AFRICAN UNION AGENDA 2063

Capacity Requirements for the New African Vision

Agenda 2063—“The Africa We Want”
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The ACBF and AUC also extend their appreciation to the team from Capacity and Development Services (CAPDEV), which carried out the field research for the capacity needs assessment.
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<td>ACBF</td>
<td>African Capacity Building Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
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<td>CAPDEV</td>
<td>Capacity and Development Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Central African Economic and Monetary Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General service</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics</td>
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<tr>
<td>STI</td>
<td>Science, technology, and innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Union du Maghreb Arabe</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>WEAMU</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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At the African Union (AU) Golden Jubilee Summit in June 2012, the heads of state and government assigned the chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) with developing Agenda 2063, an indigenous strategic framework for Africa’s transformation over the next 50 years anchored on inclusive growth and sustainable development. This was to be done in collaboration with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD Agency).

The Summit, while acknowledging past successes and challenges, rededicated itself to the continent’s development and technological transformation. It pledged its commitment to making progress in eight main areas: democratic governance; an integration agenda; African identity and renaissance; Africa’s place in the world; a determination of Africa’s destiny; an agenda for peace and security; an agenda for social and economic development; and the struggle against colonialism and the right to self-determination of people still under colonial rule. It further pledged to integrate these ideals and goals in national development plans and the development of Agenda 2063 through a people-driven process for realizing the AU’s vision for an integrated, people-centered, prosperous Africa, at peace with itself.

The Agenda 2063 preparation process involved a two-pronged approach: stakeholder consultations (with citizens, AU organs, civil society, the African diaspora, governments of member states, regional economic communities [RECs], and experts and planners) and rigorous technical work. The consultations with stakeholders brought forth the “seven aspirations,” the basis for Agenda 2063’s goals and targets. Simultaneously undertaken, the Agenda 2063 technical process involved analysis of the African development experience, including reviewing national plans, preparing draft framework documents, distilling lessons that Agenda 2063 should consider, and establishing baselines and trends of Africa’s development trajectory. This process produced three important documents: the Agenda 2063 Technical Document, the Agenda 2063 Popular Version, and the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014–2023.

While, undoubtedly, capacity needs and assessment studies had already been undertaken, the complexity of issues that Agenda 2063 addresses and the multiplicity of actors involved in implementing it required an Agenda 2063 capacity-focused review. The AUC chairperson informed the 26th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council that the Commission intended to review the continental, regional, and eventually national capacities required for such implementation, in a capacity needs assessment.

This document captures the results and emerging recommendations from the work carried out so far. Some of these were presented and discussed at the June 2015 African Union Ministerial Retreat and Heads of State Summit in South Africa.

Other work may be found in two documents also prepared for the Commission by the

The AUC’s highlighting of the importance of capacity dimensions for Agenda 2063 has been one of the missing links in previous development efforts. This time, implementation will be from a proper understanding of the capacity requirements (as encapsulated in this document) and accompanied by a capacity development plan framework (see the Capacity Development Plan Framework).

This document provides a conceptual and operational framing of imperatives and capacity issues required for delivering Agenda 2063. The nature of the assignment required a flexible system to be used for consultation, information and data gathering, and analysis. The findings in this report are derived from high-level interviews and discussions with key organizations, initial consultations with other key stakeholders and knowledgeable individuals, and analytical work. Research also included questionnaires and document reviews.

**Key messages from the capacity needs assessment**

Africa has diverse capacities at various levels to implement the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (the first 10-year plan) and Agenda 2063 overall, but for it to be more effective some key capacities need urgent attention:

- Change and transformative abilities (including change readiness and transformative leadership).

- Capacities of institutions and organizations (continental, regional, and national), involving refocusing and restructuring of work systems and a review of their mandates.

- Investment in massive training and education for critical, technical, and sector-specific skills, including in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM).

- A revamp of the content of African education at all levels, so that educated Africans (including youth and children) are imbued with African values and visionary optimism, and can find or create substantive employment.

- A move toward a Pan-African “New African” agenda through an African ideological grounding for those in the continent and the diaspora.

- The start of a progressive transfer to youth and women of key responsibilities for leading parts of Agenda 2063 within the first two years of the first 10-year plan.

- The continent’s ability to commit and mobilize its own funding for the first 10-year plan and Agenda 2063. This will be the “capacity” litmus test.

- An increase in soft skills, indispensable for each person to make things happen.

- Crucially and urgently, “dimension 1” (Recasting the African mind-set to a concept of African ownership—see chapter 2) would then guide Africa’s development paradigm, from African values.

The document has five chapters, after this overview:

Chapter 1 lays out the conceptual framing of capacity to better understand its dynamic
context in Africa. It highlights four key “capacity sets”: composite capacities; change and transformative capacities; critical, technical, and sector-specific skills; and four aspects of operational capacity for organizations (human capacity, institutional/organizational capacity, systems and work processes, and information access and knowledge).

These four capacity sets, with the Capacity Development Strategic Framework of the AU/NEPAD, can be used to frame a proper understanding of the capacity imperatives for Agenda 2063. In addressing foundational and strategic capacity elements that will enhance delivery and drive forward Agenda 2063, the report frames African youth and women as two critical game-changing capacity pillars for achieving the vision. The conceptual framing also identifies six levels for ensuring capacity readiness and development.

Chapter 2 analyzes the key capacities needed for Agenda 2063 by unpacking this new African vision into three strategic dimensions: recasting the African mind-set to a concept of African ownership; identifying initial continental “flagship projects,” key member state development goals, and special development activities and initiatives; and scenario building/risk management and anticipating future exigencies.

Chapter 3 dissects the first 10-year plan through a capacity lens focusing on goals, priority areas, and identifying potential capacity responsibilities for stakeholder groups, including academia, the private sector, civil society organizations (CSOs), and networks of youth and of women.

Chapter 4 presents some findings in broad issue areas reflecting the capacity imperatives for delivering Agenda 2063. Chapter 5 offers initial recommendations.
In framing capacity in the context of Agenda 2063, this chapter presents definitions; offers a new notion of capacity sets; moves youth and women to center stage, as capacity pillars for Agenda 2063; and proposes six levels for ensuring and promoting capacity readiness and development.

**Definitions**

The AU/NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework defines capacity as “the ability of individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and societies to sustainably define, articulate, engage and actualize their vision or developmental goals building on their own resources.”1 In developing a conceptual framing for Agenda 2063, this definition is a useful starting point to better understand the multifaceted context of capacity in Africa.

Inadequate capacity is a perennial challenge that constrains programs and projects promoting inclusive economic growth, sustained development, and integration. For Agenda 2063’s priority programs to be sustainably implemented, capacity development must be placed at the core of the transformation process.

**Four capacity sets**

The Capacity Team has crafted four capacity sets to frame the capacity needs for Agenda 2063 (figure 1.1). The focus of attention, in finalizing the review, will be on what it will take to strengthen the skills, knowledge, and expertise required to implement Agenda 2063.

**Capacity set 1: Four aspects of operational capacity for organizations**

This capacity set comprises four aspects as they relate to organizations:

- **Human capacity.** This covers “hard” and “soft” skills for implementing Agenda 2063 at all technical levels. Hard skills refer to qualifications (first degree, master’s, PhD, and so on) and experience in years. Soft skills include commitment, accountability, results orientation, proactivity, speed, problem-solving attributes, continuous high energy, teamwork, and capacity to maintain a heavy workload.

- **Institutional/organizational capacity.** This covers governance, mandates/missions, institutional funding, and organizational structure for delivering development services.

- **Systems and work processes.** These include effectiveness of operational systems and the nature of work processes critical to how institutions function. They feature core budget allocation; bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic work processes; priorities and preparation in work plans; decision making, decision activation, and interministerial and interdepartmental
coordination; and clarity in managing processes such as finance, procurement, recruitment, delegation, and information technology use.

- **Information access and knowledge.** These relate to the ease of accessing information and acquiring knowledge that enables learning for continuous improvement.

**Capacity set 2: Change and transformative capacities**

Aspects under this category include the capacities needed to initiate, facilitate, and manage change. These abilities foster “drivers-of-change” approaches, showing how to “get there” and “make it happen.” Such capacities include:

- Transformative leadership (including visioning).
- Change readiness: creating and maintaining the desire for change.
- Ability for mind-set shifts.
- Technological predisposition and information and communications technology (ICT).
- Invention and innovation commitment.
- Risk management abilities.
- Management and top leadership optimism.
- Top management commitment.
- Shared, inspirational vision.
- Ownership of decision making.

**Capacity set 3: Composite capacities**

This set features four capacity areas (planning; facilitation; knowledge and risk management; and program financing, management, and development), requiring operators to link and use knowledge and information in a multidisciplinary, multifaceted fashion, often
requiring combined skills across and beyond qualifications.

**Capacity set 4: Critical, technical, and sector-specific skills**

This set embraces hard technical or specialist skills and subject knowledge critical for Africa, and includes skills in health; mining; finance; ICT; energy; engineering; infrastructure; research institutions; water resources and management; and science, technology, and innovation (STI).

**Framing the role of youth and women as key capacity pillars for Agenda 2063**

**Putting youth and women at center stage**

Beyond the analytical basis of the capacity sets, the Capacity Team placed at center stage youth and women as key Agenda 2063 drivers, in which they are two game-changing stakeholders. Academic, economic, and political discourse holds that African youth are a forceful and promising response to the democratic and developmental deficits that have been some of the most problematic aspects of the African integration process. The role that they play in the continent’s development has been underrated; they are often portrayed as passive stakeholders who need government help. Yet there is evidence that youth and women are critical economic actors, indispensable to Agenda 2063’s success.

**Intergenerational mapping**

Work has been initiated on developing broad intergenerational mapping that can provide a framework for engaging the commitment and energy of Africans of different ages, particularly young people, to realize Agenda 2063’s vision (figure 1.2).

**Figure 1.2 Generational interlinkage for Agenda 2063**

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
African youth and children involvement planning—Pan-African ideologies

Engagement could start very young (figure 1.3), involving a range of Pan-African ideologies for each age group to transform and place Africa at a different level of development, prosperity, and global respect.

