was significantly restricted by a relocation directive in December 2012 and a subsequent encampment directive issued in March 2014 (UNHCR 2014b). In July 2013, the High Court ruled that the Directive was unconstitutional. In April 2014, the government launched a security operation called “usalama watch” targeting persons who may pose a security or terrorist threat after several deadly security incidents that had occurred in early 2014. The operation lasted for a couple of months. In December 2014, the Parliament passed the controversial Security Amendment Act, which limits the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya to 150,000. In January 2015, the High Court suspended parts of the Act, including the provision that limits the number of refugees.

Right to Work

14. Forced displacement affects the ability of the displaced to independently pursue livelihoods and economic activities. However, steps can be taken to ensure that displaced persons do not fall into long-term dependency on outside aid during displacement and to facilitate their economic integration or reintegration into society (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2008). Article 17 of the 1951 convention requires states to accord to refugees the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning employment. With regard to self-employment, however, the convention adopts a slightly different standard. As stated in Article 18, contracting states are required to treat refugees as favorably as possible and, in any event, not less favorably than aliens generally in the same circumstances.
15. Domestic refugee laws of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya effectively limit the refugees’ right to work by imposing the same restrictions and conditions applicable to aliens. However, often refugees become a source of cheap, unskilled, casual labor, and a majority of displaced people end up working in the informal economy, where work is low-paid, unpredictable, and exploitative (Metcalfe et al. 2011). Article 7 of the Ordinance No. 77053/P.R./A.E. du 1977 stipulates that, for the exercise of a professional activity, refugees are to be treated as foreigners living in Djibouti. Article 21 of the 2004 Ethiopian Refugee Proclamation provides that refugees and their families are entitled to the same rights and can be subjected to the same restrictions imposed generally on persons who are not citizens of Ethiopia. A similar approach was taken by Article 16 of the 2006 Kenyan Refugee Act. It should be noted that, regardless of the legal provisions of the refugee-hosting country, refugees and asylum seekers usually have been engaged in informal economic activities or employed by households or firms engaged in informal economic activities. Article 29 of the 2006 Ugandan Refugee Act provides that refugees shall receive at least the same treatment accorded to aliens generally in similar circumstances relating to employment and income generating activities, including (a) the right to engage in agriculture, industry, handicrafts, and commerce and establish commercial and industrial companies; (b) the right to practice a profession, provided that the refugee holds qualifications recognized by the competent authorities in Uganda; and (c) the right to have access to employment opportunities and engage in gainful employment.

Provision of services including education, health and housing

16. Access to basic services, including health and education, is a fundamental human right. As provided under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (in force in 1976), every person has the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health without discrimination. As provided under Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every human being has the right to free and compulsory education at the primary level. The 1951 convention has provisions dealing with service delivery. Article 21 of the 1951 convention deals with housing and provides that refugees shall receive treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorably than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances. Article 22 of the 1951 convention deals with refugees’ right to public education. With regard to primary education, Article 22(1) requires host countries to accord refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals. The convention sets a different standard for non-primary education. States shall accord treatment as favorably as possible to refugees, and, in any event, not less favorably than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances. This standard is also applicable to access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, and the award of scholarships.

17. With the exception of Ethiopia’s, South Sudan’s and Uganda’s domestic refugee laws, none of the domestic refugee laws in the Horn of Africa have provisions dealing with provision of services to refugees. Article 21 of the 2004 Ethiopian Refugee Proclamation stipulates that refugees will be entitled to the same rights and be subjected to the same restrictions imposed on persons who are not citizens of Ethiopia. On the other hand, Article 33 of the 2012 South Sudanese Refugee Act entitles refugees to receive the same basic health services and primary education provided to nationals of South Sudan. Article 32(1) of the 2006 Ugandan Refugee Act provides that refugee children shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals with respect to elementary education.
International and domestic IDP laws

18. At the international level, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide the normative framework identifying rules of international laws that applies to IDPs (Kälin and C.Williams 2010). The purpose of the guiding principles, which are not binding, is to address the specific needs of internally displaced persons worldwide by identifying rights and guarantees relevant to their protection. Without creating new obligations, the guiding principles restate the relevant principles applicable to the internally displaced and clarify any grey areas that might exist (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998). They apply to the different phases of displacement, providing protection against arbitrary displacement, access to assistance during displacement, and guarantees during return or alternative settlement and reintegration (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998).

