



International
Trade
Centre

Fostering Trade through Public- Private Dialogue

Business Implications of EPA Negotiations for SADC

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE N.</u>
Preface.....	1
Summary of the Discussions.....	3
Trade among SADC countries, EU, US and the rest of the world	5
Legal aspects of SADC-EPA Negotiations	9
Rules of Origin in SADC-EPA Negotiations, View of the Clothing Exporters on what the negotiators should aim at in the EPA Negotiations.....	12
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures in SADC EPA Negotiations	16
Trade in Services.....	18
Other Trade Related Areas.....	19
List of Participants.....	20

<u>LIST OF CHARTS AND TABLES</u>	<u>PAGE N.</u>
Chart I – Share SADC countries in SADC trade, 2000-2005	5
Chart II – Shares of SADC country exports by region, 2000-2005	6
Chart III – Total SADC exports by product and major destinations	7
Chart IV – Simple and weighted average tariffs facing SADC countries in major markets (including best preferential rates; percent).....	7
Chart V – Simple and weighted average tariffs facing SADC countries in major markets	8
Table I	13
Table II.....	14
Table III	14
Table IV	15

*For any comments, questions and/or suggestions please contact:
World Trade Net Team - International Trade Centre (ITC)
E-mail: worldtradenet@intracen.org*

The colors, boundaries, denominations and classification on the maps of this publication do not imply, on the part of ITC, any judgment on the legal or other status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of any boundary.

**FOSTERING TRADE THROUGH PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIALOGUE
BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS OF EPA NEGOTIATIONS FOR SADC¹**
STELLENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA, 11-12 JUNE 2007

PREFACE

The International Trade Centre (ITC) is the joint technical cooperation agency of the United Nations (through UNCTAD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) for business aspects of trade development. Established in 1964, ITC has progressively adopted a pragmatic approach in helping the business sectors of developing and transition economies to develop exports (more information on www.intracen.org).

ITC, in collaboration with the Trade Law Centre for South Africa (TRALAC) organized a “Regional Experts Meeting” for South African Development Community (SADC)² on 11-12 June 2007 at Stellenbosch, South Africa focusing on the business implications of negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union and issues relating to regional integration.

This initiative aimed at increasing the common understanding on the business implications of trade negotiations and about the ways and means for business and negotiators to jointly define their priorities; seizing the opportunities and coping with the challenges.

Fostering communications between business and government leads to devising negotiating positions in line with national needs and is inclusive of the real and concrete economic and commercial interests of the countries concerned. The discussions encompassed: (i) Market Access opportunities in Agriculture and Manufactured goods including implications of appropriate rules of origin (ROO) in preferential trade (ii) Trade facilitation: measures that need to be taken together with their implications for facilitating regional trade (iii) Investments: experiences of attracting foreign direct investments in various sectors and the impact on businesses/at the regional level; and (iv) Regional integration as a means to enhance competitiveness through production synergies and harnessing economies of scale. The participants benefited from the expertise of TRALAC, ITC, WTO, trade negotiators and key business players from the region. Their contributions helped in integrating business priorities into trade negotiations.

National teams representing the private sector and trade negotiators of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Tanzania participated at the meeting. Representatives the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also participated. In addition, the following Business and Trade Associations were being represented: the African Business Roundtable (ABR); the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce & Industry (ASCCI); the Business Unity South Africa (BUSA); the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) and the African Union (AU).

¹ The “Business Implications of EPA Negotiations for SADC” Meeting is part of the World Trade Net programme of ITC funded by: Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

² Seven Member States from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) configured themselves according to Article 37 (5) of the ACP – EU Partnership Agreement of 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement) to negotiate an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union. The seven countries are: - Angola; Botswana; Lesotho; Namibia; Mozambique; Swaziland and Tanzania. South Africa is participating in the SADC EPA configuration as an observer. The SADC Council of Ministers took note of the commitment of the seven SADC Member States and the SADC Summit endorsed that position.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS

Based on the presentations of Ms. Trudi Hartzenberg³, Mr. Jurgen Hoffman⁴, Mr. Kwasi Abeasi⁵ and Mr. Tshico Mbumba⁶

There is a need for fostering Public-Private dialogue. Why?

1. Most developing countries, especially those in Africa, after independence (from the various colonial masters) adopted a public-sector-led approach in pursuit of their economic development. Governments gave the impression (and indeed some governments still continue to act that way) that they can do it single-handedly and provide all the development needs of their respective countries. Several years' later countries have all come to accept that it was not the best approach because it ignored the tremendous potential of the private sector as a credible partner or ally in the development equation. This is what has become known as making the private sector the engine of economic and social growth.
2. The ACP Guidelines for the EPA negotiations explicitly call for the “*involvement of all stakeholders in the negotiating process*” and “*public support for the negotiations and the outcome of the negotiations*”. They require that negotiations be subject to public scrutiny, which include “*parliamentary follow-ups*”. Despite this commitment to involve a wide range of stakeholders in the EPA negotiating process, large portions of the private sector, civil society and parliamentarians have had little say in the way negotiations have unfolded. It is hard to imagine how participation can improve substantially before December 2007, but implementation of the EPA will compel the public and private sector to work side by side and that the linkages between them will improve with time. There will be more agreements after the EPA – but now is the ideal time to cement this relationship so one can have a framework for stakeholder involvement.
3. With the deep-seated suspicions and mistrust between the public and private sectors over the years however, a public-private-partnership (PPP) can only be forged and nurtured through dialogue. Again it is important and indeed critical that this public-private-partnership is nurtured to become strong so that it can be used for effective negotiations because that is what the other side of the negotiating table has been using so effectively. The public-private-partnership concept is well known and effectively utilized in the developed nations for a long time now. In the developing African countries however, it appears new and is not properly understood. Countries should therefore start by educating people on PPP concept so that each party clearly understands the role and responsibility of other partners.
4. The partnership is also important because while in the past trade policies were developed solely by the public sector, it was the private sector that actually did the trading except for commodities and items, which the governments considered strategic to the country's economy (especially in mono-crop economies), for example, cocoa in Ghana or oil in Nigeria or Angola. Then the

³ Executive Director, Tralac

⁴ Senior Trade Advisor, Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum

⁵ Chief Executive, The African Business Roundtable

⁶ Senior Trade Officer, Head of Multilateral Trade Department, Ministry of Trade, Angola

government (or for that matter the public sector) got involved in the direct trading activity. It is important that those who do the actual trading are made to participate fully in the negotiations. While they may not be good at policy formulation, they definitely have experience of trading. Fostering continuous dialogue to yield an effective partnership will eventually “lead to devising negotiating positions in line with national needs and be inclusive of the real and concrete economic and commercial interests of the countries concerned”.