Such planning might entail—largely picking up on the younger age groups in figure 1.3—the following:

- Ages 5–7: introducing initial African values, heroes, “can-do” attitude, confidence building, and so on, through African cartoons and other entertaining visual series.
- Ages 14–17: introducing Pan-African ideologies and model AU-type organizations; promoting STEM, business, innovation, conservation wisdom, and financial management.
- Ages 18–21: promoting leadership schools, thought leadership, tertiary courses,

Figure 1.3 An intergenerational mapping tree

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
Pan-African ideologies, and STEM and innovation.

- Ages 22–25: entering the workforce; training in business, conservation, and financial management; exposing to politics, governance, Pan-African ideologies, and STEM and innovation; promoting doctors, engineers, technicians, electricians, entrepreneurs, other health professionals, and so on.

- Ages 26–29: commercializing inventions; employing youth by youth; promoting STEM, productive inventions, and so on; exposing young executives to politics, governance, and Pan-African ideologies.

- Ages 30–35: promoting STEM, Pan-African ideologies, and so on; generating enhanced governance, entrepreneurial executives, and transformative leaders.

**Six levels for ensuring and promoting capacity readiness and development**

Drawing on the conceptual framing of the four capacity sets (above) and the three strategic dimensions (next chapter), the Capacity Team identified six activity levels:

- Africa’s continental coordinating platforms (AU/RECs, and so on).

- Institutions and organizations (governmental, intergovernmental, and those serving stakeholder groups).

- Leadership (political, managerial, entrepreneurial, traditional rulers, and so on).

- Youth and women.

- The African people, particularly grassroots populations and the public.

- Individual Africans, for commitment to being the “New African” for “The Africa We Want.”

These levels are important not only for assessing capacity readiness, but more important for guiding the preparation of capacity development plans and enhancing the capacity for greater ownership and mobilization for work under Agenda 2063.
2

CAPACITY FOR WHAT?
THE THREE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF AGENDA 2063

Starting with the first 10 years, the Capacity Team addressed the question: What capacities are necessary for achieving Agenda 2063? The team undertook a substantive analysis of the content, purpose, and activities of Agenda 2063, leading it to “unpack” the Agenda into three strategic dimensions (figure 2.1).

This approach helps us understand the work needed to achieve the outputs and outcomes in this vision (table 2.1). This unpacking therefore provides a first strategic response to the question: capacity for what?

These dimensions are not mutually exclusive; are multilevel and multifaceted; and are

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**Figure 2.1 Unpacking Agenda 2063 into three strategic dimensions**

Dimension 1
Recasting the African mindset to a concept of African ownership

Dimension 2
Identifying initial continental “flagship projects,” key development goals of member states, and special development activities and initiatives

Dimension 3
Scenario building/risk management and anticipating future exigencies

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
dependent on each other for unlocking the capacities needed for achieving Agenda 2063.

**Dimension 1: Recasting the African mind-set to a concept of African ownership**

The most important dimension for realizing the Agenda 2063 vision, dimension 1 challenges the African continent to use the opportunity of Agenda 2063 to pursue unprecedented prosperity, take charge of its destiny, and secure the ownership of its own resources and of the African narrative and brand (box 2.1). Succeeding in this dimension will be essential to paving the way for dimension 2.

**Dimension 2: Identifying initial continental "flagship projects," key member state development goals, and special developmental activities and initiatives**

This dimension has, in some ways, already been seen in other continental frameworks designed with flagship projects, such as the Lagos Action Plan, the African Economic Treaty and, most important, the 1963 Organization of African Unity Summit Resolution (which laid the foundation for the continent.

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**Table 2.1 The three strategic dimensions of Agenda 2063**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension 1: Recasting the African mind-set to a concept of African ownership</th>
<th>Dimension 2: Identifying initial continental “flagship projects,” key member state development goals, and special development activities and initiatives</th>
<th>Dimension 3: Scenario building/risk management and anticipating future exigencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Capacities needed:  
- Mind-set change  
- Change and transformation readiness  
- Spirit of self-confidence  
- African values  
- Pan-African perspective—African liberation and solidarity  
- African ownership of its development paradigm  
- Performance and evaluative culture  
- African ownership and management of its own resources and agendas  
- Accountable and transformative leadership  
- Responsive institutions  
- African ownership of its own narrative and brand | Capacities needed:  
- Flagship programs and areas for accelerated actions  
- Programs and activities in the 10-year plan  
- National and regional projects  
- Stakeholder group projects and initiatives  
- Continental free trade agenda | Capacities needed:  
- Anticipating the future  
- Building scenarios  
- Pushing Africa’s technological advances  
- Reading and analyzing global trends into the future  
- Understanding and using or taming current or future disruptive technologies |

**Source:** ACBF Capacity Team.

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**Box 2.1 The significance of dimension 1 in Agenda 2063**

Agenda 2063 should be seen as transformative. That intent is nested in its goals, priority areas, and indicative strategies. This agenda will not, however, be attained just because it is desired. It will need a purposeful construction, nurturing and harnessing the drivers of change, that is, the capacity to drive transformation and to help and manage change processes.

The focus in dimension 1 is not necessarily on projects. Instead, a premium is placed on less tangible, less evident but crucial, and often neglected transformative capacities that will be a new foundation for Africa to believe in its capacity to be a great continent. This captures Africa’s grand vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.”

**Source:** ACBF Capacity Team.
to develop. Adding bold flagship projects with timeframes is an important continental step forward. Achieving these flagship projects will also depend heavily on the mind-set transformation aspects under dimension 1.

**Dimension 3: Scenario building/risk management and anticipating future exigencies**

Critical for success on this dimension will be Africa’s belief in and commitment to preemptively charting and designing its own vision of the future, including establishing leadership in various technological areas. Success will also require intelligent approaches for managing risks and hurdles (internal and external).

**Linking the four capacity sets to the three strategic dimensions**

Figure 2.2 shows the interrelationship between the capacity sets and strategic dimensions. The key capacity set is number 2, which comes through in all three dimensions, emphasizing that achieving Agenda 2063 requires focus and investment on driving change and transformation.

**Figure 2.2 Interrelationship between the four capacity sets and the three strategic dimensions of Agenda 2063**

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
CAPACITY REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 10-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Seven aspirations of Agenda 2063

The Agenda 2063 consultative process undertaken by the AUC brought forth seven aspirations for the next 50 years, with implementation broken down into the short, medium, and long term. Six of the seven are presented as feeders to what we consider the ultimate aspiration—a prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development (table 3.1).

Goals and priority areas under the first 10-year plan

Agenda 2063 has five 10-year plan frameworks. This first plan focuses on issues pertinent to the 10 years but also aligned with the other expected outcomes at the end of 2063. The first plan has 20 goals and 35 priority areas (and 289 targets) centered on the seven aspirations (see table 3.1). Most of these targets are national, with the continental/regional bodies playing other roles.

Identifying likely stakeholder capacities and responsibilities for the first 10-year plan

In addition to the 10-year plan’s flagship programs are national priority programs and projects, and development initiatives of stakeholder groups. The first 10-year plan thus provides a continental framework that can be populated with people-centered activities in line with the plan’s bottom-up effort to imbue stakeholder groups with responsibility.

Agenda 2063 flagship projects seen through a capacity lens

The flagship projects in the first 10-year plan (box 3.1) have been designed to move from the norm of not implementing previous continental frameworks, and propel Africa’s transformation toward 2063. Making Agenda 2063 happen will require capacities to achieve the flagship programs and projects.

The flagship programs’ outputs require capacities—hard and soft—to be built and enhanced (figure 3.1). A capacity lens brings to the fore the issues of instruments and mechanisms that can enhance committed attention to making Agenda 2063 a true “African transformation” agenda.

Previous continental development frameworks have shown the need for a renewed focus on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to be a key element in Agenda 2063. Delivering the 10-year plan—specifically the flagship projects—will require investment in M&E capacities to promote an M&E culture. M&E for these projects will require developing capacities for communication, implementation, stakeholder engagement, and reporting on progress at multiple levels.
### Table 3.1 Likely responsibilities for the priorities of the 10-year plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspiration</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Priority area</th>
<th>Primary responsibility/capacities</th>
<th>Secondary responsibility/capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development</td>
<td>(1) A high standard of living and quality of life for all citizens</td>
<td>Jobs, incomes, and decent work. End to hunger, poverty, and inequality. Social security and protection, including people with disabilities. Modern and livable habitats, and basic quality services.</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>Private sector, CSOs, Youth and women’s networks, Think tanks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Well-educated citizens and a skills revolution underpinned by STI</td>
<td>Education and STI skills-driven revolution</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities, AU</td>
<td>Academia, Think tanks, Private sector, Diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Healthy and well-nourished citizens</td>
<td>Health and nutrition</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>Private sector, CSOs, Diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Transformed economies</td>
<td>Inclusive and sustainable economic growth. STI-driven manufacturing/industrialization and value addition. Economic diversification and resilience.</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities, AU, Private sector</td>
<td>Think tanks, Financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Modern agriculture for more productivity and production</td>
<td>Agricultural productivity and production</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities, AU institutions</td>
<td>Private sector, CSOs, Youth and women’s networks, Diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth</td>
<td>Marine resources and energy. Port operations and marine transport.</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>Diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7) Environmentally sustainable climate, and resilient economies and communities</td>
<td>Sustainable natural resource management. Conservation, biodiversity, climate resilience, genetic resources, ecosystem water security, and natural disaster prevention and preparedness.</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities, AU</td>
<td>CSOs, Private sector, Think tanks, Research institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of African renaissance</td>
<td>Framework and institutions for a united Africa</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities, AU</td>
<td>Academia, Youth and women’s networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8) United Africa (federal or confederate)</td>
<td>Financial and monetary institutions</td>
<td>Member states, RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>Financial institutions, Private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9) Established and functional continental financial and monetary institutions</td>
<td>Infrastructure and communications connectivity</td>
<td>Private sector, Diaspora</td>
<td>Member states, RECs, and regional entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspiration Goal</td>
<td>Priority area</td>
<td>Primary responsibility/ capacities</td>
<td>Secondary responsibility/ capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) An Africa of democracy, good governance, and respect for justice and human rights</td>
<td>Democracy and good governance Justice and human rights</td>
<td>Member states AU organs and institutions</td>
<td>CSOs Academia Think tanks Youth and women's networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) A secure and peaceful Africa</td>
<td>Preserving and maintaining peace and security</td>
<td>Member states RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>Youth and women's networks CSOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) An Africa with a strong cultural identity and common ethics, values, and heritage</td>
<td>Values and ideals of Pan-Africanism Cultural heritage, businesses, and creative arts</td>
<td>Member states Faith-based organizations CSOs Youth and women's networks</td>
<td>Private sector CSOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) An Africa whose development is driven by African people, especially its youth and women, and that cares for children</td>
<td>Girls and women's empowerment Preventing violence and discrimination against girls and women</td>
<td>Member states RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>Private sector Academia Faith-based organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) An Africa as a strong and influential global player and partner</td>
<td>Africa’s place in global affairs Partnership</td>
<td>AU organs Member states RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>CSOs Diaspora</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) An Africa taking full responsibility for financing her development</td>
<td>African capital markets Fiscal system and public sector revenues Development assistance</td>
<td>Private sector Member states RECs and regional entities</td>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACBF Capacity Team, adapted from AUC (2015).
Box 3.1 The first 10-year plan’s flagship projects

- **Integrated High-Speed Train Network.** Connecting all African capitals and commercial centers, this will help move goods, people, and factor services; reduce transport costs; and relieve congestion of current and future systems.