19. The ICGLR Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region (the Great Lakes Pact) has two protocols that are relevant to the situation of IDPs in the Horn of Africa. The Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP Protocol) is the first binding multilateral instrument in the world dedicated to establish a legal framework for the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and a legal basis for their implementation in national law. It attempts to ensure legal protection of the physical and material needs of IDPs. The ICGLR Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons (the ICGLR Property Protocol) attempts to address the issue of access to land and property lost, confiscated, or expropriated through the process of displacement and exile (IDMC and IRI, 2008). Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda are members of the ICGLR IDP Protocol and the ICGLR Property Protocol 2006 (in force in 2008).

20. The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) imposes comprehensive legal obligations on contracting states to respect, protect, and fulfill the economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights of IDPs, including prevention, response, and durable solutions. It draws heavily from the UN guiding principles, but strengthens the framework for the protection and assistance for IDPs in several ways, including addressing the role of armed groups and other non-state actors, and requiring contracting states to seek assistance when its resources are inadequate to protect and assist IDPs, incorporate obligations into national legislation, and designate a national institutional focal point on internal displacement. Uganda and Somalia have signed and ratified the convention. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and South Sudan have signed the convention but failed to ratify it. Kenya and Sudan have not yet signed the Kampala Convention.

21. Only three HOA countries have a comprehensive legal and policy framework dealing with internal displacement. Uganda is one of the first countries in the world to develop a national policy for IDPs, which guarantees the right of IDPs to choose between return, local integration, and settlement elsewhere in the country; establishes the responsibility of government to protect its citizens from arbitrary displacement; and specifies the detailed institutional arrangements for the protection and assistance of IDPs at national and subnational levels. Kenya’s IDP legislation—the Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act 2012—confirms the application of the Great Lakes Protocol and UN Guiding Principles to IDPs in the country; enshrines the responsibility of government to prevent arbitrary displacement; establishes the government’s responsibility to protect and assist IDPs, including facilitating durable solutions; and specifies the institutional responsibilities for IDPs. In Sudan, the National
Policy on Internal Displacement 2009 covers all phases of the displacement cycle and establishes the right to freedom of movement, but favors return over and above other settlement options.

**Property rights**

22. Principle 21 of the guiding principles prohibits the arbitrary destruction, appropriation, occupation, or use of IDP property and possessions. In addition to prohibiting acts that violate the property rights of IDPs, the guiding principles also contain provisions dealing with remedies. Principle 29(2) requires competent authorities to assist returned and/or resettled IDPs to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions that were left behind or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. It also requires competent authorities to provide or assist IDPs in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation when recovery of property or possessions is not possible. The ICGLR property protocol specifically adopts the guiding principles approach. Article 6 requires member states to undertake to adopt and implement the guiding principles as a regional framework for providing protection and assistance to IDPs.

23. Article 9 of the Kampala Convention obliges state parties to take necessary measures to protect individual, collective, and cultural property left behind by IDPs. In situations of return, Article 11 requires state parties to establish appropriate mechanisms providing for simplified procedures for resolving disputes relating to the property of IDPs. State parties are also required to take all appropriate measures, whenever possible, to restore the lands of communities with special dependency and attachment to such lands upon the communities’ return, reintegration, and reinsertion.

24. The domestic IDP laws and policy documents of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have included provisions dealing with property rights of IDPs. Article 9 of Kenya’s IDP legislation identifies access to effective mechanisms that restore housing, land, and property as one of the conditions for durable solutions. Article 6 of the National Policy on Internal Displacement 2009 stipulates that IDP’s have the right of possession of property, but fails to provide for the issue of land, housing, and property restoration in situations of return. The Ugandan IDP Policy (2004) has provisions dealing with IDP’s property rights. Article 3.6 requires the government to ensure that IDPs are not arbitrarily or compulsorily deprived of property, except as provided in the Constitution. It also requires local governments to endeavor to protect property and possessions left behind by IDPs against pillage, destruction, arbitrary and illegal appropriation, or occupation or use. Local governments are also required to assist IDPs to return, resettle, and reintegrate, by acquiring or recovering their land. Where recovery is not possible, local governments are required to endeavor to acquire and allocate land to the displaced families.