Perceptions of a private sector of SADC countries concerning EPA negotiations


- Business wants participation in the negotiations, following a successful example of Mauritius.
- Business should be provided with certain guarantees from government against rapid change of rules. Business in Africa is not well informed about the result of the negotiations and rapid implementation of agreements leads to changes in national legislation, which, in turn, create obstacles and problems such as insufficient time for business to react to regulatory changes. National “single window” coordination shall be created.
- European Market should not become a cornerstone for Africa, other markets should also be considered as important (for example, the US market).
- The European Commission’s Impact assessment of the EPAs admit that “EPAs could lead to the collapse of the manufacturing sector in West Africa” and indeed the same applies to the SADC.
- Even though the EPAs are supposed to enable ACP countries to gain better access to the European Market, this is not automatic but could rather put their local industries under severe strain due to competition from cheap European imports that are often subsidized and sometimes of poor quality.
- The Cotonou Agreement intended that EPAs would contribute to regional integration but is believed that regional integration projects are rather being undermined.
- Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) usually negotiated by the country’s Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) which is similar to EPAs has shown that these agreements by themselves do not guarantee foreign direct investment but that other conditions are needed to attract investments e.g. infrastructure etc.
- EU is bent on introducing new generation issues (such as government procurement) which were rejected in no uncertain terms at the WTO where developing countries were able to demonstrate unity. The opening up of services competition, investment markets etc. will not automatically generate the suggested gains for African countries.
- EU is also reported to be refusing to look at alternatives to free trade EPAs despite a requirement to do so under Cotonou Agreement. Even under the current WTO rules there is scope for pro-development trade arrangements.

TRADE AMONG SADC COUNTRIES, EU, US AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

Based on the presentation by Mr. Patrick Low⁷

1. The dominant position of South Africa in SADC can be derived from its share of exports and imports: two thirds of the entire trade of the region is the South African trade (Chart I).

CHART I
Share of SADC countries in SADC trade, 2000-2005
(percent)



Source: UNSD Comtrade and WTO estimates

2. Most of the SADC countries have significant export interests in the EU. So, for example, Botswana as an exporter of diamonds, meat and meat products, hides and skins, copper & nickel, textiles, soda ash, vehicle parts, etc.⁸ is mainly exporting to the EU. Substantial trade interest in the EU market is also obvious for Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania. On the contrary, countries like Swaziland and Lesotho have, on an average, relatively low share in the European market (Chart II). However for some products in which these countries have substantial export interest (for example, sugar for Swaziland), EU remains an important export destination.


⁷ Director, Economic Research and Statistics Division, WTO

⁸ See, Botswana Country Profile available at:

<http://www.intracen.org/appli2/leather/africanplatform/CountryProfile.aspx?info=CountryInfo&countryid=22&countryname=Botswana&lang=en>

CHART II


Shares of SADC country exports by region, 2000-2005



Intra-SADC
 EU 25
 Rest of world

3. Exports from SADC countries are concentrated in metals, minerals and petroleum (Chart III).

CHART III
Total SADC exports by product and major destinations
(Million dollars and percent)




4. SADC has export interests across the EU and the USA. Irrespective of the fact that the share of export of the SADC countries in the rest of the world is rather significant, the main importing countries still remain the EU and the USA (Chart III).


5. Next Chart illustrates that there are no significant trade barriers against SADC countries in the EU or US today except on a few select products.

CHART IV
Simple and weighted average tariffs facing SADC countries in major markets
(Including best preferential rates; percent)

EU – Weighted



EU - Simple




6. Comparison of the data above with the rest of the world figures (Chart V) allows us to conclude that the rest of the world has high levels of protection for imports from the region.


CHART V

Simple and weighted average tariffs facing SADC countries in major markets

Rest of world – Weighted



Rest of world - Simple



It is necessary to mention that SADC countries enjoy significant non-reciprocal trade preferences from the EU, which has given, rise to significant volume of trade between SADC countries and the EU. SADC countries, therefore, have substantial interest in keeping current preferences and negotiating new preferential mechanisms to be included into the EPAs.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF SADC-EPA NEGOTIATIONS

Based on the presentation of Mr. Gerhard Erasmus⁹ and Mr. Patrick Low¹⁰

There are three provisions in the WTO rules that are relevant to the negotiations. Article XXIV of the GATT on customs unions and free trade areas; Enabling Clause, which has some provisions on regional arrangements specific to regional agreements among developing countries; and provisions of the Article V of the GATS.

According to Article XXIV of the GATT if countries are going to create a free trade area or customs union they must cover *substantially all trade*. One has never been able to get a decent definition of what *substantially all trade* means. *Substantially all* criterion has been argued as an efficiency criterion to prevent what is sometimes called “cherry picking” and additional distortions. Inclusion of the *substantially all* clause into the Agreement was motivated by political economy considerations as much as it was by economic efficiency considerations. There is also a stipulation according to which barriers to trade with third parties should not be higher than the ones existed before the establishment of a FTA or a customs union. The idea is that countries are not supposed to create preferential trade agreements in order to do something detrimental to others.