- **African Virtual and E-University.** This will increase access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa by reaching many students and professionals in multiple sites simultaneously. It will also develop relevant and high-quality open, distance, and e-learning resources to offer prospective students access from anywhere in the world, anytime.

- **Commodities Strategy.** This will help African countries integrate into global value chains, add value and extract higher rents from their commodities, and promote vertical and horizontal diversification anchored on value addition and local content development.

- **Annual African Forum.** This will bring together, annually, academia, civil society, the private sector, and African political leadership to discuss measures, constraints, and developments needed to realize the goals and aspirations of Agenda 2063.

- **Continental Free Trade Area by 2017.** This will boost growth of intra-African use and trade as an engine of growth and sustainable development. It aims to double intra-African trade by 2022. It also aims to strengthen Africa’s common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations and to establish the African Investment Bank and Pan-African Stock Exchange (by this year), the African Monetary Fund (by 2018), and the African Central Bank (in two stages, by 2028/34).

- **African Passport and Free Movement of People.** Transforming Africa’s laws, which remain restrictive on movement of people despite political commitments, is needed to bring down borders, promote issuance of visas by member states, and enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries by 2018.

- **Grand Inga Dam Project.** The optimal development of the Inga Dam will generate 43,200 megawatts of power to support current regional power pools and their combined service to transform Africa from traditional to modern energy sources, and to ensure all Africans’ access to clean and affordable electricity.

- **Pan-African E-Network.** With a wide range of stakeholders, this envisages policies and strategies that will lead to transformative e-applications and services in Africa, especially cyber security; the intra-African broadband terrestrial infrastructure; and the information revolution as the basis for service delivery in the bio- and nanotechnology industries—ultimately transforming Africa into an e-society.

- **Silencing the Guns by 2020.** Aiming to end all wars, violent conflicts, and gender-based violence, and to prevent genocide, this project will monitor progress by establishing an African Human Security Index.

- **African Outer Space Strategy.** This aims to bolster Africa’s development by strengthening its use of outer space. Outer space is crucial to Africa in all fields: agriculture, remote sensing, climate forecasting, disaster management, banking and finance, and defense and security. Africa’s access to space technology is no longer a luxury; there is a need to speed up access to it. New developments in satellite technology make it very accessible to African countries. The Brazzaville meeting on aerial space technology underlined the need for strategies to develop a regional market for space products in Africa.

Source: ACBF Capacity Team, adapted from AUC (2015).
Figure 3.1 Agenda 2063 flagship programs seen through a capacity lens

**“Soft” capacities required**
- Strong leadership commitment
- Governance abilities
- Political will
- Mindset change/readiness
- Transparency and accountability
- Self-confidence capacities
- Strong commitment
- Ownership mindset
- Intra-African mutual help commitment
- Regional integration mindset
- Sense of fairness and equity
- Accommodative approaches to “sovereignty”
- Change and transformative readiness capacities
- Willingness capacity
- Proactiveness
- Hard-working habits
- High drive and energy
- Teamwork abilities

**Agenda 2063 flagship programs**
1. Integrated High-Speed Train Network
2. Great Inga Dam
3. Silencing the Guns by 2020
4. Annual African Forum
5. Commodities
6. Establishment of the Continental Financial Institutions
7. The Continental Free Trade Area
8. Single African Aviation Market
9. Outer Space
10. The Pan-African E-Network
11. Establishment of the Virtual University
12. Free Movement of People and the African Passport

**“Hard” technical capacities required**
- Various critical, technical, and sector-specific skills
- Leadership
- Strategic planning capacities
- Systems and work processes
- Governance capacities
- Implementation capacities
- Conceptual capacities
- Monitoring and evaluation capacities
- Management capacities
- Coordination
- Knowledge and information capacities
- Development management capacities
- Development and development of partnerships
- Infrastructure capacities
- Risk management
- Science and technology
- Efficient and effective capacities
- Innovating/inventing capacities

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
This report’s findings are derived from questionnaires; document reviews, particularly capacity assessments and institutional legal framework documents; and high-level consultations with regional and continental institutions on the capacity imperatives. The review was primarily regional and continental, while a national capacity-scoping exercise for Agenda 2063 would later be undertaken. The scope of this work included:

At the continental level:

- The AU and its organs, including the PSC, General Assembly, Executive Council, Permanent Representatives’ Committee, and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council.
- The AUC and its departments.
- AU specialized agencies and institutions: the NEPAD Agency, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

At the regional level:

- The eight AU-recognized RECs: the East African Community (EAC); the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The review went beyond the regional and continental institutions to include selective contacts with other stakeholders, including academia, think tanks, civil society, faith-based organizations, the private sector, and youth and women’s networks.

This chapter presents findings in broad issue areas for the capacity imperatives needed to achieve Agenda 2063.

**Capacity set 1: Four aspects of organizations’ operational capacity**

This section looks at the four aspects of operational capacity in the continent’s institutional architecture.

**Regional and continental institutions**

Africa has made remarkable progress in establishing institutions to contribute to the AU vision and advance its development agenda regionally and continentally, including ones whose set-up goes beyond the institutions of the AU and RECs (table 4.1).

Yet the continent’s institutional architecture is heavy and complex. In addition to the bodies in the first column in table 4.1, the AU has more than 30 liaison and technical offices across the continent targeting specific development areas.
Regionally and subregionally, beyond the eight AU-recognized RECs, there are at least 100 other entities. And many RECs have overlapping memberships, resembling a tropical forest with climbers and heavy undergrowth (figure 4.1). The regional and continental set-ups present other challenges, too.

Lack of clear mandates. One challenge linked to the institutional set-up with huge implications for Agenda 2063’s implementation is the poor clarity on mandates among the AUC and RECs; among the AUC and some AU organs; and among the AUC and PAP, APRM, and NEPAD Agency. The mandates may be stated on paper, but implementation on the ground often demonstrates tensions.

Duplicating roles, functions, and activities. Lack of clarity has led to overlaps and duplications in how many of the institutions operate, with the AUC often attempting to play both a policy and implementation role. There is also noticeable duplication between the NEPAD Agency and some AUC departments. Regionally, the AUC is also occasionally seen as encroaching on the implementation space of RECs. Further, while RECs are described as the AU’s “building blocks,” there is a sense that they are sometimes sidelined into second-class involvement in major forums and other activities.

**Legislative framework.** The Constitutive Act established a complicated maze of institutions and responsibilities that often overlap or potentially create different power centers. These have severe implications for adopting normative standards and continental decisions. Structurally, organs are set up at the same level without a clear hierarchy and organic link. One area of contention is that the AUC chairperson, deputy chairperson, and commissioners are equally elected. This formula could harbor challenges on full executive authority, which the chairperson might be expected to exercise, on sanctions and rewards for performance.

There is similarly a functional and structural disconnect between RECs and AU organs, possibly because the instruments that govern relations among them are from memoranda of understanding that require updating and are not fully binding. The protocols and other instruments on relations between the AU and
RECs are not implemented effectively, and need revision.

**Governance.** The regional and continental governance set-up is onerous, process driven, and time consuming. Implementation of decisions does not reflect harmony or collective voice among continental constituents.

**Funding.** Member states, including RECs, are inadequately demonstrating ownership of the AU and its programs, since their contributions to the AU are irregular and insufficient. Current funding for the AU and its programs is heavily dependent on external partners—donors fund about 95 percent of the AU and its programs. These institutions have few

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.

Note: AMU = Arab Maghreb Union. CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary Community; CEPGL = Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; IOC = Indian Ocean Commission; MRU = Mano River Union; SACU = Southern African Customs Union; WAMEU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
resources, compelling them to compete un-
duly for external funding. This failure by AU
member states creates a dependency syndrome
that comes with subtle conditions and some-
times intrusive involvement of development
partners in AU processes. Arguably, Africa
has lost control of its own agenda, while mem-
ber states hesitate to empower the AUC with
greater functional decision-making powers.

Some of the following contribute to regional
and continental operational and related capac-
ity challenges:

• Insufficient involvement of nonstate ac-
tors, especially youth, women, and other
stakeholders in AU and REC processes.

• Insufficient demonstration of a strong Pan-African spirit.

• Limited sharing and exchange of informa-
tion, with each working as an independent
entity.

• Slow implementation and insufficient re-
sults-driven approaches.

• Insufficient decision-making effectiveness.

• Too little decentralization.

• Slow and bureaucratic work approaches
and operation methods.

• Insufficient change-driven abilities and de-
sire for innovation.

• Too few transformative leaders and managers.

Human capacity

The assessment shows great demand for
human capacity at all levels for all institu-
tions. Regional and continental staff capacity
is hindered in hard and soft skills.