**Freedom of Movement**

25. The UN guiding principles deal with freedom of movement. In addition to affirming that every IDP has the right to liberty of movement and the freedom to choose his or her residence, Principle 14 states that IDPs have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other settlements. This principle implies that national authorities have the obligation not to interfere with persons seeking to exercise their freedom of movement in contexts of displacement (Oloka-Onyango 2010). Principle 15 gives further effect to the movement-related rights identified in Principle 14. IDPs have the right to seek safety in another part of their country, the right to leave their country, the
right to seek asylum in another country, and the right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty, and or health would be at risk. Article 9(f) of the Kampala Convention requires governments to guarantee the freedom of movement and choice of residence of IDPs, except where restrictions on such movement and residence are necessary to ensure security for the IDPs or maintaining public security, public order, and public health.

26. Domestic IDP laws of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have provisions that guarantee freedom of movement. Freedom of movement is one of the conditions for durable solutions identified by Article 9 of Kenya’s IDP legislation. Article 5 of the National Policy on Internal Displacement 2009 stipulates that IDPs have the freedom of movement, the right to choose the place of settlement, the right to move freely inside the camps, and to leave them without restriction. Article 6 of the same policy reiterates IDP’s right to freedom of movement. Recognizing that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right, Article 3.2 of Ugandan IDP Policy (2004) attempts to ensure that the effects of internal displacement do not result in the curtailment of IDP’s rights to move freely by ensuring that (a) all IDPs have the freedom to move and have access to all areas where various economic and social activities take place; (b) all IDPs (men and women) freely choose their places of residence; (c) IDPs move freely in and out of camps, other settlements, or any other part of the country; and (d) security is provided in areas inhabited by IDPs to allow freedom of movement.

Access to Livelihoods

27. Like their fellow citizens, all IDPs need and have a right to work (Tajgman 2010). Forced displacement affects the ability of the IDPs to independently pursue livelihoods and economic activities. However, steps can be taken to ensure that IDPs do not fall into long-term dependency on outside aid during displacement and to facilitate their economic integration or reintegration into society (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2008). Principle 22 (b) of the UN guiding principles is meant to ensure that IDPs are able to participate in economic activities without discrimination relative to the rest of the population. It provides that IDPs have the right to freely seek opportunities for employment and to participate in economic activities. The Kampala Convention, in Article 3, explicitly stipulates that state parties shall promote self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods among IDPs. Article 11 requires states to seek durable solutions for IDPs, a goal that cannot be achieved without restoring livelihoods.

28. The domestic IDP laws and policy frameworks for Kenya and Sudan directly deal with access to livelihoods. Article 9 of Kenya’s IDP legislation lists access to employment and livelihoods as one of the conditions for durable solutions. Article 5 of Sudan’s National Policy on Internal Displacement 2009 stipulates that IDPs have the right to work and requires the state to support the IDPs to engage in income-generating activities, to develop their skills to participate in development, and to “include them in the productive circle again.” Article 6 of the same policy lists IDPs’ rights relevant to the restoration of livelihoods, including access to documentation, right of possession of property, civil rights, as well as economic and employment opportunities.

Provision of services including education, health, and housing

29. Delivery of services such as health care, education, and adequate housing is critical for durable solutions upon return in places of exile, of asylum, and resettlement to a third country. The right to
health and education are also human rights. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (in force in 1976) stipulates that every person has the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health without discrimination. The right to health encompasses not only access to timely and appropriate health care but also to underlying determinants of health, which include access to an adequate supply of safe and nutritious food, safe and potable water, adequate sanitation, housing as well as hospitals, clinics and other health-related facilities, trained medical and professional personnel who receive domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2008). As provided under Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every human being has the right to free and compulsory education at the primary level. In displacement situations, continued school attendance provides a degree of stability, security, structure, and normalcy in the context of upheaval, uncertainty, and trauma that the experience of displacement entails. Schools can provide IDP children with an important source of psycho-social support and help to reduce their exposure to threats, including sexual exploitation, physical attack, and military recruitment. Equal access to education is an important indicator of IDPs' integration into the local community (Mooney and Wyndham 2010).