So in a sense one could put it as an operational rule to maximize trade creation and minimize trade diversion. It is important to remember that the Enabling clause only covers arrangements amongst developing and not arrangements between developed and developing countries. That means that there are no formal legal instruments specifically designed for regional trade agreements between developed countries on the one hand, and developing countries and LDCs on the other. This brings us to an important question in the negotiations – What then can be done to ensure that the developmental needs of the SADC EPA group are accommodated?

Most of the developing countries are not quite happy with Article XXIV provisions and tend to notify their regional agreements with other developing countries under the Enabling Clause. It allows them to avoid application of the *substantially all* trade and other tests prescribed by Article XXIV of the GATT. Industrial countries do not like trends in question. These facts should be taken into consideration by the African countries while negotiating FTAs among themselves.

There is a very little experience with GATS rules on regionalism. They are based on the GATT rules model, but they are a bit looser in some ways and a bit less specific. There is no serious examination of the services provision in an RTA so it is really quite hard to know how it will work out.

GATT/WTO is going to turn 60 on the 1st of January 2008, the same day the Cotonou waiver expires. It will not be an exaggeration to say that for all intents and purposes the GATT/WTO has been a bystander in the whole development of regionalism in the world economy. The main reason is that governments have not really seen it as being in their interests to get tough on regionalism. It is only relatively recently that things are being taken a bit seriously at the multilateral level.

Question with RTAs in the African continent is of particular interest and is interrelated to the process of EPA negotiations. There are number of RTAs in force in Africa with different

⁹ Tralac Associate

¹⁰ Director, Economic Research and Statistics Division, WTO

participants and provisions. In order to gain trade preferences in 1999, South Africa, for example, concluded the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. This agreement constitutes a Free Trade Agreement covered by the provisions of the Article XXIV of the GATT. It is binding and secures South Africa's trade interests. All the rest of the SADC countries do not have secure preferential trade provisions but the so-called Cotonou Agreement waiver that comes to an end on the 31st of December 2007¹¹. The same is true for Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries. TDCA has been "grandfathered" under Article 31 of the 2002 SACU Agreement (between the Governments of the Republic of Botswana, The Kingdom of Lesotho, The Republic of Namibia, The Republic of South Africa and The Kingdom of Swaziland).

In other words, most of the ACP countries have to negotiate new instruments in order to protect their trade interests. According to Article 36 of the Cotonou Agreement, Parties agree to conclude World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible trading arrangements that shall be introduced gradually. One has to admit that the process of negotiating EPAs is rather slow and one of the proposed solutions, which could help to accelerate it, is to take current the TDCA text as the basis for negotiations in order to simplify and accelerate the process. A New Economic Partnership Agreement will not only have to substitute the Trade Chapter of the Cotonou Agreement but will be at the heart of its economic and trade cooperation pillar. The new Agreement shall be WTO compatible and shall go way beyond a chapter on trade and goods including trade related issues, services, investments, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.

From the legal text of the Cotonou Agreement it becomes clear that ACP countries are not under an obligation to negotiate binding disciplines on trade-related issues. There is, however, an explicit recognition of the importance of these issues for both national and regional development. It has been agreed in the Cotonou Agreement, and also at national and regional levels (SADC, COMESA, etc.) Let us take an example. In Africa transaction costs are one of the highest in the region. If you wish to make a phone call from Maseru in Lesotho to Johannesburg in South Africa it will go through London, England, substantially increasing its cost. These problems should be solved in the new EPAs and there is a strong legal basis for that. So, for example, Article 41 (5) of the Cotonou Agreement includes a provision that Community shall support the ACP States' efforts to strengthen their capacity in the supply of services. Particular attention shall be paid to services related to labour, business, distribution, finance, tourism, culture and construction and related engineering services with a view to enhance their competitiveness and thereby increasing the value and the volume of their trade in goods and services. According to para. 4 of the Article 41 Parties further agree on the objective of extending under the economic partnership agreements, and after they have acquired some experience applying the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment under GATS, their partnership to encompass the liberalisation of services in accordance with the provisions of GATS and particularly those related to the participation of developing countries in liberalisation agreements.

Legal provision known as a Cotonou waiver is close to the end and *de jure* new EPAs should be negotiated, signed, ratified and to be in force since the 1st of January 2008. However, it is most probable that EPAs will not be negotiated before the deadline. There is still too much to define on trade, not to mention the other issues. In practical terms, every member of every EPA will have to

¹¹ On the 14th of November 2001 on the Ministerial Conference WTO Members granted a waiver to EC allowing it to give preferential market access for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of Countries under the Lome Convention which should be replaced by Free Trade Agreements between the EC and ACP on the 1st of January 2008 under the Cotonou Agreement.

agree and ratify an agreement. All ACP countries in each EPA will have to agree on the deal with EU. It will require time. One should find answers to several important questions. Are we effectively talking about different EPA CUs/FTAs establishing a FTA with the EU, or are some other intra-EPA arrangements envisaged? How will the different EPAs define inter-EPA arrangements (Enabling Clause)? Are we going to make customs unions or free trade areas? What should the EPAs be fighting for? What might the EU agree to at the end of the year? A renewed waiver?

The permission of all WTO members will be necessary to secure another waiver and therefore gives every WTO member the veto power to frustrate the waiver request. The previous waiver took more than 20 months to approve as some of the Latin American countries were blocking the process. The only way to sway the complaining parties is to reward the countries with compensatory adjustments in the form of concessions. It is very unlikely that the EU will ask for another waiver. Main reason for this is a real opposition. There are, for example, some Latin American countries that are very likely to say No. Moreover, some ACP countries have already indicated that they will rather use their opportunity in the WTO to articulate and defend the flexibilities relating to their developmental needs rather than use this opportunity to argue for a waiver.