AUC. During the review, the AUC had about
1,500 support, professional, and administra-
tive employees assigned to 28 organizational
departments, regional/liaison offices, and units
and divisions. Of the 1,500, 80 percent worked
at AUC headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethi-
pia while 20 percent worked at its regional/
liaison offices to service an African population
of more than 1 billion. To compare, the Euro-
pean Union employs about 33,000 to service
the European population of a little more than
740 million. About 33 percent of AUC staff
are women, but women constitute only 10 per-
cent of managers. About 40 percent of staff
are aged under 40 (table 4.2).

Some 40 percent of AUC employees are pol-
cy officers, and about 56 percent are general
service (GS) employees (the rest include di-
crators and youth volunteers). Policy officers
are technical specialists, and GS employees
provide administrative and other support du-
ties. Given that most of the AUC’s work is
policy oriented, the share of policy officers is
low.

The AUC often competes for talent with coun-
tries able to offer better salaries (figure 4.2).
This could be a barrier to recruiting staff from
these countries, and may constitute a political
barrier to African integration, including filling
staff quotas.

In the past few years only about half the
AUC’s staff have been on regular contractual
appointments, with the rest on periodically
renewed short-term contracts. Most contrac-
tual staff members have been in the AUC
for four years on average. Given rigidities in
the budget and human resource regime, the
AUC’s management tends to offer short-term
appointments, since these are not covered
under the Maputo Protocol of 2003, accord-
ing to which only 700 staff can be permanent
employees (generally equal to the perma-
nent staff in the AUC). This practice affects
performance and is counterproductive. There is therefore a need to revisit host-country agreements and the Maputo Protocol to better align staffing requirements with the challenges and requirements of the AUC’s Third Strategic Plan 2014–17, which calls for a strategic shift toward economic development, facilitated regional integration in Africa, and delivery on Agenda 2063. This shift requires a skilled and motivated staff.

NEPAD Agency. After the decision by the AU Executive Council in July 2012 for the NEPAD Agency to fill 94 positions over five years (2012–2016), the agency is pursuing that mandate. The new structure comprises the Bureau of the Chief Executive Officer and two departments (the Programme Implementation and Coordination Directorate, and the Administration, Finance, and Human Resources Directorate).

Among the AU-approved staff positions for the NEPAD Agency is a concentration at P2 and P3 (figure 4.2), with eight positions for P5. Staffing at P3 and P4 would usually provide the backbone for an organization’s expert technical inputs. Positions at P4 are expected to cover program staff on partners’ funding.

RECs. Based on document reviews and conversations with individuals, it seems that RECs have great demand for additional human capital for all institutions. The capacity of staff to adapt to the greater integration RECs aspire to is inefficient. In addition, each REC’s organogram indicates more than the required personnel to execute its mandate.

Table 4.2 AUC staff profile, headquarters and regional offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Regional offices</th>
<th>Overall (% of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1 (directors)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P1–P6 (policy officers)</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>579 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSA2-GSA6</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>442 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSB5-GSB10</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>354 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth volunteers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>33 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total staff</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>468 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>970 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than or equal to 40</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>574 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 41 and 50</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>488 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 and above</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>376 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular staff</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>702 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short term</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>736 (51%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2014).
But filling the various positions was a challenge since RECs expressed concern, during a study by the ACBF, about a lack of funds to recruit the staff needed, and about staff training and skills development. This constraint is caused by and manifested in many issues such as underdeveloped ICT; low numerical skills; inadequate staff incentives; limited secretariat autonomy; lack of regular on-the-job training; staff mismatches and workloads; and too little staff-needs analysis and strategic planning. (These issues also affect the AUC.)

**Soft skills.** The regional and continental institutions have much room to use soft skills more, notably trust; proactivity; problem-solving skills; results orientation; partnership-building attributes; heavy workload ability; teamwork ability/commitment; negotiation/persuasive abilities; commitment to development outcomes; continuous high energy/commitment; accountability (for results, efficiency); diligence and thoroughness; and speed and sense of urgency.

**Systems and work processes**

Operational systems are critical for clarity in management systems of such processes as finance, procurement, recruitment, delegation, and information technology. Many different work processes need to be reviewed, clarified, redesigned, or reengineered to enhance delivery.

Still, some regional and continental institutions use M&E systems increasingly for programs that use qualitative, quantitative, and balanced scorecard approaches. But some of the M&E systems focus on assessing inputs, outputs, and processes rather than outcomes. Inadequacy in work processes feeds into limited response to requests from staff, with a consequence of low rates of productivity and implementation, and of responses by partners and organizations.

**Knowledge sharing and information access**

Regionally and continentally, most institutions and organizations conduct little research; generate few publications; and have challenges with communication, dissemination, and knowledge sharing. Most individuals work in silos, seldom sharing information internally or externally. Too few systems are in place for the regional and continental organizations to be “learning bodies.”

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**Figure 4.2 Intended distribution of positions at the NEPAD Agency, 2016**

![Chart showing the intended distribution of positions at the NEPAD Agency, 2016.](source: NEPAD Agency (2014).)
Other challenges facing regional and continental institutions in championing Agenda 2063

The African Union Commission

The AU has become an assertive and forward-looking institution with an objective to accelerate economic and political integration. It has revitalized its institutional architecture, starting with a Constitutive Act that embraces democracy, good governance, integration in the world economy, and a mandate to promote peace and security. The AUC has also assumed a tighter working relationship with the AfDB and UNECA. Yet the AU still labors under weak capabilities, inefficient procedures, weak internal systems, and a complex institutional architecture, as just seen.

One challenge facing the AUC since the AU’s transformation from the Organization of African Unity in 2002 is to build an institution “fit for purpose.” While great efforts have been made in the past decade to do this, the hope was that the institution “in the making” would become effective immediately and meet the expectations of African citizens—but the AUC has not done so. Some key change areas and capacity-related questions include:

- Should the AUC be given executive authority?
- Should the AUC be reduced to curtail duplication and internal overlap?
- What type of personnel should work there? Are paper qualifications enough for professionals required to drive Agenda 2063?
- What performance and accountability measures should be in place for the AUC to be more responsive?
- How best should the AUC relate to the other RECs, member states, and AU organs?

All these questions, and more, need addressing if the AUC is going to be the apex coordinating point for implementing Agenda 2063.

One example of the AU’s structural complexity is that it has about 30 liaison and technical offices in Africa (table 4.3). Some

---

Table 4.3 Some AU technical and liaison offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU technical offices</td>
<td>African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The African Academy of Languages</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-African Phytosanitary Council</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Semi-Arid Food Grains Research and Development project</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre for Linguistic and Historical Studies by Oral Tradition</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Energy Commission</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Observatory of Science, Technology, and Innovation</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AU liaison and field offices for peace and security | Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Liberta, South Sudan, Sudan, Western Sahara, Algiers (Special Office), Kenya (Rear African Union Mission in Somalia headquarters), and Somalia (Forward African Union Mission in Somalia headquarters) | Various |

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
are understaffed, underbudgeted, and have mandates that need revision for Agenda 2063.

The AU also has special representations and envoys for issues and possible crises (table 4.4). Most offices in these two tables are for peace, security, and humanitarian issues, so cannot be used to champion Agenda 2063.

**African Union organs**

The Constitutive Act in creating the AU organs and vesting them with specific powers does not provide sufficient detail for operationalizing such organs. Some critical areas of their work are understaffed and under-resourced, and the organs do not harmonize their initiatives enough.

- **General Assembly and Executive Council.** These organs have worked well, but their work has been concerned primarily with organizing meetings and servicing the decisions and content agenda for AU summits and other meetings. Their other foreseen roles and activities require more consistent attention. They also lack resources and expert support services.

- **Permanent Representatives’ Committee.** This is an important organ, and its areas for oversight responsibilities could usefully be streamlined. This would help reduce its workload and provide additional proactive and operational spaces for the AUC’s work. Its role should be synchronized with the PAP’s as the legislative oversight organ.

- **PSC.** The strategic organ of the AU on peace and security in the continent, the PSC has made strides in coordinating and collaborating with RECs. Operationally, however, new mechanisms are needed to support and rationalize this collaboration beyond the memorandum of understanding they signed. PSC staff capacity must be strengthened in data and information collection and dissemination, risk analysis, and humanitarian issues.

- **Economic, Social, and Cultural Council.** This provides the framework for the African people to engage with the AU. But its institutional set-up is not yet as visible and engaging as it should be. Staff and other constraints seem to be paralyzing its work.

**Table 4.4 AU special representations in Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU Cairo office</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Mission for Mali and Sahel</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy of the AU for the Lord’s Resistance Army Issue; AU–United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur; AU Mission for Mali and Sahel; Chairperson of the High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan; AU Representative on the tripartite team for Humanitarian Assistance to South Kordofan and Blue Nile State; Special Representative for Women, Children, and Armed Conflicts; and High Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NEPAD Agency (2015).*
restructuring its work modalities and coordination frameworks within the AU, making good progress. Yet because NEPAD was originally born with the idea of transforming Africa, its role in Agenda 2063 should be discussed, and its current set-up and capacity revisited.

Regional economic communities

RECs have paid some attention to institutional transformation in line with their mandates. Initiatives range from systems and organizational development to improvements in individual skills (table 4.5).

All RECs are generating regional development plans for implementing mandates and decisions, moving toward three-year planning cycles, though many find this hard given the realities of funding flows and the complexities from new mandates coming from AU summit decisions. It is hard to ensure implementation where budget certainty is limited and plans have to be constantly adjusted.

Each REC has set up a political oversight structure to shape policy decisions and overall direction. They remain reliant, however, on adopting and ratifying instruments before undertaking initiatives, and ultimate authority still usually resides with foreign ministers and with heads of state and government, for whom each REC has to arrange summits (and multiple summit-linked events). Arranging them can be expensive, and although RECs learn from each other and the AU by attending meetings, they could gain by standardizing how they manage such events.

Given their different histories, RECs are at varying stages of formation and capacity. They have some commonality in phasing in economic integration and common policy interventions on trade and flows of goods and people. But they rarely leverage other RECs’ experiences to enhance capacity. Some have moved faster on particular integration issues than others and could share experience on strategies that have been shown to work.

All RECs seem to be gradually expanding their mandates to cover social, economic, and governance issues, irrespective of the issues the REC was created to focus on. Many RECs thus have initiatives in multiple sectors, suggesting that they require far greater capacity (table 4.6).