30. Principle 18(2)(d) of the UN guiding principles requires competent authorities to provide IDPs with—and ensure safe access to—essential medical services and sanitation. Beyond this, Principle 19 requires states to provide wounded and sick IDPs with medical care, as well as psychological and social services, and to pay special attention to the health needs of women as well as to prevention of contagious and infectious diseases. Principle 23 of the UN Guiding Principles is designed to protect the right of IDPs to education during their displacement. In addition, affirming the right of every human being to education, Principle 23 requires the authorities concerned to ensure that IDPs, in particular displaced children, receive education that shall be free and compulsory at the primary level. Education should respect their cultural identity, language, and religion. Principle 23 also requires concerned authorities to make special efforts to ensure the full and equal participation of women and girls in educational programs. The right to education is also to be secured in the context of durable solutions in accordance with the obligation to provide “equal access to public services” in Principle 29(1).

31. The domestic IDP legal and policy frameworks of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have provisions relevant to service delivery. Article 9 of Kenya’s IDP legislation provides for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living without discrimination. Article 5 of the National Policy on Internal Displacement 2009 requires the government to provide basic services to the IDPs such as food, health, water and sanitation, housing, and education. The Ugandan IDP Policy (2004) has a number of provisions guaranteeing adequate service delivery to IDPs. Article 3.9 requires the national and local governments to support the provision of shelter and housing to IDPs in a manner that ensures (a) the safety and security of IDPs; (b) the proximity of housing to local services; and (c) the involvement of women. Under Article 3.11, the Ministry of Education and Sports and local governments are required to ensure that IDPs, particularly displaced children, have the same access to education as non-displaced children in Uganda. Recognizing the lower economic base of IDPs and the inadequacies of the education provided in displaced camps, the government is required to create affirmative action schemes for displaced persons to enable them to have access and attain the same educational standards attained by other students in the country. Article 3.12 requires the Ministry of Health and local governments to provide all wounded and sick IDPs with the required medical attention without discrimination or delay.
Regional Institutions

32. At the regional level, AU and IGAD have attempted to facilitate conflict resolution and support peace efforts, and these regional institutions have also attempted to implement the resolution concerning displacement. The African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), have engaged consistently with refugee protection. The AU/OAU has adopted a range of legal instruments, staged gatherings resulting in resolutions, declarations, decisions, recommendations and plans of action, and created bodies with displacement-focused mandates. The Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa is a decision-making body and supports the work of the AU Commission in matters of forced displacement. In particular, it provides political leadership in formulating responses to humanitarian emergencies; conducts field missions and in-country needs assessments; where possible, provides refugee-hosting states with financial assistance; and works to sensitize member states and the international community to the plight of displaced persons in Africa.

33. As an AU organ, the Coordinating Committee on Assistance and Protection to Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (CCAPRRI) is meant to function as an advisory body to the PRC’s Sub-Committee on Refugees and provides a forum and interface between the refugee practitioners and the decision making and policy organs. The Department of Political Affairs’ Division of Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons (HARDP) functions as a secretariat to all AU bodies dealing with refugees, facilitating their activities, decision making, and policy development.

34. The EAC (East African Community) currently does not boast of vibrant institutional involvement in refugee management. Although the promise in its 1999 Treaty and the potential for adapting the Common Market Protocol for the benefit of refugees of East Africa origin created expectation for an active EAC refugee protection unit, there is no evidence that such a unit is currently operational. Despite the absence of a dedicated unit, the EAC is not completely inactive in the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, as the UNHCR maintains engagement with the organization. For instance, the UNHCR has prompted EAC action in the area of refugee protection by entering into a memorandum of understanding with the EAC with the aim of establishing a framework for cooperation in the area of protecting refugees.

35. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has a fairly promising unit working in the field of displacement. Within the secretariat of the ICGLR, the unit responsible for humanitarian and social issues coordinates a cluster of activities, including aspects relating to the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. In a 2006 Regional Plan of Action for Humanitarian and Social Issues, the unit released a proposed Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) Programme with an overall objective to “establish a regional framework for the protection, assistance and search for durable solutions for refugees.” Some of the strategies envisaged by the unit include ensuring that refugee camps in member states are located in accordance with standards approved in the AU/OAU Convention, facilitating access and integration of refugees in the local structures of asylum host countries, and the special treatment of female refugees.