The waiver is clearly not the solution; and judging from the comments from the EC delegation and the SADC Secretariat it seems that completing the negotiations on time will be our only salvation. It sounds easy enough, all one has to do is to negotiate an 'EPA light' which only concentrates on trade in goods. A build in agenda seems inevitable to provide a framework for future engagements. The new generation issues will dictate such an agenda and parties will commit in the EPA to negotiate the agreed issues at a future date. And if there is a signed text, the EPA can be provisionally implemented as sanctioned by Art. 25 of the Vienna Convention. Both the Cotonou Agreement and the TDCA were provisionally implemented and there is no reason why the same cannot happen in this instance. It is however important that such provisional implementation must be formally decided and adopted as result of a recognised need.

Legal limbo is the other option. By the time someone has challenged the legality of the continuation of the Cotonou waiver it can still be used as an excuse for preferential treatment.

The following is a list of the possible legal solutions that can be considered after the expiry of the waiver: 1) a WTO-consistent FTA 'light' – would have to define trade commitments even if other issues still under negotiation; 2) interim application of standard EU GSP – not in accordance with commitment to preserve existing access; 3) a redefinition of EU's GSP+ – but possible issues here with the vulnerability criteria and signature of conventions on human rights, labor rights, environment and governance; 4) WTO-consistent, redefined non-reciprocal preference arrangement pending completion of the EPA negotiations.

RULES OF ORIGIN IN SADC-EPA NEGOTIATIONS - VIEW OF THE CLOTHING EXPORTERS ON WHAT THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD AIM AT IN THE EPA NEGOTIATIONS

Based on the presentation of Mr. Jack Raymond Kipling¹²

Rules of origin, alongside other potential trade barriers (such as technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labelling requirements), issues around trade facilitation, etc. are one of the key determinants of the market access. As tariffs and quota-based trade barriers have reduced rules of origin have become an important feature of preferential trade in clothing and textiles. These rules are used to establish the “economic nationality” of goods and provide a framework within which the origin of goods, being not only the source they are shipped from but also where they have been produced, is determined.

What, in the view of clothing exporters, negotiators should aim to secure at the EPA negotiations as far as rules of origin are concerned? They should endeavour to secure a single stage conversion rule of origin (ROO) for all countries, with no exceptions that allows for cumulation within the entire region. *Put another way, rules of origin for market access into EU should mirror the current rules of origin as they apply for LDCs under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).*

Why should rules of origin be common for all the Sub-Saharan Africa? No country in Africa can be an alternative to the world leader in the textile industry, China. However, sub-Sahara Africa as a whole may be an alternative to China and India in years to come. With this aim, the African Cotton and Textiles Industries Federation (Actif) was established last year. Any rules of origin that allow for accumulation across the entire region will help African integration.

Why is a single stage conversion rule of origin so important? There are traditionally three types of rules of origin based on the processing stages. Current Cotonou rule of origin is based on the concept of “double transformation” i.e., if two of the processing stages (yarn into fabric- weaving; and fabric into apparel- assembly) are done in the beneficiary country, and then only they can enjoy duty free entry into the EU. The difficulties encountered by African countries and, especially, LDCs in fulfilling the “double transformation” rule for textile and clothing products can be illustrated by the mere fact that it is not possible for them to procure fabric at competitive prices from within the country. Therefore, the current SADC EPA negotiations should strive to achieve a shift from double transformation to the single transformation (example, manufacture from fabrics)¹³.

The merits of a single stage conversion rule over double or even triple stage of conversion are apparent from the experience of AGOA. AGOA originally was passed into law in 2000. The initial proposed rules of origin for apparel for AGOA were based on a single stage conversion. It was the US Textile lobby, that forced a change from a simple single stage conversion rule to a yarn forward 3 stage conversion rule of origin, limiting fabric origin to US or regional fabrics only, but the LDCs were given a 4 year reprieve from following the single stage conversion rule to allow them to develop a textile industry in the meantime. The US Textile Industry’s objective was simply to limit the possibility of a growth of exports from sub-Sahara Africa. What happened in reality? The potential of AGOA to deliver on its goals of massive job creation was severely curtailed. It led to a split of LDCs and non LDCs¹⁴ in the region.

¹² Chairman, Export Council for Clothing Industry in South Africa

¹³ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/october/tradoc_136503.pdf

¹⁴ South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia and Botswana.

There have been three major and a number of minor amendments to the AGOA. These are:

- AGOA II passed in August 2006, these amendments (re)classified Namibia and Botswana as LDC countries, thus permitting them to source third country fabrics. It also clarified certain customs interpretations, including “knit to shape”, the origin of yarns (further processed into fabric), and extended the volume cap on duty-free clothing exports from beneficiary countries.

- AGOA III passed in July 2004, extends AGOA from 2008 to 2015, increases duty-free clothing quota, designates ethnic printed fabric as AGOA eligible, and extends third country sourcing provisions by three years to September 2007.

- AGOA IV passed in December 2006, extends clothing’s third country provisions by five years to 2012, extends the GSP to end-2008, and introduces abundant supply provisions for fabrics.

There is a significant difference between the rules of origin under the Cotonou Agreement, which governs preferential access to the European Union, and AGOA. In particular, under AGOA, LDCs¹⁵ were entitled to meet a less stringent ROO of single transformation to enjoy preferential access to regional markets. The impact of relaxation of the ROO is clearly reflected in the utilisation rates of the AGOA preferential scheme.

Tables I and II report the utilization rate for textiles and clothing of Harmonised System (HS) chapters¹⁶ 61 and 62.

TABLE I

Utilization of the HS chapters 61, 62 (garments) and 63 (other made-up textile articles) from AGOA lesser developed effective beneficiaries with textile certification and special rules of origin (2001)

Partners:

Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia

HS		Imports value (\$000)				AGOA pref. scheme		
Chapter	Description	From world	From AGOA TOTAL	From ACOA MFN free	From AGOA dutiable	Covered	Receiving	Utiliz. Rate (%)
61	Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or crocheted.	24 912 730	285 265	0	285 265	285265	136 157	47.7
62	Art of apparel & clothing access, not knitted/crocheted	26 227 123	264 504	0	264 504	264 504	164 304	62.1
63	Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing etc	1 207 777	181	0	181	181	0	0.0
TOTALS		52 347 630	549 950	0	549 950	549 950	300 461	54.6

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on ITC trade data.