Table 4.5 Some institutional capacity initiatives among RECs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC</th>
<th>Type of initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>COMESA has undertaken an institutional review and is expanding its capacity. It has institutional strengthening partnerships, largely with the World Bank and AfDB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>ECOWAS is undertaking a large institutional development and change initiative to help it expand. This includes direct skill development initiatives for senior leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>SADC has been driving an institutional change process, improving its systems, structure, and staff capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>ECCAS has launched an institutional strengthening project, receiving AfDB support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>IGAD has launched an Institutional Strengthening Action Programme to enhance its capacity for delivery. It receives support from Nordic countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>CEN-SAD began a project for restructuring in 2007. But there is limited evidence to show that there is ongoing reflection on institutional development. Many of the efforts relate to work in particular sectors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC</th>
<th>Peace, security, and governance</th>
<th>Economic development and trade</th>
<th>Agriculture and environment</th>
<th>Social development</th>
<th>Infrastructure development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Works mainly with the AU on peace and security issues. Not much evidence of internal capacity. Much of the focus is on post-conflict reconstruction capabilities. Has a Committee of Elders, but limited support capacity.</td>
<td>Substantive area of concentration and policy frameworks developed in several areas. But limited focus on capacity enhancement for domestication and implementation.</td>
<td>Party to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), but limited internal capacity for engaging in agricultural policy issues. Some focus on environment and food security policies.</td>
<td>Has programs on particular health issues, but little to suggest holistic capacity for social development. Not a priority.</td>
<td>No focus on infrastructure development. Main efforts are on trade facilitation and economic integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Has historically been active in peace and security. Possesses substantive capacity support, and programs have increased focus on post-conflict reconstruction.</td>
<td>Has established solid capacity in economic development and is active in trade and monetary issues.</td>
<td>Party to the CAADP, but no real evidence of engaged capacity building. Not a priority area.</td>
<td>Has initiatives on sports and cultural areas, but limited in health and education.</td>
<td>Has developed policy frameworks for water and energy, but has little capacity in active infrastructure development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Capacity enhancement in peace and security is mainly in partnership with the AU.</td>
<td>Some economic integration initiatives are underway, but not much evidence of focused capacity enhancement initiatives.</td>
<td>Party to the CAADP, but has few capacity strategies on agriculture and the environment.</td>
<td>Is under pressure from member states to broaden focus, but has little capacity for engaging in social issues.</td>
<td>Projects and initiatives are under way. Substantive support derived for specific infrastructure areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Initiatives have unfolded under the PSC. Has capacity for early warning, deployment, and peacekeeping in partnership with the AUC.</td>
<td>Development and capacity support is focused on trade, including the Programme for Building African Capacity for Trade.</td>
<td>The CAADP is a central approach for capacity enhancement. Intervenes in environmental management and disaster risk management.</td>
<td>No real evidence of capacity initiatives in this area.</td>
<td>Plans for infrastructure have been developed. Support for enhanced capacity received from several sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Has worked closely with the AU. More direct capacity initiatives relate to counter-terrorism. A Peace Fund has been established.</td>
<td>Limited evidence of capacity enhancement in economic integration. Most efforts are in agriculture and infrastructure.</td>
<td>Party to the CAADP, but focus is on drought management and dealing with natural disasters.</td>
<td>Some efforts under way on issues of health and women, but does not appear too active on social issues.</td>
<td>Focus on infrastructure mainly in implementation. Capacity development mainly for specific research initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Initiatives focus on crime. Capacity development mainly through knowledge exchange. Initiatives are unfolding in governance.</td>
<td>Has launched initiatives to support member states. Support comes mainly from the United States Agency for International Development Southern African Global Competitiveness Hub program.</td>
<td>Party to the CAADP, but no capacity initiatives are evident.</td>
<td>Some capacity support initiatives are in place with regional centers of excellence in particular areas. Has some joint social initiatives.</td>
<td>Has ongoing infrastructure projects, all with some form of capacity enhancement integrated with project implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>No evidence of capacity enhancement initiatives in this area beyond AU-led initiatives.</td>
<td>Studies conducted but no evidence of focused capacity initiatives. Past focus on investments through specialized agency.</td>
<td>Has established initiatives, but most are at policy level with little capacity for implementing them.</td>
<td>Little evidence of active initiatives.</td>
<td>Initiatives have emerged focused on conceptualization. Little active capacity development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Has not really been active in peace, security, and governance issues, partly due to complex internal and inter-member state relations.</td>
<td>Some policy effort and a regional bank. But efforts seem limited.</td>
<td>Has conducted some policy work on desertification. Not very active in the CAADP-related initiatives.</td>
<td>Little evidence of active initiatives.</td>
<td>Had some small projects in the past.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African Peer Review Mechanism

The APRM began within the NEPAD Agency to promote economic, political, and corporate governance. It is now a semi-independent institution under the AU system, created and driven by Africans for Africans. It is remodeling itself to align its work processes with Agenda 2063 and to promote compliance with these aspects of governance. It is also a voluntary self-assessment mechanism for AU member states to consolidate and institutionalize democratic governance, but such voluntarism renders it hard for the entity to broadly push and promote governance and peer review for every African country.

The Pan-African Parliament

The parliament’s aim is to promote representing common Africans and their grassroots organizations in the decisions and deliberations of AU policy organs. Its mandate is to "exercise advisory and consultative powers only" to AU policy organs, for which it is given the authority to pass resolutions and make recommendations on matters important to Africa, but not, however, the oversight and legislative powers that would make it a strong enforcement body for Agenda 2063.

The AU in 2012 set up the African Governance Architecture and the African Governance Platform as political and institutional frameworks for promoting, harmonizing, and coordinating democracy, governance, and human rights. The Platform is an arm to help dialogue, information exchange, and joint action among regional, national, and continental governance actors.

Capacity set 2: Change and transformative capacities

The Capacity Team reviewed the prevalence of change and transformative capacities in regional and continental institutions (figure 4.3).

The team also administered online questionnaires to African stakeholder groups (diaspora, academia, think tanks, private sector, civil society, youth and women’s networks, and Africans working in international organizations), to ascertain their perception on the prevalence of

Figure 4.3 The prevalence of regional and continental change and transformative capacities

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.

Note: Capacities are rated from 0–9, where (approximately) 1–3 are low, 4–6 are medium, and 7–9 are high.
change and transformation capacities in such institutions (figure 4.4).

**Capacity set 3: Composite capacities**

The composite capacities of regional and continental organizations were reviewed in four groups:

- **Strategic planning** (the most prevalent group—figure 4.5): strategic planning; critical/strategic thinking; and results-based management.

- **Program development, management, and financing**: ownership financing; program development; mobilizing domestic resources; and project planning and implementation.

- **Facilitation**: leveraging assets; partnership management and development; communication and awareness creation; coordination and organizational capability; and process facilitation and organizational skills (including “functional” capacities).

- **Knowledge and risk management**: risk management and mitigation; management of development cooperation; knowledge systems to drive change/ transformation; and critical support systems and processes, including the use of technology and innovation.

Although the figure shows that institutions adopt planning strategies and mechanisms, a finding from strategic planning documents is that little attention is paid to critical strategic thinking and results-based management,

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**Figure 4.4 African stakeholders’ perspective on regional and continental change and transformative capacities**

**Percent**

- Top leadership and management optimism 4%
- People motivated for a shared inspirational vision 4%
- Innovation and invention commitments 12%
- Transformational culture 8%
- ICT and technological predisposition 8%
- Risk management abilities 8%
- Ownership of decision making 16%
- Change readiness attitudes 12%
- Spirit of Pan-Africanism 20%

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
which are key elements. Similarly, insufficient focus is given to implementing activities and to mobilizing domestic resources to finance programs and projects. The figure also suggests that capacity to leverage assets, generate data, and communicate and raise awareness is low, as is that for knowledge systems.

Capacity set 4: Critical, technical, and sector-specific skills

The Capacity Team pursued preliminary work on the skills needed for implementing Agenda 2063. Full details are in a related document, *African Critical Technical Skills: Key Capacity Dimensions Needed for the First 10 Years of Agenda 2063*. This section highlights engineering, manufacturing, and construction; physicians and other health workers; and higher education institutions, including production of graduates.

Engineering, manufacturing, and construction

Professionals in these fields will constitute a key capacity base for Agenda 2063, especially in delivering the flagship projects. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa will need about 2.5 million new engineers.

The graduates in selected countries grew by 139 percent in 2009–2014, with Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Swaziland producing more graduates in engineering, manufacturing, and construction. Absolute numbers remain low, however, in most of the countries (figures 4.6 and 4.7).

Physicians and other health workers

See table 4.7.

Higher education institutions and graduate production

Table 4.8 provides an idea of current graduate production in the African educational system. (Updated data now show an estimated 2,600 universities, colleges, and technical institutions, rather than 2,271, with an estimated 775 public and 226 private universities.)
Status of African youth and women

Youth

Youth empowerment and participation is an uncontested concept in political modernity, whether in economic and political debates or academic discourse. The Population Reference Bureau reports that the African population is 1.136 billion, with 41 percent under the age of 15, and 65 percent under 35, offering a phenomenal potential dividend given the improved educational standards and advanced uptake of technology among...
### Table 4.7 Density of physicians, nurses, and midwives and required rate of workforce growth according to population growth rates in 12 African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Physicians, nurses, and midwives per 1,000 population</th>
<th>Annual net growth (%)</th>
<th>Annual population growth (%)</th>
<th>Required annual workforce growth (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scenario I</td>
<td>Scenario II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>−0.7</td>
<td>−2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>−1.3</td>
<td>−2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>−2.5</td>
<td>−4.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>−1.0</td>
<td>−2.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>−2.3</td>
<td>−3.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>−3.8</td>
<td>−5.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>−1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the World Health Organization (2015).

### Table 4.8 Higher education institutions in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Polytechnics</th>
<th>Colleges</th>
<th>Institutes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep. of</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Africa</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 4.8 Higher education institutions in Africa (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Polytechnics</th>
<th>Colleges</th>
<th>Institutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>Swaziland</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Africa</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>775</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

African youth (figure 4.8). Many have distinguished themselves as entrepreneurs, academics, and political leaders of global repute.