36. While it appears that the Disaster Risk Management Component has attracted more of IGAD’s attention in the past, there is some evidence that refugee protection is gaining some attention. For instance, at a conference on refugees initiated by the IGAD Council of Ministers, the idea of a separate unit within the IGAD Secretariat dedicated to humanitarian issues, especially refugee
protection, was proposed and adopted (Abass and Ippolito 2014). IGAD has established a Regional Consultative Process (IGAD-RCP) on migration, in accordance with relevant AU Decisions, with a core function of promoting the common position of the IGAD member states and the African Union as provided in the Migration Policy Framework and to facilitate regional dialogue and cooperation on migration policy issues among the IGAD member states. The overall objective of the IGAD-RCP is to facilitate dialogue and regional cooperation in migration management among IGAD member states by fostering greater understanding and policy coherence in migration, as well as strengthening regional institutional and technical capacities to implement the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and other AU and IGAD policies on migration (Declaration on the Establishment of IGAD Regional Consultative Process on Migration).

37. At the national level, most of the institutions dealing with refugee issues are housed in ministries dealing with security issues. In Djibouti, the Ministry of the Interior is the main government institution in charge of refugee protection. The national refugee agency is the Office National d’Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (ONARS). However, the presidency, which is mandated to deal with issues of national security in asylum cases, also has a role to play. In Ethiopia, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is part of the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority (SIRA). In Kenya, the Department of Refugee Affairs is part of the Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government, which is responsible for internal security. An exception to this trend is Uganda, whose Refugee Department is part of the Office of the Prime Minister, which also has the mandate for the socioeconomic development of conflict-and disaster-affected parts of the country.
ANNEX 3.

THE PECULIAR (?) DYNAMICS OF THE KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS
Objective

1. The objective of the proposed activity is to assess the macro, micro, and social impact of the presence of refugees on the host communities in the Turkana County in Kenya. While there have been a variety of descriptive studies about the interactions between refugees, the aid community, and hosts in the vicinity of Kakuma camp, these have not yet been able to provide estimates of the net benefits to locals of the presence of refugees and aid.

2. Successfully carried, the results of this work will:

(a) inform policy discussions on integrating the refugee and host community economies by clarifying the concepts of (i) integrating refugee and host community economies; (ii) characteristics of an integrated economy; (iii) socio-economic impacts (both positive and negative) of the presence of refugees in Turkana and by extension all of Kenya; and (iv) essential stimulus and modalities for formalizing and integrating the two economies in order to reap the most possible benefits for all.

(b) Inform World Bank Group’s development response to displacement induced macro-fiscal, environmental and social impacts through existing or stand-alone operations.

Rationale

3. The Kakuma refugee camp, with over 179,000 refugees, is one of the largest refugee camps in Africa and comprises 15 percent of the total population of the county. Established in 1991 for South Sudanese refugees, the camp is now home to refugees from fourteen other nationalities, largely Ethiopians, Rwandans, Burundians, Congolese, Eritreans, Somalis, and Sudanese. From an estimated population of 50,000 at the height of voluntary repatriation in January 2008, the camp population increased to over 181,000 by March 2015, with most families spending an average of ten years as camp residents. The population of the Kakuma refugee camp is still increasing. Depending on the evolution of the situation in South Sudan, it is expected to reach 200,000 by the end of 2015. The refugee camp itself consists of four settlement clusters: Kakuma Refugee Camps I, II, III, and IV. The camp is near Kakuma Town, one of the three urban areas in Turkana County. With a population of about 60,000, Kakuma Town consists of businesses and residences clustered along a 100-meter stretch on the Kitale-Lokichoggio-Juba Highway (Oka, 2014).

4. The camp also is at the center of a lively economic and social network that extends beyond the vicinity of the camp and influences both the physical and economic topology of Turkana and Kenya. The interactions between the refugees and host communities is against a backdrop of (a) a reality of the host defined by conflict, exclusion, and marginalization; and of the refugees in their trauma, inactivity, waiting, and the patron-client relationship; (b) structural constraints of low rainfall and climatic devastations, long term effects of chronic malnutrition, low health, conflict, general views on pastoralism as an anachronism; and (c) the presence of relief/development driven economies, which exist only as long as there are refugees.