¹⁵ For the purposes of the Special Rule under AGOA, lesser developed sub-Saharan African countries are defined as those with a per capita GDP of less than \$1,500 a year in 1998. On the basis of the data contained in the 1999/2000 *World Development Report*, all sub-Saharan countries except Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa fall below this per capita threshold and have thus been declared eligible to use third-country fabric (non-US and not African) in their apparel exports to the US. AGOA amendments specially grant Botswana and Namibia lesser developed AGOA status for the Special Rule.

¹⁶ These two chapters represent the bulk of trade for all AGOA LDCs. In fact, trade when petroleum products are excluded and trade under these two chapters account high as 93.9 per cent for all AGOA LDCs and by 96.7 for AGOA UN LDCs. The utilization rates were, for 2001, as low as 54.6 and 55.5 per cent for AGOA LDCs and AGOA UN LDCs respectively.

TABLE II

Utilization of the HS chapters 61, 62 (garments) and 63 (other made-up textile articles) from AGOA UN LDC effective beneficiaries with textile certification and special rules of origin (2001)

Partners:

Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia

HS		Imports value (\$ 000)				AGOA pref. scheme		
Chapter	Description	From world	From AGOA TOTAL	From AGOA MFN free	From AGOA dutiable	Covered	Receiving	Utiliz. rate (%)
61	Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or crocheted	24 584 320	239 545	0	239 545	239 545	129 544	54.1
62	Art of apparel & clothing access, not knitted/crocheted	24 301 363	187 673	0	187 673	187 673	107 579	57.3
63	Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing etc.	834 654	165	0	165	165	0	0.0
TOTALS		49 720 337	427 383	0	427 383	427 383	237 123	55.5

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on ITC trade data.

As shown in table III and IV, in 2002 the utilization rates rose dramatically to 97.5 and 97.2 per cent in the case of UN LDCs and 92.3 and 96.4 per cent in countries considered as LDCs in AGOA.

TABLE III

Utilization of the HS chapters 61, 62 (garments) and 63 (other made-up textile articles) from AGOA lesser developed effective beneficiaries with textile certification and special rules of origin (2002)

Partners:

Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia

HS		Imports value (\$000)				AGOA pref. scheme		
Section	Description	From world	From AGOA TOTAL	From AGOA MFN free	From AGOA dutiable	Covered	Receiving	Utiliz. Rate (%)
61	Art of apparel & clothing access., knitted or crocheted	26 902 083	397 691	0	397 691	388 856	358 851	92.3
62	Art of apparel & clothing access., not knitted/crocheted	27 713 308	302 640	0	302 640	302 640	291 673	96.4
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing, etc.	2 634 875	279	0	279	244	0	0.0

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on ITC trade data.

These data, showing a net increase on both volume of exports and utilization rates, seems to indicate that, after a “learning by doing period”, the relative high preferential margin and the special

rules of origin allowing for imports of non-US, non-African fabrics are generating trade flows and investment in the AGOA beneficiary countries.

TABLE IV

Utilization of the HS chapters 61, 62 (garments) and 63 (other made-up textiles articles) from AGOA UN LDC effective beneficiaries with textile certification and special rules of origin (2002)

Partners:

Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia

HS		Imports value (\$000)				AGOA pref. scheme		
Section	Description	From world	From AGOA TOTAL	From AGOA MFN free	From AGOA dutiable	Covered	Receiving	Utiliz. Rate (%)
61	Art of apparel & clothing access., knitted or crocheted	25 535 151	288 612	0	288 612	279 778	272 776	97.5
62	Art of apparel & clothing access., not knitted/crocheted	25 499 716	166 231	0	166 231	166 231	161 499	97.2
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing, etc.	2 126 948	78	0	78	74	0	0.0

Source: UNCTAD calculations based on ITC trade data.

In conclusion, restrictive rules of origin will not induce economic development. From a buyer's perspective, EPA with onerous rules of origin could be worse than no agreement at all because it raises expectations of duty free access without being able to deliver on it. It is proposed that Rules of Origin based on single conversion criterion with accumulation across whole of Africa should be incorporated into future EPAs. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan African clothing and textile industry should be seen as one collective whole in the EPA negotiations. Any other scenario will severely limit the ability of the clothing industry to play a meaningful role in the upliftment of Africa.

SANITARY AND PHYTO-SANITARY MEASURES IN SADC-EPA NEGOTIATIONS

Based on presentations by Mr. Jurgen Hoffman¹⁷ and Ms. Paulina M. Elago¹⁸

It is an acknowledged fact that any country that wants to export agricultural products to another country will have to comply with SPS regulations in force in the targeted country. WTO rules define SPS measures as measures necessary to protect human and animal health from food borne diseases and other health risks and plants from pests and diseases. All SPS measures have to be in compliance with the provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures of the WTO. However there are technical bodies (created before the SPS Agreement came into force) that guide the SPS Agreement of the WTO, namely the OIE (International Office for Epizootics) for zoo-sanitary measures; the IPPC (International Plant Protection Convention) for phytosanitary measures and the provisions of the Codex Alimentarius for food safety standards.

SPS measures should not be seen as measures to prohibit or impede on trade in agricultural products, but the reality shows that this can happen and this should be seen as counterproductive to the spirit and policies of the SADC EPA negotiations. In reality, there is a room for using SPS measures as Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) that can prevent access into the EU market despite there being no tariffs imposed on the goods.