Africa has the youngest population in the world and Agenda 2063 recognizes this youth cohort as the continent’s demographic dividend. But the sheer size of Africa’s youth population is not enough to guarantee its value in Africa’s development, since its current condition threatens to keep it locked outside systems of production and decision making. About 10 million young Africans enter the labor market each year, with less than 22 percent absorbed by the African public sector and less than 8 percent by the private sector. The bulk is either unemployed, in insecure employment, or self-employed within the African informal sector. About 300,000 young people attempt to leave Africa each year as economic migrants or refugees to North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Australasia. In the last three years alone, about 10,000 have died on the seas, often as victims of human traffickers.

Only when Africa makes a real investment to increase capacities and opportunities among its young people will they represent a real dividend.

In addition, despite being the majority, those under 35 are marginalized in political, social, institutional, economic, and religious spheres. This contrasts with the past where youth were involved in championing great movements in Africa that led to today’s political landscape. But the majority’s voice is oppressed. Young people may be creative and innovative but do not get the support to achieve their dreams. Planning for the continent’s development does not involve youth, who are often only considered in the post-planning phases.

While most countries in the west are adjusting their policies to cater to growing elderly populations, Africa is not gearing its policies to support and enable a fast-growing youth and child population. There is not enough emphasis on creating sustainable policies for health, education, and housing systems, or on investing in youth as creators, innovators, and industrialists. As a result, enormous pressure

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**Figure 4.8 Summary of key capacity elements of African youth**

**The condition of African youth**

- 10 million young Africans enter the labor market annually; only 30% are absorbed
- There are 2,295 universities/institutes in Africa

**Graduation program areas from 2009–2014:**

- Education programs = 108,247
- Health sciences = 44,150
- Agriculture = 24,392
- Engineering, manufacturing, and construction = 76,648

**65% of Africa’s population is under 35 years old**

*Source: ACBF Capacity Team Presentation, 2015.*
has been placed on Africa’s resources, especially housing, services, and livelihoods, made worse because 40 percent of the population is living in urban areas.

There must therefore be a conscious effort to include youth—otherwise, current planning is akin to building a house for someone who has no use for it.

**Women**

The plethora of challenges facing women in Africa are not insurmountable, and Africa has the potential to turn the tide for Africa’s women with clear, focused, and committed action. But a sense of urgency has to be injected in current programs to reverse the continued exclusion and vulnerability of African women, engaging them in all three of the earlier dimensions (see figure 2.1 for example). Implementing Agenda 2063 must begin from the premise that the Agenda will aim to mainstream and integrate programs for women (and youth). Over and above this, some sectoral and technical areas in Agenda 2063 lend themselves to a special focus on women, particularly rural women and young women.

Agenda 2063 aspires for an Africa where women play their rightful role in all spheres of life, are free from abuse and discrimination, and are able to enjoy a full range of social, economic, and political rights. These aspirations are sound and noble, but the current condition of Africa’s women is very different.

Women make up 50 percent of Africa’s population, but 62 percent of illiterate adults in Sub-Saharan Africa, implying that they are not in a position to take up emerging opportunities for industry, enterprise, and innovation. Their participation rate in economic activity is equally poor: 70 percent of women are in the informal sector, and only 1 in 26 are in senior management, compared with 1 in 6 men (figure 4.9). In seven of Africa’s largest economies, only 32.7 percent of women are in the labor force. Women make up some 70 percent of Africa’s agricultural labor and they produce 90 percent of food.

**Figure 4.9 Summary of current capacity elements of African women**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The condition of African women</th>
<th>50% of Africa’s population is female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only 32.7% participate in the labor force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only 28% in technical training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70% in informal sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70% of agricultural labor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75% of those displaced in armed conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ACBF Capacity Team Presentation, 2015.*
Most African youth and children are female, and their potential is unlimited. Evidence already shows that they are early adopters of technology and innovation. A mass investment in training and educating African female youth could change the work landscape and dramatically increase enterprise and innovations in Africa. Investing in girls and women, especially in education, reproductive health, and child marriage prevention, is key to Africa’s demographic transition.

Problems common to youth and women

The capacity needs assessment for delivering Agenda 2063 showed that various soft capacities under dimension 1 were missing, especially those related to capacity to transform and capacity to lead (with exceptions — box 4.1). At the center of this was a glaring absence of youth and women in leadership and decision-making roles, and an imbalance in the employment demographics of key institutions. This has three possible explanations: a failure to employ and support youth and women through the institutions’ employment pipeline; insufficient attention to building the capacity of youth and women to lead and manage; and a reluctance to create real opportunities for youth and women to take up leadership roles.

Umbrella capacities

The Capacity Team also examined “umbrella capacities” that Africa needs to promote and protect its interests, particularly in today’s globalized world with pervasive interests of global actors. It found that the continent is still weak in the following 10 such capacities:

- Ensuring continental security.
- Achieving true ownership of African funds and natural resources.
- Using outer space satellite technology to monitor Africa’s resources.
- Owning and managing its currency arrangements.
- Negotiating with global actors with one voice.
- Using, analyzing, and generating its own data.

Box 4.1 Promising capacity practices in Africa: Some examples

- Rwanda’s parliament is 64 percent women.
- Ethiopia increased its universities over 12 years from two to 34 in 2012.
- Benin’s Songhai Centre innovatively promotes agriculture, youth entrepreneurship, and sustainable development.

Source: United Nations (UN) (2013), Burnett (2014), and Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services (n.d.).
• Promoting and optimizing technology and innovation to place Africa ahead of some global progress curves.

• Developing and ensuring a true African ideological grounding of Agenda 2063. This should aim to enhance pride; belief; committed actions; and collective ownership by all Africans; encourage a new African solidarity agenda; and promote free movement of Africans within the continent.

The absence or dearth of African continental capacity in most of these areas is a serious hindrance to achieving Agenda 2063’s transformation dimensions.

**Technology and innovation capacity: The new capacity frontier**

Technology—particularly ICT—is a key capacity area for attaining Agenda 2063. Fast-rising “positive” disruptors will most likely change human life and overall social capacities in major ways, starting in the very near future (table 4.9).

The Capacity Team believes that five main technologies can help Africa vastly increase its capacity for attaining Agenda 2063. The Team describes them in *African Critical Technical Skills: Key Capacity Dimensions Needed for the First 10 Years of Agenda 2063*.

**The African diaspora**

The diaspora is growing in virtually all parts of the globe. One main challenge is therefore to connect the children born abroad to the values and vision of Africa, including the Pan-Africanist ideology.³

Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development database on immigrants show that Africa ranks the highest in losing its highly educated citizens through migration: 10.2 percent of them are migrants.⁴ Figure 4.10 presents a focused snapshot of migrants’ education.

Figures 4.11 and 4.12 highlight diaspora numbers.

**Africa’s current development conundrum: Capacity as the missing link to achieve Agenda 2063’s vision**

In assessing the capacities needed for Agenda 2063, it was noted that the resolutions from the 1963 Organization of African Unity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.9 Mobile penetration in Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015: Where are we?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global population: 7.25 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>African population: 1.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Internet penetration: 3.1 billion/40% of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Internet penetration: 308 million/26.6% of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global unique mobile subscriptions: 3.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African mobile subscriptions: 726 million/66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UN (2015) and Wilkinson and Chiumia (2014).*

*Note: The McKinsey Global Institute predicts that 12 disruptive technologies will alter global social and economic systems, and that business and policy leaders must understand which technologies will matter to them, and prepare accordingly. First comes the mobile Internet, becoming increasingly inexpensive since mobile devices are becoming more capable computing devices.*
Figure 4.10 Selected educational profiles of Africans abroad by birth country, 2008–2012

Source: Gambino, Trevelyan, and Fitzwater (2014).

Figure 4.11 African diaspora in Europe (selected countries)

Source: Extracted and compiled by ACBF Capacity Team from Dumont, Spielvogel, and Widmaier (2010).
Summit stated and strategized approaches for handling some of the issues still being grappled with. This points to a disconnect between the ability to plan and envision, versus capacity to deliver. The reasons for such a disconnect are, understandably, both internal failures of determination, and external distractions.

Institutions that have been set up have not fully lived up to delivery expectations on development outcomes. To compound this, the drivers of Africa’s economic growth or demise have often come from outside Africa. Even more troubling is that Africa seems to be content with the slow progress and growth rates, and this raises the question of the standards held in its people’s minds.

It therefore seems that Africa has not been fully liberated but rather her minds have been pampered and flattered with phrases from the west such as “Africa is rising,” leading the continent to become lazy and think that the goal has been achieved.

Africa is a continent of richness yet its people are living in poverty, but this was not always the case. When united, Africa has been known to move forward out of times of strife, first against colonialism and now against the new enemy: poverty. So it is important to find a unifying cause to create a similar capacity momentum to go forward with Agenda 2063, just as was done during colonization. Such a cause will bind the continent, and give the people the sense of urgency for
realizing Agenda 2063 as a whole. They can stop worrying about Africa’s problems by, for example, focusing on lack of capital, lack of infrastructure, or inefficient use of resources as issues to tackle separately.

For Africa to really “rise,” there needs to be a transformative agenda of mind-set and ownership, a positive narrative and a real, productive outcome as a result. The continent needs the capacity to realize this dream.
Chapter 4 shows that a fundamental shift is required in the African psyche. Agenda 2063, as formulated, presents a framework for attaining the AU vision. But for the whole vision to materialize, it needs to be anchored on a deeper existential paradigm, identity, and ideology. There is therefore a need to ensure that, parallel to implementing priority programs and projects, conscious action is taken toward inculcating norms and values that underlie the mind-set transformation needed to attain the AU vision. There is an urgent need to frame and articulate a compelling ideological motivation to unite Africans for the Agenda 2063 imperative for transformation, toward “The Africa We Want.”

Making institutions fit for purpose

Regional and continental institutions

Agenda 2063 envisages a continent that ensures that it plans, speaks, and acts as one: a continent with performance actions on delivering collective aspirations and interests and expectations of its citizens. These expectations require us to reexamine the current continental, regional, and national institutions with a view to answering the question: Are they fit for purpose?

The institutional landscape of regional and continental organizations is crowded, and the impact of contributions rarely matches their growing numbers. Some rationalization could usefully be considered in the context of Agenda 2063.