18 data.unhcr.org, December 2014
19 data.unhcr.org/South Sudan
20 The onset of the political crisis in South Sudan and ensuing violence in December 2013 precipitated a surge in refugee flows over the course of the last year, with over 620,000 refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, including over 45,000 to Kenya. Current estimates for South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma amount to just over 90,000 people.
21 Currently, two different modes of exchange are seen in the social interactions between the host community and refugees. The host community is shaped by its cultural history and the condition of poverty. Meanwhile, the refugee community is shaped by the
Methodology of the Proposed Study

The Economic Component

5. The proposed study aims to fill this knowledge gap and inform the design of policies by undertaking an economic impact analysis (EIA) of the protracted presence of refugees in the Turkana County an integral component of the larger Economic and Social Impact Analysis. The study will be undertaken in close collaboration with UNHCR as well as other humanitarian and development actors, and it will also provide inputs to the UNHCR’s shift to embed resilience in humanitarian response, through livelihood support and the integration of social services and economies of refugees and host community.

6. The proposed study will be based on background studies that follow a three-track approach: (1) evaluating the channels of impact; (2) seeing the big picture; and (3) zooming in on stumbling blocks.

The Social Component

7. A mixed methods approach will be adopted for this component. A socioeconomic rapid survey, representative of the host and refugee populations, will provide a snapshot of the social and economic status, and interactions among the refugee and host communities (details are in the economic assessment). Qualitative, field-based analysis of key social issues will be undertaken to supplement the quantitative data derived from the survey, which will enable us to more systematically understand the motivations and compulsions for choices that people make in participating in the economy and how they would be positively and negatively impacted by the proposed integration of the host and refugee economies. This would be very useful to derive specific responses and strategies for the more vulnerable groups among the communities.

8. The qualitative aspects will be organized around six key components:

   i. Socioeconomic mapping: Education and health status and access to services; intra-household livelihood roles and contributions and assets ownership disaggregated by gender and age sets; means of livelihood and access to capital, skills, training and markets; access to natural resources for household consumption and livelihoods needs; coping strategies, including adverse/negative strategies, child labor, and survival sex.

   ii. Social organization and structure: Social composition of the host and refugee communities; characteristics of vulnerable households; relative status and interaction among social groups differentiated by gender, ethnicity, age, and religion; formal and informal leadership structures.

   iii. Economic participation: Levels of economic participation of refugee and host community households disaggregated by men, women, youth, and children; current livelihood activities being pursued, both formal and informal; constraints to economic participation and interaction, including encampment policy for the refugees; access to and confidence in systems governing economic participation, including grievance redress and/or arbitration; and the political economy of facilitating policy changes, including refugee management for the effectiveness of developmental interventions.

   drastic change in their situation, but this is tempered by their continued access to global networks, capital consumption, and relief. As a result, the refugee community actually has an economically advantageous position relative to the host community.
iv. **Community organizations and institutions:** Changes in the prevalent rules, incentives, and social norms that govern interactions, including adverse impacts of corruption, rent-seeking, and bribes; role and functioning of community organizations; access to benefits from formal and informal institutions.

v. **Conflict and violence:** Overall security situation; the type and prevalence of conflict and violence, including sexual and gender-based violence; causes and drivers, and the perpetrators and victims; conflict resolution and peace building mechanisms and institutions.

vi. **Developmental activities:** Key development interventions for both host and refugee communities (major actors, including government, donors, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, faith-based organizations, philanthropists, etc.); perceived benefits by communities; changes in response to the local situation; and expectations of host and refugee communities.


The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat. 2013. Responses to mixed migration in the Horn of Africa & Yemen. Nairobi: RMMS.


List of Persons Met

Refugee and host communities in and around Dollo Ado and Shire refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, Kiryandongo settlements in Northern Uganda, Kilo 26 refugee camp in Sudan, Ali Addeh refugee camp in Djibouti, and urban centers in Kampala and Juba.

Djibouti

- Honorine Sommet Lange, Representative, UNHCR
- Ashraf El Nour, Regional Representative, IOM
- Mr. Guelleh Idriss Omar, Director of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Sirag Omar Abdoulkader, Secretary General at the Ministry of Interior
- Ms. Saida Omar, Director (a.i.), Director of External Financing
- Prefect of the Ali Sabieh Prefecture
- Sub-Prefect of Ali Addeh
- Frederic Van Hamme, Reporting/External Relations Officer, UNHCR
- Wa Nsenga Albert Katumba, Sr. Protection Officer, UNHCR
- Imed Khanfir, Head of Programme, WFP
- Emmanuelle Guerne Bleich, Representative to the Republic of Djibouti and IGAD, FAO
- Charlotte Trop Moller, Regional Program Advisor, NRC
- Houssein Hassan Darar, Secrétaire executive de l’ONARS
- Mr. Leone Magliocchetti Lombi, Water and Agriculture Expert, FAO
- Giulia Spagna, DRC