The specific issues that need to be addressed are:

1. *The complexity of EU legislation.* EU legislation towards SPS is complex and commodity based (more than 760 pages of text). Moreover, existing rules allow EU to implement a mechanism in which each Member States is entitled to have its own SPS requirements. Due to variety and complexity of EU requirements, most countries having a preferential market access quota in the Cotonou Agreement, have stopped exporting agricultural products because of the onerous financial and capacity burden to their industries. These are: Kenya, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and also, since 2004, Swaziland. *The issue of harmonisation of EU internal SPS rules is, thus, the one of a major concern for SADC countries during the SADC EPA negotiations.*

2. *Different levels of SPS implementation measures across Africa.* It imposes serious financial burden on business and creates legal uncertainty. *Regional SPS standards should be harmonized.* This could be done through regional integration. It is recommended, for example, to ratify an annex to the current SACU Agreement that would unify SPS standards across Africa. Another solution is to bring national laws of African countries up to date in accordance with current international SPS standards (OIE and IPPC; Codex Alimentarius).

3. *Creation of regional institutions and laboratories* in Africa that could be involved into SPS related research and control would also significantly contribute to trade facilitations between EU and SADC countries.

¹⁷ Senior Trade Advisor, Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum

¹⁸ Deputy Director, Trade Facilitation and Capacity Building, Southern Africa Global Competitiveness Hub, Botswana

The Technical Assistance Needs

EU should assist African countries in capacity building on regional and national level, provide financial assistance, contribute to infrastructure development and legal frameworks.

EU should also help in establishing an information system for channelling information from the EU to the SADC region on SPS and TBT regulations.

ITC programs as well as FAO and EDF programs on financing African SPS initiatives should continue to exist. In this context, reference can be made to work done for Namibia by the International Trade Centre¹ and the FAO¹ to address the capacity building needs of Namibia in the regional integration process.

It is also necessary to mention that different countries in Africa have different SPS related problems: some of them do not experience problems with certain agricultural products diseases; they simply do not have them. SADC EPA negotiations should envisage provisions that would allow facilitating SPS measures for agricultural products originating from countries in question.

Other concerns:

Up to now, focus on SPS compliance has been on public sector capacity building and control which is necessary and the first line of defence for SPS compliance. The EU authorities must have confidence in the national bodies targeted by the EU and implementing the SPS conditions set by the EU. **Capacity Building in the public sector is of immense value to the exporting country and training programs have to be developed in the framework of the EDF support mechanisms and Aid for Trade provisions in co-operation with the EC regional authorities.**

However, costs incurred by private sector and in both, SPS for meat exports and table grape exports, as is the case of Namibia, have not been quantified. The cost often have to be borne by small scale producers, who can ill afford the additional costs that have not been getting much attention up to now.

An investigation into the relation between heightened production costs and higher prices obtained for their export products for commercial and communal producers is urgently requested.

Taking into account the shrinking of benefits from preferential market access in the EU markets and the burden of higher costs, what is the contribution of the export sector to the development of agriculture in the small-scale sector in especially developing countries such as Botswana and Namibia? Again, no viable information is available to guide policy makers in their decisions. **Another investigation to quantify the effect of the high cost of SPS compliance on the developmental objectives of selected SADC – EPA member states should be launched.** In this investigation differences between direct contributions and monetary transfers and indirect costs directly affecting producers should be recognised.

Swaziland has temporarily opted out of the market already, because the relation between compliance costs and export prices to both the public and the private sector did it not make it worthwhile to implement the more and more stringent measures requested by institutional and industry SPS and standard measures implied upon the exporting countries. **Can this economic effect be measured and explained in a country study?**

TRADE IN SERVICES

Based on the presentation of Mr. Paul Kalenga¹⁹

- Cotonou Agreement:
 - There is no firm obligation to liberalize trade in services in the context of EPA. However EU and ACP agreed on the objective of extending their partnership to liberalizing services in accordance with General Agreement on Trade in Services in WTO (GATS) provisions.
 - Unlike trade in goods (Article XXIV of the GATT), Article V of the GATS reflects some flexibility for developing countries and obliges them to undertake commitments only in accordance with the level of development of countries, both overall and in individual sectors and sub sectors.
 - General principles for taking commitments under GATS are:
 - Progressive liberalization
 - Positive list approach
 - Asymmetry in commitments in accordance with special and differential treatment of developing and least developed countries
 - Positive regional discrimination
 - The right to regulate
 - Proper sequencing
 - Establishment of a sound regulatory framework that is supportive of services activities.
- 2004 SADC Negotiating Guidelines provided for regional service integration agenda to be linked to EPA commitments and flexibilities in accordance with GATS principles. However, there was a paradigm shift in 2006 SADC Strategic Framework: no binding commitments on services but ask for only capacity building support from the EU. SADC EPA countries submitted a comprehensive and detailed cooperative programme of human, policy, institutional capacity building at national levels. This was to be complemented by a process of regional convergence on regulations and policies related to trade in services, to develop a common approach to address the key challenges of creating a viable regional services market.
- EC response:
 - While acknowledging that there is no fixed obligation to liberalize services but there is no blank cheque either for capacity building support in absence of obligations
 - Support regional service liberalization commitments.
- Some SADC EPA countries (majority) now want to consider services in EPA regionalism. The issue is whether by entering into negotiations without a common regional framework and if only some countries in the region take bilateral commitments with EU to the exclusion of others, will it result in uneven liberalization of the sector within the region? Will it impact negatively on the development of a regional regulatory environment for services subsequently?

¹⁹ Trade Policy Adviser, RTFP/SADC Secretariat

OTHER TRADE RELATED AREAS

Based on the presentation of Paul Kalenga²⁰

- SADC EPA negotiating position: cooperative and non-binding arrangements in other trade related areas, such as investment, competition policy, public procurement, protection of intellectual property rights, trade and environmental standards, trade and labour standards.
- EC: commits to assist in strengthening regulatory frameworks but “no blank cheques...for adjustment purposes or capacity building when the foundations for these things are not yet being laid” in other words, there is no commitment for technical assistance in absence of binding agreements on these issues
- The EC argues that there must be the “right policy framework” in a manner consistent with levels of development and institutional constraints

DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF EPA

- SADC: binding development commitments for EPA-related adjustment support
- EC:
 - Development dimension goes beyond financial aspects to include a pro-development content of the EPA and support to implementation
 - The outcome of the EPA negotiations (tariff reduction agreement and treatment of services and trade related rules) would determine the needs and therefore the level of EPA-related development support required
 - Conditional linkages between the negotiation outcome and additional development resources beyond EDF resources
- EU expects broader up-front commitments by South Africa (a condition) on services and trade-related areas