Specifically, their mandates need to be clarified and harmonized, and turf wars and duplicated efforts reduced. Operationally, many of their functions and work systems require reengineering to render the organizations more results-focused and less bureaucratic. Such steps are tied to better governance and enforcement capacities. It might be useful, for example, to reduce the transaction costs that stem from “processes” such as meetings (often involving experts, ministers, and heads of state and government).

Crucially, new ways need to be found to strengthen implementation: focus, M&E, capacities, and accountability for results. This means that human capacity and staffing for regional and continental institutions needs to be based on qualified people who are “Pan-Africanists.” Programs could also be held to implant Pan-Africanist attitudes for staff of the various organs and secretariats.

In the next five years, organizations should update or undertake transformational institutional reforms informed by Agenda 2063’s vision and its seven aspirations (see table 3.1). Likewise, the organizations’ recruitment policies should be heavily reoriented to increase youth (male and female).

Specific institutions

AUC. The AUC should be urgently restructured for greater capacity, to better align its set-up to the spirit and content of Agenda 2063 and its First 10-Year Implementation Plan. One element will be to streamline its working systems, cutting departments and decentralizing its responsibilities.

Consideration needs to be given to enabling the AUC chairperson to exercise greater powers as
chief executive, with full authority to manage the Commission (with appropriate performance rewards and sanctions over staff and senior officers). Another fundamental proposal is to review the Constitution, by a commission headed by the PAP (composed of heads of state and government, advisers, and REC executives).

Finally, the AUC might be converted into the main executive organ of the Executive Council for the Assembly’s decisions. (This would take account of the Commission’s proposed streamlining.)

RECs. Consideration should be given to transforming RECs into integral parts of the AU, serving as regional AU commissions. This would help tighten coherence in planning, implementation, and decision making. It would also mean that RECs’ decisions and positions would ultimately be adopted continentally, at AU summits. A detailed framework and mechanisms would need to be developed.

RECs should be renamed to reflect the regional focus of their roles and responsibilities in the context of the overall organic AU institutional architecture of the continent. And consideration should be given to having five RECs instead of eight, each representing an AU region.

NEPAD. The role of NEPAD in the context of Agenda 2063 should be discussed, with reference to the original NEPAD ideal, the AUC’s current functioning, and other secretariat institutions.

APRM. Consideration should be given to transforming voluntary accession to the APRM into a requirement, given widespread agreement across the continent on the importance of democratic governance. Consideration should be given to renaming it to better reflect its role as a governance-promotion entity.

PAP. It would be groundbreaking if the PAP could fulfill its function as a legislative authority, as initially expected. In more incremental fashion, reforms and further capacity assessment would be useful in the next few years.

Allocating roles and responsibilities for Agenda 2063

Regional and continental organizations

Table 5.1 could be a useful starting point in allocating roles and responsibilities for implementing Agenda 2063 among the AUC, PAP, RECs, APRM, NEPAD, and other stakeholders. The organizations’ roles and responsibilities for advancing the Agenda are given in figures 5.1–5.4.

Other stakeholders

Allocating roles and responsibilities should promote wider ownership, allowing other stakeholders to help deliver the flagship programs and other initiatives.

The private sector (economic operators) should have key organizing roles for flagship and other major projects, and a lead role in promoting resource mobilization from the business sector and investing in innovation and new products. Academia should have a lead role in transforming and reinventing education, and in developing a continental educational curriculum around the three dimensions, instilling a Pan-African spirit. For their part, CSOs should advocate for mindset transformation and an African ownership agenda, including implementing and domesticking Agenda 2063 nationally; contributing to reviewing and monitoring people-centered activities among grassroots populations; and monitoring whether targets are met.

Faith-based organizations should have a lead role in inculcating ethics, morals, and values,
while think tanks should focus on research, data generation and collection, future analysis, and scenario planning. Youth organizations would be well placed to plan and implement Agenda 2063’s programs, as would women’s organizations for their constituents. African celebrities, including sports and cultural personalities, will be excellent ambassadors for Africa’s transformative vision.

The diaspora can contribute to Agenda 2063’s priorities and initiatives, particularly the flagship projects, and mobilize resources. Finally, Enhancing implementation capacities

To strengthen adoption, use, and coordination of key implementation capacities, the following approaches are proposed.
Figure 5.2 Roles and responsibilities of RECs

- Exercising decentralized responsibilities for Agenda 2063, including the seven aspirations, flagship, and major programs
- Promoting and harmonizing joint efforts to address trade, governance, socioeconomic development, movement and integration of goods and people, and other specific issue areas
- Promoting and undertaking operational measures for mobilizing domestic resources for Agenda 2063 from within the region
- Promoting and developing initiatives and operational measures for a robust science, innovation, and technology agenda: including planning, harmonizing, and retaining critical technical skills
- Implementing regional, continental, and cross-country programs and projects

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.

Figure 5.3 Roles and responsibilities of the NEPAD Agency

- In the spirit of Agenda 2063, the NEPAD agency’s role needs to be clarified
- Possible area of focus: development planning, development knowledge, development intelligence, African development paradigm, and anticipating the future
- Systems to manage and monitor Africa’s resources and to interpret what has been captured
- Mobilizing resources for Africa’s development, including recapturing illicit financial flows
- NEPAD could also have a role for research, knowledge, Africa data development, and promoting an African scientific and technological innovation agenda

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.

Figure 5.4 Roles and responsibilities of the APRM and PAP

- APRM
  - Rename and realign the APRM
  - Focus on political, corporate, and economic governance reviews and action plans
  - Lead redesign of a peer review modality
- PAP
  - Fully empowered as a legislative authority of the continental AU governance system to play an effective oversight role of the AU organs and institutions

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
Set up, immediately, a central entity. This is to push forward arrangements and mobilization for urgent work to deliver on the first 10-year plan, including:

- Domesticating Agenda 2063: supporting and encouraging member states to prepare “national Agenda 2063 frameworks” to enhance domestication.

- Creating a movement for promoting Agenda 2063 awareness.

- Encouraging decentralization to promote inclusiveness of other stakeholders such as youth, women, and the private sector.

- Using existing universities and member states to task national institutions of higher learning with developing curricula on Pan-Africanism.

- Undertaking capacity assessment in selected countries across the continent’s five regions.

Adopt a well-decentralized approach for implementing the first 10-year plan and Agenda 2063 overall. A decentralized plan for implementation should be articulated, discussed, and agreed on, reflecting the idea that substantive responsibilities on achieving the targets and aspirations need to be understood by and duly credited to African countries, RECs, and other regional organizations. This plan needs to build on the subsidiarity of regions and member states.

Involve key stakeholder groups. Beyond intergovernmental institutions, there is a need for identifying, negotiating with, “bringing on board,” and crediting (including identifying incentives for) key stakeholder groups to lead actions. (These groups include the “other stakeholders” in the previous section.)

Identify program activities for the first 10-year plan. This will help progressively identify and mobilize key resources and capacities, using the newly adopted 10-year plan as the basis. It will also help centralize and coordinate capacities from actors to be involved in each target and priority area, and provide an opportunity for including or fleshing out other targets and priorities identified by region, country, or stakeholder group.

Increase capacity for greater ownership, by preparing “national Agenda 2063” documents. To help domesticate Agenda 2063, consideration should be given to urging interested countries to quickly prepare national Agenda 2063 documents. Such documents would capture both the provisions in the documents produced continentally, including parts of the first 10-year plan, and offer summary reflections of each country’s own priorities. Some could be translated into local languages, boosting capacity for greater ownership and committed synchronization of priority initiatives. There is also a need to devise practical ways of obtaining finance to prevent the hijacking of original African ideas by other nations.

Promote a new belief, a mind-set transformation, and an African commitment and confidence to build a new tomorrow from today: The mind-set and ownership transformation, emphasized in the resolution of African heads of state during their recent summit in South Africa, is arguably the most important strategic dimension of Agenda 2063 (see box 2.1). Since this requires a proper ideological grounding of Africans through sensitization, commitment building/indoctrination, and so on, brainstorming and content preparation should be initiated at once, drawing on stakeholder groups, key thought leaders, passionate Pan-Africanists, and African institutional establishments. The urgency of this for ensuring sustained
approaches, negotiating/fighting capacity, and tactical intelligence capacity cannot be overemphasized.

**Promoting mind-set change and transformative capacities**

Table 5.2 further outlines some of the major actions needed.

**Making youth a central capacity pillar**

- Put in place arrangements for transferring responsibility for driving and planning aspects of Agenda 2063 related to youth.

- Harness the value and likely high returns of youth, and niche areas where the real potential is yet to be fully tapped for Africa’s development culture, with the aim of “reloaded” youth development and empowerment.

- Use African youth channels to increase awareness to promote their ownership and commitment to the Agenda.

- Bring more youth into continental, regional, and national institutions.

- Promote capacity development and a learning culture that allows for greater application of indigenous knowledge forms, adaptation of foreign knowledge and its domestication, and diversification of knowledge and information sources to design youth leadership and empowerment programs.

- Promote access to and exchange of tools, knowledge, strategies, information, experiences, and new technology to increase and strengthen young people’s involvement in the economic, social, and political life of their countries.

- Design and implement youth employment and entrepreneurship programs along value chains in partnership with the private and public sectors in critical areas.

- Strengthen vocational, graduate, postgraduate, and on-the-job training to ensure that educational qualifications are best suited for meeting the market’s needs and for strengthening African small and medium enterprises.

- Establish and strengthen platforms for tripartite social dialogue among labor unions, employers’ bodies, and youth organizations.