ETHIOPIA

- Abebe Zerihun Yicheneku, Operations Officer, Ethiopia
- Ato Ayalew, ARRA Deputy Director, Addis Ababa
- Bayon Aberera, Help Age International
- Bornwell Kantande, Senior Program Officer, UNHCR, Ethiopia
- David Murphy, International Rescue Committee
- Getenew Zewdu, World Vision
- Guan Zhe Chen, Country Director, Ethiopia
- Isabelle Robin, ACF (Action Contre le Faim)
- Jason Forauer, World Vision
- Johanna Leppänen, Lutheran World Federation
- John Ikubaje, Governance and Human Rights Officer, African Union
- Josh Friedman, Danish Refugee Council
- Jospeh Mbithi, Senior Project Control Officer, UNHCR, Ethiopia
- Lisa Fergusson-Nicol, UNHCR Senior Legal Officer to AU and ECA
- Liyunet Demsis, IOM
- Louise F. Scura, Sector Leader Sustainable Development Ethiopia, S. Sudan and Sudan
- Mohamed Abdulahi, Pastoralist Welfare Organization
- Moses Okello, Deputy Representative, UNHCR, Ethiopia
Muhomed Hussein, Norwegian Refugee Council
Muktar Shekoumer Adem, Board Director, Ogaden Welfare and Development Association.
Mulugeta Juleta, Ethiopian Red Cross
Qaiser M. Khan, Lead Economist, Ethiopia
Rita Amukhobu, OIC Humanitarian Division, African Union
Tapio Vahtola, Senior Project Coordinator, UNHCR, Dollo Ado
Josh Friedman, Deputy Country Director Ethiopia - Regional Mixed Migration Manager, DRC
Amb. Aguibou Diarrah, Head, AU Border Programme, Peace & Security Department (PSD)
Emebet Kebede, Humanitarian Adviser, DfID
Valentin Tapsoba, Representative, UNHCR
Bornwell Katende, Deputy Representative, UNHCR
Gary Quince, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Union to the African Union
Aichatou Tamba, Technical Advisor, GIZ African Union Office
H.E. Ahmed Shide, State Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Philip Kusch, Head of Programme, GIZ African Union Office
Tamba E. Juana, Special Assistant to Commissioner of Social Affairs

KENYA

Alessandra Morelli, Representative for Somalia, UNHCR
Anita Oberai, Program Specialist (USAID)
Bella Bird, Country Director, Kenya, South Sudan and Somalia
Caroline Njuki, Regional Migration Coordinator, IGAD
Chris Porter, DfID
Dean A. Cira, Program Leader for Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) - Deputy Refugee Commissioner, and his team
Diarietou Gaye, Country Director for Kenya, Rwanda and Eritrea
Dr. Burton, Special Technical Advisor
Ekwom P. Nabuin, County Executive for Finance and Planning
FAO Representative
Gabriella Waajiman, NRC Deputy Regional Director-Country Director, Kenya
Gerald Njau, Refugee Assistant, US Embassy
Girma Gebre-Kristos, UNHCR Head of Sub-office, Kakuma and his team
Heather Amstutz, Regional Director for Horn of Africa and Yemen, DRC
Hon. Charles Lokiot Ewoi, Public Service, Decentralised Administration and Disaster Management
Hon. Joseph Nanok, the Governor of Turkana County
Hugh Riddell, Senior Operations Officer
Implementing and Operational Partners - WFP, LWF, NCCK, Don Bosco, World Vision, IRC, NRK
Lucy Kiama, Executive Director, Refugee Consortium of Kenya
Maria- Thrase Keating, UNDP, Country Director
Morten R. Petersen, EU- ECHO, Somali Situation
Nicholas Cox, Regional Advisor (AID)
Peter Ekai lokool, Deputy Governor
- Peter Fernandes Cardy, Senior Operations Officer, Regional Integration Department, Africa Region
- Peter Isabirye, Operations Officer for Kenya, Rwanda and Eritrea
- Raouf Mazou, Representative, UNHCR Kenya
- Ruth Kagia, Advisor to the President
- Sam Okara, WFP, Program Officer
- Samuel A. Chakwera, Assistant Representative (Programme)
- Stephen Rukun, Regional Refugee Coordinator, US Embassy
- Sub-County Commissioner and local NGO working with host communities – Lokado.
- Ruth Kaiga, Sr. Advisor, Social Sectors/International Relations, Office of the President
- Leila Pakkala, Regional Director, UNICEF
- Fathia Alwan, Program Manager-Health and Social Development, IGAD
- Dr. Debalkew Berhe, Programme Manager, Environment Protection and Natural Resources Management, IGAD
- Dr. Dirk-Jan Omtzigt, Analyst/Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
- Amb. Mahboub Maalim, Executive Secretary of IGAD
- Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, Sr. Conflict and Humanitarian Advisor, IGAD