²⁰ Trade Policy Adviser, RTFP/SADC Secretariat

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Angola

Mr. Tshico MBUMBA
Senior Trade Officer
Head of the Multilateral Trade Department
Ministry of Trade
Largo 4 De Fevereiro
Luanda, Angola
Tel: +244.30.1237
E-mail: mbumbatshico@yahoo.com.br

Mr. Vicente SOARES
Senior Adviser
Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Angola
Luanda, Angola
Fax: +244.222.444566
Mob: +244.924809888
E-mail: ccira@ebonet.net
E-mail: vsoares@snet.co.ao

Botswana

Ms. Maria MACHAILO-ELLIS
Executive Director
Botswana Confederation of Commerce
Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM)
Plot 5195, Old Lobatse Road
P.O. Box 432
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel: +267.3953459
Mob: +267.72110524
Fax: +267.3973142
E-mail: mellis@boccim.co.bw
E-mail: boccim@info.bw

Ms. Paulina M. ELAGO
Deputy Director
Trade Facilitation and Capacity Building
Southern Africa Global Competitiveness Hub
Plot 40, Unit 4, Gaborone International
Commerce Park
P.O. Box 602090
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel: +267.3900884
Mob: +267.71861566
Fax: +267.3901027
E-mail: pelago@satradehub.org

Lesotho

Ms. Gertrude MOTHIBE
MSc Pharm (Brad) Managing Director
Lesotho Pharmaceutical Corporation
P.O. Box 256
Mafeteng 900
Maseru, Lesotho
Tel: +266.22.700326/321617

Tel: +266.52.500009
Mob: +266.58745610/58870027
Fax: +266.22.700002
E-mail: gertie@lpc.co.ls
E-mail: sup_gertie@yahoo.co.uk

Mr. Simon PHAFANE
President
Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry
P.O.Box 113
Maseru, Lesotho
Tel: +266.22.316937
Fax: +266.22.322.794
E-mail: simon@lesoff.co.ls

Mozambique

Mr. Adelino BUQUE
President
CTA - Confederação das Associações
Economicas de Moçambique
Confederation of Business Associations of
Mozambique TA
Av. 10 de Novembro, Recinto da Facim
Maputo, Mozambique
Tel: +258.21.311734/6
Mob: +258.823928180
Fax: +258.21.311732
E-mail: info@cta.org.mz
E-mail: buque2004@yahoo.com.br

Mr. Kekobad PATEL
President of Customs and Fiscal Committee
Confederation of Business Associations of
Mozambique (CTA)
P.O. Box 698
Maputo, Mozambique
Tel: +258.21.427471
Mob: +258.82.3006090
Fax: +258.21.325657
E-mail: enacomo-sede@virconn.net

Namibia

Mr. Ernst ENDER
Director, Market Development
Namibia Breweries Limited
Isacor Street, Northern Industria
P.O. Box 206
Windhoek, Namibia
Tel: +264.61.3204043
Mob: +264.081.1246447
Fax: +264.61.215858
E-mail: ernst.ender@olfitra.com.na

Mr. Jurgan HOFFMANN
Senior Trade Advisor
Namibia Agricultural Trade Forum
P.O. Box 5096, Ausspannplatz
Windhoek, Namibia

Tel: +264.61.379507
Mob: +264.081.1283637
Fax: +264.61.225371
E-mail: jhoffmann@iafrica.com.na
E-mail: jurgen@nammic.com.na

Ms. Ndiitah NGHIPONDOKA-ROBIATI
Counterpart to the Trade Advisor
Namibian Agricultural Trade Forum
P.O. Box 5096, Ausspannplatz
Windhoek, Namibia
Tel: +264.61.379507/0/8
Mob: +264.081.2950976
Fax: +264.61.225371
E-mail: nrobiati@nammic.com.na
E-mail: ndiitah@ndiitah.freereserve.co.uk

South Africa

Mr. Job SITHOLE
International Relations Section
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa
Stellenbosch, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.4032484
Fax: +27.21.4033908
E-mail: kahmed@parliament.gov.za

Mr. Douglas GIBSON
International Relations Section
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa
Stellenbosch, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.4032484
Fax: +27.21.4033908
E-mail: kahmed@parliament.gov.za

Ms. Ruth MAGAU
International Relations Section
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa
Stellenbosch, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.4032484
Fax: +27.21.4033908
E-mail: kahmed@parliament.gov.za

Ms. Lise KORSTEN
Professor: Plant Pathology
Dept of Microbiology and Plant Pathology
Faculty of Biological and Agricultural
Sciences
University of Pretoria
Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27.12.4203295
Fax: +27.12.4204588
E-mail: lise.korsten@up.ac.za
E-mail: lkorsten@fabi.up.ac.za

Mr. Jack Raymond KIPLING
Chairman
Export Council for Clothing Industry
in South Africa
6 Hawthorndern Road

Kenilworth 7700
Cape Town, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.7616421/7610610
Mob: +27.082.3748981
Fax: +27.21.7616394
E-mail: jack@clothingexports.co.za
E-mail: jack@clotrade.co.za

Mr. David CHRISTIANSON
Independent Journalist,
Stellenbosch, South Africa
E-mail: dwchris@mweb.co.za

Mr. Rian GELDENHUYS
Director
Floor Inc Attorneys
Stellenbosch, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8801714
Mob: +27.82.4691925
Fax: +27.21.8802807
E-mail: rian.geldenhuis@floor-inc.co.za

Ms. Rhaish NAIDOO
Executive: Corporate Strategy
Pioneer Foods
32 Market Street
Paarl 7646
P.O. Box 20, Huguenot 7645
Stellenbosch, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8075132
Fax: +27.21.8075290
E-mail: tnaidoo@poineerfoods.co.za