- Enhance the capacities of African governments and AU organs and institutions to engage African youth in eight areas:
  - Accelerating Africa’s transformation by increasing self-belief, self-confidence, and either rewriting the narrative or writing a new narrative for Pan-Africanism and African renaissance.
  - Strengthening Africa’s knowledge and innovation economies through innovative cross- and multi-sectoral partnerships that help bridge skill gaps by creating knowledge networks.
  - Participating in AU organs, institutions, and decision-making processes.
  - Participating in regional integration, decision-making processes, and national strategy development.
  - Engaging in civic matters, including human rights and governance; rural development and governance; peacebuilding in
## Table 5.2 Mind-set and transformative change capacities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda 2063 transformation drivers</th>
<th>Indicative actions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mind-set change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African value systems</td>
<td>Develop and agree on an African value system and a Pan-African concept that transcends cultures, traditions, and physical boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-African perspective</td>
<td>Inculcate these values throughout the African population, including schools, families, and work places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African development paradigm</td>
<td>Inculcate these as part of the social system from birth (these values should not be an add on, but rather a fundamental aspect of every African’s life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African solidarity liberation</td>
<td>Fast-track the people-to-people integration process (countries do not make for integration, people do)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Learn from the history of liberation struggles—share “what made it happen” and promote a culture of self-driven change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-awareness and self-confidence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inculcate African values and history at all levels</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embrace Africa’s history and current challenges as a responsibility and task to work on, toward Agenda 2063</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build social networks and alliances to encourage unity, self-sacrifice, and solidarity among Africans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance and evaluative culture</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage individuals to have a sense of duty and accountability toward the common good. The 2063 Agenda requires everyone to work 24/7/365</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promote a culture of drive, purpose, and collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ownership of African development agenda</td>
<td>Reduce the distance between the leadership and the people to engender hope, ownership, and relevance of the Agenda</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promote the Agenda with all people, and live by example. For instance, leadership cannot have two lives, one simple, and one elitist, just to get the vote</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce the Agenda 2063 messages to the simple language relating to what matters to people in their stakeholder groups. This includes using “calls to action” and promoting representative principles such as “driven, purposeful, and collaborative”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure that the outreach makes everyone see their role in, and potential benefit from, Agenda 2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable, competitive, and transformative leadership</td>
<td>Be futuristic and knowledgeable, not just of today or yesterday. Leaders needs to articulate not just their countries’ vision, but that of the continent</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promote leadership that is competitive at all levels and all times (not just in winning elections). The continent’s competitiveness will be derived from the sum competitiveness of its leaders</td>
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<td>Embrace the African value system of unity, sacrifice, and the interest of the common good, not just the nation state</td>
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<td>Responsive institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establish institutions that are fit for purpose</td>
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<td>Harmonize and rationalize institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strengthen institutional mandates and modes of delivery and end the worship of individuals (as now)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instil institutional values to sustain the Agenda, and not transitory individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of the African brand and narrative</td>
<td>Develop an outreach program (either regional or country specific) for Agenda 2063, to reach all segments of society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop relevant messages that will be part of an outreach and communication program for Agenda 2063</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish “development envoys” for Agenda 2063 to champion its core tenets (not just peace and security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage universities to undertake research and publications and to tell the African story to the African audience and the rest of the world (felt, seen, told, lived, and written by us). This can take the form of essay competitions, and so on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable democratic developmental states and institutions</td>
<td>Put people at the center of development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conceive development in terms of human development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set and implement higher standards for human development than the Millennium Development Goals/ Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Have the confidence to refuse aid that does not fit into the continent’s priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement long-term high-impact programs that also create employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of African resources</td>
<td>Ascertain Africa’s continental, regional, and national resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake an intergenerational map of the continent’s human resources, their skills, and expertise, and determine how they can help implement Agenda 2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ascertain the number of Africans in the diaspora, resources at their disposal, and their skills and expertise, and determine how they can help with Agenda 2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use current financial resources prudently; avoid waste and “political” projects that benefit only a few</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACBF Capacity Team.
light of more youth radicalization and the politicization of faith; and urban development and governance in light of rapid and sometimes chaotic urbanization.

- Engaging in environmental justice, climate change, and natural resource management.
- Participating in the economy, including in self-employment and employment in infrastructure; financial services; trade and industry; ICT and other technology; and agriculture and agro-based industries.
- Participating in extractive industries, including in the beneficiation of raw materials and through local content policies (local procurement), that is, building capacities that help Africa transition from being a resource-rich, relatively poor continent.

**Making women a central capacity pillar**

- Transform AU institutions over the next five years to reflect continental demographics, especially ensuring that women (and youth) lead key structures and processes within AU agencies.

- Commit member states in the next five years to adopt policies allowing and enabling women (and youth) to occupy key national leadership roles in business, government, and nongovernmental sectors.

- Adopt women’s (and youths’) representation and decision making in key continental, regional, and national institutions.

- Establish processes to increase the capacity of youth and women to lead and manage institutions and processes.

- Begin implementing Agenda 2063 with the aim to mainstream and integrate programs for women.

- Focus institutions on the agriculture sector—the full value chain from production to distribution—leveraging the skills, knowledge, and commitment of rural African women. (Through better livelihoods, women can access health care and provide their children with education and better nutrition.) This will require:
  - Pursuing programs to support and strengthen women farmers, entrepreneurs, and industrialists to leverage women’s potential as leaders and innovators in agriculture.
  - Putting the leadership of Africa’s green revolution in the hands of African rural women.

- Engage women’s capacities in STEM.

**Retaining and using capacity wisely**

- Develop national policies to enhance capacity use and retention.

- Create skill-based networks where professionals abroad can train and add to Africa’s human capital.

- Perceive the diaspora as a potential asset to transfer best practices from the developed world.

- Design policies to decrease the restrictions created by dual citizenship on those who wish to return to the continent.

- Implement short-term skill transfer projects for members of the diaspora to come to Africa temporarily.
• Propose tax arrangements with host countries to remunerate the home country.

• Engage in international agreements with wealthy countries not to recruit skilled people from developing countries, including African nations.

• Track and monitor the situation of youth who should be entering the labor market annually.

• Create a new working pact involving academia and the private and public sectors to enhance employability by focusing training on meeting job market needs.

Enhancing capacity through technology and the data revolution

• Share strategic intelligence on planning and development.

• Use and strengthen institutions of higher learning for policy and development planning to embed Agenda 2063 policies not only in politics but also in rigorous research.

• Promote a data revolution where Africa controls its own data collection, generation, and interpretation.

• Take advantage of the new technological conveners or influencers such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Google, and so on.

• Dedicate government departments to handle connectivity to accelerate the effort.

• Create an enabling environment for private investment in telecoms and for government oversight and clear policies on ICT, driving connectivity in Africa.

• Increase connections between tech players and policy makers, building support during the implementation phase.

• Cultivate youth’s interest in STEM.

• Create innovation centers to pool funds and ideas, and to create technology and entrepreneurship communities.

Instilling Pan-Africanism through Agenda 2063

• Create incentives, including through funding, for universities to incorporate Pan-Africanism and Agenda 2063 into academic curricula. Universities could incorporate Pan-Africanism into social studies courses, for example.

• Create a mechanism to formulate and articulate the content of Pan-African curricula, capturing the older generation’s knowledge. Find social and other kinds of expressions that capture Pan-Africanism.

• Project Pan-Africanism in all its forms through society and institutions.

Creating an African capacity movement for promoting Agenda 2063

• Regard Agenda 2063 almost as a transformative agenda rather than a development agenda.

• Instill greater ownership in the endeavor by identifying mobilizing themes that resonate with African stakeholder groups.

• Promote Agenda 2063 as “Agenda Now Now” to convey a sense of urgency.
• Mobilize Africans into a movement behind the new vision, keeping in mind the “Africa We Don’t Want.”

Increasing Africa’s capacities in future analysis and scenario planning

• Enable and encourage nonstate actors to contribute to scenario planning, especially encouraging centers of excellence to advance research and analysis.

• Continently or regionally, allocate responsibility for future analysis and scenario planning to one institution.

• Institutionalize mechanisms for scenario planning to feed into policy making.

• Ensure that future analysis and scenario planning engage with a broad range of stakeholders, especially youth and women.

Boosting critical, technical, and sector-specific skills

• Create an expertise pool on such skills, which are important for the flagship projects.

• Design and invest in massive advanced and vocational training in STEM and critical technical skills.

• Design approaches for engaging and using the skills of the diaspora.

Other broad recommendations

• Develop and implement refresher training for key staff of regional and continental organizations in the composite capacity areas of strategic planning, program development, finance and management, knowledge and risk management, and facilitation and coordination.

• Develop and implement regional and continental training programs in soft skills (as defined in the earlier “Soft skills” subsection) for change and transformative leadership.

• Quickly develop continental strategies under AUC leadership for ensuring the 10 umbrella capacities (see “Umbrella capacities” above) that are needed for realizing Agenda 2063’s vision.

Additional considerations for deepening cross-cutting capacity

In addition to the capacity issues covered in this document, capacity in the following cross-cutting areas needs to be boosted:

• Future leadership and future management in the continent.

• Governance and management of Agenda 2063 implementation at all levels.

• Continental entrepreneurship.

• The private sector’s role.

• Readiness to face risks and threats.

• Management of the external environment’s impact on Agenda 2063.

The new African vision is buttressed with a new belief: Africa “can do,” “must do,” “will do,” and “will be.” This great continent is blessed with human and natural resources in a way that is second to none.
NOTES

1. AU and NEPAD Agency (2012).

2. These flagship projects are listed in box 3.1.

3. As read with the protocol establishing the African Economic Community, and the constitutive acts for RECs and other AU organs.

4. This topic is more fully developed in the just-cited document.

REFERENCES


The June 2015 AU Ministerial Retreat of the Executive Council and the Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa emphasized the importance of the capacity dimensions for delivering on Agenda 2063. The Executive Council proposed that the finalized capacity assessment work should highlight the critical skills needed and the role of universities in providing training.

The work on Capacity Dimensions for Agenda 2063 was initiated by the AUC, with close support of the ACBF, which has produced three documents:

- **African Critical Technical Skills: Key Capacity Dimensions Needed for the First 10 Years of Agenda 2063.**
- **Capacity Requirements for the New African Vision: Agenda 2063—"The Africa We Want."**
- **Capacity Development Plan Framework: Buttressing Implementation of the First 10-Year Plan—"The Africa We Want."**

The AUC's highlighting of the importance of capacity dimensions for Agenda 2063 has been one of the missing links in previous development efforts. This time, implementation will be from a proper understanding of the capacity requirements (as encapsulated in this document) and accompanied by a capacity development plan framework.

This report provides a conceptual and operational framing of imperatives and capacity issues required for delivering Agenda 2063. The findings are derived from high-level interviews and discussions with key organizations, initial consultations with other key stakeholders and knowledgeable individuals, and analytical work.