**SOUTH SUDAN**

- Christian Manahl, Political Counsellor, EU
- Vincent de Boer, Economic Governance and Rural Development, EU
- Anna Chichocka, Economist, EU
- Karin Marianne Eriksen, Senior Adviser, DANIDA
- Peter Bo Larsen, Country Director, DanChurchAid
- Kate Norton, Country Director, DRC
- Ninna Pedersen, Programme Manager, NPA
- Edward Awuziami, Programme Coordinator – Emergency Response, NPA
- Ezana G. Kassa, Programme Manager – Rural Development, NPA
- Gregory Norton, Country Director, NRC
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- Moses Mabior, Head of Aid Coordination, Ministry of Finance and Planning, GOSS
- Martin Machiek, Director of Planning and Capacity Building, Local Government Board, GOSS
- Cathy Howard, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA
- Bartholomew Wanyama, Programme Manager, Local Governance and Service Delivery Project, PACT
- Katie Copelane; Justice and Governance Adviser, PACT
- Taban Gwakik, Deputy Programme Manager, PACT
- Robert Wuda, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, PACT
- Malgorzata Tumidajewicz, First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy
- Arop Mathiang Amiyock, Director for Repatriation and Early Reintegration, RRC
- Jeremy Astill-Brown, Deputy Team Leader, Security and Defence Transformation Programme (UKAID):
  - Ulrika Josefsson, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Sida
  - Jimmy Clarke, Economic Counsellor, USAID
  - Kelly William Doley, Program Officer, USAID
- Taban Emmanuel, Program Management Specialist, USAID
- Bolorma Amgaabazar, Acting Country Director, WB
- Droma Bank Dominic Kat, Local Government Specialist, WB

UGANDA

- David Apollo Kazungu, Ugandan Commissioner for Refugees, Office of the Prime Minister.
- Brian Wei, Livelihood Consultant
- Endashaw Tedesse, Sr. Social Protection Specialist
- Franklin Mutahakana, Senior Operations Officer
- Karen Riguette, External relations Officer
- Kyriandongo District Local Government - District Commissioner and her staff
- Moses K. Kibirige, Acting Country Manager
- Mr Dost Yousafzai, Senior Field Coordinator
- Mr Ihsan Khan, Protection Officer
- Mr James Onyango, Assoc. Comm. Services Officer
- Mr Ray Chikwanda, Assoc. Field Officer
- Mr Stephen Allen, Assoc. Protection Officer (focal point)
- Mr. Turyagennda Emmanuel, Kyriandongo representative and his Assistant
- Ms Alice Litunya, Head of Hoima Field Office
- Ms Esther Kiragu, Assistant Representative (protection)
- Ms Neimah Warsame, Representative, UNHCR Uganda
- Ms Sakura Atsumi, Deputy Representative, UNHCR Uganda
- Ms Scholastica Nasinyama, Executive Director and the Interaid team.
- Refugee leaders - 10 leaders including South Sudanese old and new as well as Kenyans.
- Representatives of Interaid, Action Africa Help, Real Medicine Foundation, IRC, DRC, Samaritan Purse and Save the Children.
- UN-family: Resident Coordinator’s office, UNDP, FAO, IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNWOMEN, WFP, WHO, MTI.
- Dr. Lilimlim Robert, Director, the Second Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
- Bafaki Charles, Principal Settlement Officer, Refugee Department, Office of the Prime Minster
- Lynn Ngugi, Multi Sectoral Coordinator, UNHCR
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