Swaziland

Mr. Walter Siphon MATSEBULA
Economist
Swaziland Sugar Association
Cnr. Msakato & Dzeliwe Streets
P.O. Box 445
Mbababne, Swaziland
Tel: +268.4042646/6028586
Fax: +268.4045005
E-mail: walterm@ssa.co.sz

Tanzania

Mr. Hussein KAMOTE
Director of Policy and Research
Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI)
9th Floor - NIC Investment House
Samora Avenue
P.O. Box 71783
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Tel: +255.22.2114954/2123802/2130327
Mob: +255.784660918
Fax: +255.22.2115414
E-mail: kamote@cit.co.tz

**Regional Organizations
(private sector)**

African Business Roundtable (ABR) – South Africa

Mr. Kwasi ABEASI
Chief Executive
The African Business Roundtable (ABR)
P.O.Box 05328
Accra, Ghana
Tel: +233.277.550732
Fax: +233.21.663801
E-mail: kabeasi@abrnnet.org
E-mail: kabeasi@yahoo.co.uk
E-mail: thabitha@abrnnet.org

ASCCI – South Africa

Ms. Siphiso MAGONGO
Assistant Economic Development
Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce
& Industry (ASCCI)
73 Eleventh Street
Parkmore, Sandton, 2146 South Africa
Tel: +27.11.7835448
Mob: +27.76.8015813
Tel: +27.86.6912510
E-mail: siphiso@ascci.org.za

BUSA - South Africa

Ms. Catherine GRANT
Trade Policy Advisor
SADC Employers Group
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)
1st Floor, 3 Gwen Lane
Sandton, South Africa
Tel: +27.11.784.8000/1/2/3
Mob: +27.082.6264068
Fax: +27.86.609.8248
E-mail: catherine.grant@busa.org.za

**Regional Organizations
(public sector)**

African Union Commission – Ethiopia

Mr. Festus O. FAJANA
Trade Policy Expert
African Union Headquarters
Department of Trade & Industry
Commission of the African Union
P.O. Box 3243
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: +251.11.5514554/5517700 ext 120
Mob: +251.911.230.590
Tel: +251.11.5515885
Fax: +251.11.5513036/5510467
E-mail: fajanaf@africa-union.org
E-mail: ffajana@hotmail.com

Mr. Fudzai PAMACHECHE
African Union Headquarters
Department of Trade & Industry
Commission of the African Union
P.O. Box 3243
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: +251.11.5514554
Tel: +251.11.5515885
Fax: +251.11.5513036/5510467
E-mail: fudzaip@yahoo.co.uk

SADC – Botswana

Mr. Paul KALENGA
Trade Policy Adviser
Southern African Development Community
RTFP/SADC Secretariat
SADC House
Private Bag 0095
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel: +267.3951863
Fax: +267.3972848
E-mail: pkalengalza@yahoo.co.uk
E-mail: paulk@sadc.int
E-mail: pkalenga@sadc.int

TRALAC

Ms. Trudi HARTZENBERG
Executive Director
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: truidihartzenberg@tralac.org

Mr. Gerhard ERASMUS
Tralac Associate
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208/083 302 7131
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: gerharde@tralac.org

Mr. Ron SANDREY
Senior Research Fellow
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: rons@tralac.org

Mr. Eckart NAUMANN
Tralac Associate
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21. 789 1449/082 411 2770
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: eckart@naumann.co.za

Ms. Marica BASSON
Events and Publications Coordinator
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Mob: +27.82.887.2830
E-mail: maricabasson@tralac.org

Ms. Nancy HULL
Intern
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: intern@tralac.org

Mr. Gus MANDIGORA
Researcher
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: gusmandigora@tralac.org

Mr. Taku FUNDIRA
Researcher
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: takufundira@tralac.org

Mr. JB CRONJE
Researcher
Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac)
C.L. Marais Building
Crozier Street
Stellenbosch, 7600, South Africa
Tel: +27.21.8832208
Fax: +27.21.8838292
E-mail: jbcronje@tralac.org

Delegation of the European Commission to South Africa

Ms. Eva BURSVIK
First Secretary - Trade Adviser
Delegation of the European Commission to South Africa
1, Greenpark Estates
27, George Storrar Drive
Groenkloof 0027, Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27.12.452 5200/452 5225 (direct)
Fax: +27.12.4609923
E-mail: eva.bursvik@ec.europa.eu
E-mail: evabursvik@ec.europa.eu

WTO

Mr. Patrick LOW
Director
Economic Research and Statistics Division
World Trade Organization
Centre William Rappard
Rue de Lausanne 154
1211 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.7395605
Fax: +41.22.7395762
E-mail: patrick.low@wto.org

ITC

Mr. Stephen BROWNE
Deputy Executive Director
Office of the Executive Director
International Trade Centre (ITC)
54-56 Rue de Montbrillant
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.7300460
Fax: +41.22.7300575
E-mail: browne@intracen.org

Mr. Rajesh AGGARWAL
Senior Adviser
International Trading System
Division of Trade Support Services
International Trade Centre (ITC)
54-56 Rue de Montbrillant
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.7300306
Fax: +41.22.7300576
E-mail: aggarwal@intracen.org

Mr. Laurent MATILE
Senior Officer
Multilateral Trading System
Division of Trade Support Services
International Trade Centre (ITC)
54-56 Rue de Montbrillant
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.7300275
Fax: +41 22 730 0576

E-mail: matile@intracen.org

Mr. Jean-Sebastien ROURE
Adviser on Multilateral Trading System
Division of Trade Support Services
International Trade Centre (ITC)
54-56 Rue de Montbrillant
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.7300303
Fax: +41.22.7300576
E-mail: roure@intracen.org

Ms. Grazia LOMBARDI
Galli della Loggia
Logistics Coordinator
Division of Trade Support Services
International Trade Centre (ITC)
54-56 Rue de Montbrillant
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: +41.22.7300389
Fax: +41.22.7300576
E-mail: lombardi@intracen.org